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Abstract 
This thesis is an investigation into the unique rural banking system in Ghana and the 
role of information systems in fraud control. It presents a robust information security 
and internal control model to deal with fraud for the banking system. The rural banking 
industry has been noted for poor internal control leading to fraud. This has resulted in 
poor performance and even the collapse of some banks. The Focus of the study was on 
the processes used to deliver banking services.  
To design a protection system, a number of rural banks were visited. This was to 
understand the environment, regulatory regimes and the structure and banking 
processes of the industry and banks. Systemic vulnerabilities within the industry which 
could be exploited for fraud were found. The lack of structures like an address system 
and unreliable identification documents makes it difficult to use conventional 
identification processes. Also the lack of adequate controls, small staff numbers and the 
cross organisational nature of some transactions among other cultural issues reduces the 
ability to implement transaction controls. Twenty fraud scenarios were derived to 
illustrate the manifestation of these vulnerabilities.  
The rural banking integrity model was developed to deal with these observations. This 
protection model was developed using existing information security models and 
banking control mechanisms but incorporating the nature of the rural banking industry 
and culture of its environment. The fraud protection model was tested against the fraud 
scenarios and was shown to meet the needs of the rural banking industry in dealing 
with its systemic vulnerabilities. The proposed community-based identification scheme 
deals with identification weaknesses as an alternative to conventional identity 
verification mechanisms. The Transaction Authentication Code uses traditional adinkra 
symbols.  Whilst other mechanisms like the Transaction Verification Code design 
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internal controls into the banking processes. This deals with various process control 
weaknesses and avoids human discretion in complying with controls. Object based 
separation of duties is also introduced as a means of controlling conflicting tasks which 
could lead to fraud.  
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Chapter 1 
 
 
1 Introduction 
Fraud risk has been identified as a major problem in business (Flast, 2009). Banking 
fraud investigations in Ghana have risen from 25 in 2005 to 130 in 2007 (Editorial 
Committee, 2008). Ghana‟s rural banks have not been an exception to this trend in 
fraud and have had their share of fraud.  
Rural banks are said to have weak management coupled with weak internal control 
systems and non-adherence to uniform accounting guidelines and practices as 
prescribed in the operational manual for Rural Banks (Coker, 2002). This has resulted 
in wide-spread embezzlement and fraudulent practices by personnel. In most cases 
rural banks have no written policies and procedures to guide their operations (CDC 
Consult Limited, 2009).  
This thesis therefore analyses the issue of fraud and presents a fraud control model that 
deals with fraud risks affecting rural banks. 
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1.1 Dealing with Rural Banking Fraud 
Fraud is an operational risk issue and like most types of risks it is dealt with using 
conventional risk management techniques. The immediate reaction to the rural banking 
problem would be to adopt tried and tested banking fraud control mechanisms used in 
banks the world over. This is however not an option due to the unique nature of the 
rural banking system and the environment in which it operates. See chapter 2.  
Rural banks could also use widely accepted risk management techniques for identifying 
risks, quantifying them and adopting bespoke cost effective mitigation mechanism. 
Using this method however would be problematic mainly because of the approach 
normally used to quantify risk. This approach estimates risk as a product of the 
likelihood of a fraud and the exposure to it. It requires knowing the likelihood of risks 
and the exposure should the risk occur. Data indicating the likelihood of risk events 
occurring is however not available in the rural banking industry. This leaves the option 
of depending on the intuition of risk managers in assessing the likelihood and exposure 
of occurrence of adverse events. This approach is highly subjective and unreliable as a 
means of choosing what risks to mitigate and how to mitigate it.  
1.2 Contribution  
A key contribution of this research is the Rural Banking Integrity Model (RBIM). This 
is a fraud control model that is designed to meet the needs of the rural banking industry. 
In this model identity is seen as a social construct. Personal identity is presented in 
terms of personality and individuality and as an integral part of a social identity. This 
paradigm is presented as an alternative to the current means of identification where 
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people are identified through personal identifiable information linked to inanimate 
objects like an address or an identification document.  
Also presented in the model is the use of traditional Adinkra symbols for 
authentication. In addition a set of transaction controls are integrated into the business 
delivery processes. These controls are designed in such a way that it ties the physical 
elements of the banking processes to records representing them. They are also designed 
in such a way that they cannot be bypassed in an attempt to commit fraud.  
The thesis also contributes to the understanding of the interrelation of culture and 
security. Most security models involve a set of secure states and the transition rules that 
allow them to move from one secure state to another. They are however generic and 
appear to be value neutral. In an attempt to implement part or a combination of these 
models there is the need to take into account the context of the environment into which 
they would be implemented. This thesis adds to the understanding of the inculturation 
of security models. Although the RBIM is mainly based on the role based access 
control and the Clark – Wilson models, it takes into account the context of the rural 
banking industry. This is done by aligning control mechanisms to the traditional culture 
and the goals of the various stakeholders of the industry. This alignment is seen 
especially in its transition rules. 
1.3 Broad Aims  
The basic premise of this thesis was to look for ways to design an effective internal 
control model to deal with the problems in the rural banking sector mentioned above. 
This research took a holistic view of rural banking in Ghana in the process of designing 
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mitigation mechanisms. This approach was adopted because rural banks are unique in 
nature as a result of the laws that create and regulate them.  
Various characteristics set rural banks apart from any other bank. Key among them is 
that they operate in rural Ghana and are limited by law in their geographical area of 
operation hence simple transactions become cross-organisational with its associated 
problems. In addition the banks are small units and therefore do not have the resources 
available to large commercial and investment banks.   
The rural banking industry is in the process of computerisation and there are plans to 
implement computer systems throughout the entire industry (Editorial Committee, 
2005). Information stored on such a system would represent the resources and customer 
deposits of the bank. Arbitrary changes to such data can result in the loss of these 
resources. Criminals could target these systems to appropriate corporate resources to 
themselves. With information security techniques being the means by which computer 
systems can be controlled it become the prime means for controlling rural banking 
business processes.  
In this thesis, there is a shift in the view of the role of information security. 
Traditionally information security is seen as a way of dealing with risks that arise as a 
result of the use of technology and is therefore used to protect information systems 
from posing risks to businesses. Information security systems become a self serving 
exercise which is deployed to protect the information system rather than the business. 
The view of information security in this thesis is to expand its use from protecting 
information systems to protecting the business as a whole by reducing business risk. 
Information security is therefore used as a risk management tool. 
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The approach used to achieve an effective security design in this thesis involved an 
analysis of the nature of the industry, the environment within which it operates and the 
business processes used to deliver services to the public.  
The focus of the analysis was to thoroughly understand the rural banking industry. The 
analysis also identified vulnerabilities in the industry and the threats that were present. 
In addition it also identified the enabling conditions and the opportunities presented 
within the industry and the environment for the implementation of controls.  
Two main problems were found in the study. The first were problems with the identity 
management of both customer and staff. The second had to do with problems with the 
internal control mechanisms that were used to deal with transaction failures. Threats to 
the system it was observed came from both customers and staff who used deception for 
personal gain.  
To deal with this requires that data objects must only be modified by authorised people 
in authorised ways. In this regard, the proposed model deals more with data integrity 
issues than confidentiality. Though Confidentiality is desired, commercial security 
concerns have always had integrity of data as their prime objective (Clark and Wilson, 
1987) and in this case seems more appropriate. The rural banking system was therefore 
designed to ensure that the integrity of data is maintained.  
The rural banking integrity model is presented as a fraud control model designed to 
meet the needs of the rural banking industry. It combines various mechanisms to create 
a generic model for the protection of the rural banking system. It adopts mechanisms 
from information security models like the Clark-Wilson model which is developed 
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based on traditional business controls like the double entry system. It also uses 
traditional culture and practices of the communities within which the banks operate.  
The proposed system is presented as a generic rural banking fraud control model. It 
could be adopted in full or in part to deal with fraud depending on the priorities of 
security managers and on the circumstances of the implementing bank.  
1.4 Objectives and Research Questions 
The objective of this research work was to develop model using access control 
techniques for the purpose of improving fraud control within rural banks. It was also an 
objective to take a broad view during analysis and design to identify and consider all 
factors which might not be traditionally considered in risk management and security 
system design.   
The specific objectives were to: 
1. Analyse the business process used to deliver rural banking services and to 
determine the vulnerabilities associated with these processes. This analysis 
looked at: 
a) What controls were used to prevent fraud and how reliable existing 
controls were,  
b) The extent to which these controls were being adhered to and  
c) How banking operations could be made more secure especially against 
fraud. 
2. Analyse the rural banking industry and the environment it operates in to identify 
the factors that could influence fraud control either positively or negatively.  
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3. Examine the possibility of the use of information security technology 
particularly access control techniques to enhance fraud control. An emphasis 
was to look at the design of transactions and the introduction of control 
mechanisms  with special emphasis on: 
a) Roles, 
b) Conflict of interest and the risks they create  
c) Separation of duties as a control mechanism  
d) The existing environmental conditions that can be taken advantage of to 
create a reliable and suitable security system that could enhance fraud 
prevention and control.  
These objectives led to the following research questions that were answered: 
1. Can conventional banking controls used by banks all over the world be applied 
to the rural banking industry to safeguard it against fraud and operational risks?  
2. In what form could role based access control techniques be implemented within 
the rural banking system to support internal control of banking operations to 
give reasonable assurance against fraud through the: 
a. Control of possible overlap of functions/permissions of members that 
can create potentially dangerous conflict of interest situations and the 
opportunity for fraud in the rural banking system. 
b. The design of transactional processes and the incorporation of security 
requirements into transaction functions. 
3. In what way could internal control mechanisms be enforced to prevent the users 
having an option not to adhere to controls?   
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4. How can the identity of customers and employees be managed in the rural 
banking system to prevent fraud? 
5. To what extent could the socio cultural characteristics of rural Ghana be tapped 
and used for engineering security to solve operational risk issues in general and 
fraud in particular? 
1.5 Methodology  
Various methods were used to collect and analyse data to help arrive at the conclusions 
and to design the threat mitigation mechanisms in the security model. A diagram 
showing the methodology is shown in figure 1.1. 
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1.5.1 Review of Relevant Literature 
Initial background work was done to understand the nature of the rural banking 
industry to help understand the industry. This initial search helped shape the field 
research that followed. Issues to do with the characteristics, regulatory regime, and 
location of rural banks among other issues were looked at. It also helped to shape the 
type of information to be collected and from whom to collect.  
Background literature on rural banking 
Field research and Data collection;  
Rural banks, ARB Apex Bank  
and Commercial banks.  
Identification of systemic weaknesses and 
derivation of fraud scenarios 
Review of pertinent literature on risk management, 
information security and fraud prevention   
Design of Security model for fraud protection 
Validation of model through expert validation  
Figure 1.1 Methodology 
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The nature and the different type of risks and their treatment were looked at. Security 
concepts, goals and techniques were also examined. Well known security models 
including role based access control, the Clark-Wilson, Chinese wall and others like the 
role based access controls frame work was also examined to see how they could be 
applied to the problems identified during the field work. 
1.5.2 Field Research 
Data collection was done through a field research. It was the chosen because it offered 
a better means to understanding the nuances of the issues within the rural banking 
system. It was seen as the most effective means of understanding the details of what is 
done in the daily operations in rural banks. It gave the opportunity to identify new 
information. This was very important since there is little research into the operations of 
rural banking. 
The data collection methods used during the field research included a structured 
questionnaire, observation and interviews. Documents were also studied. 
Data collected included the structure of the banking industry and the individual banks. 
Detailed information on the services offered by the rural banks was also collected 
during the field work. A systematic description of the processes used to deliver the 
services was done. Process controls in use within the rural banks were also 
documented. Another important part of the field research was to understand the nature 
of the communities that the banks operate in.    
Vulnerabilities within the systems and processes were identified and documented. This 
was done through discussions and interviews with employees and banking 
professionals and also from reported incidents. 
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The views of the rural and other commercial banking operations were also collected 
with regards to the level of effectiveness of controls and the possible means by which 
these controls can be improved.  
1.5.3 Derivation of scenarios  
After documenting banking processes and collecting other information on rural banking 
systems vulnerabilities or systemic weaknesses were identified. The possible 
manifestation of systemic weaknesses or vulnerabilities within the banking processes 
was then identified. These were documented in the form of twenty fraud scenarios built 
as an illustration of the vulnerabilities within the system. The scenarios were either 
fraud cases that had occurred within the rural banking or commercial banking systems 
or incidents that could occur. They were derived during the field research and were 
discussed with the banking officials to confirm that they could actually happen given 
the weaknesses.  
1.5.4 Design of security model 
A comprehensive security model was then designed for the protection of the rural 
banking industry against fraud at this stage. This was based on the risk and security 
techniques examined and the views of banking professionals interviewed during the 
field work. 
1.6 Organisation of write up 
This thesis consists of nine chapters the remainder of which is organised as follows;  
The second chapter looks at the background literature of rural banking in Ghana, the 
nature of risk, operational risk and fraud. Chapter three discusses the management of 
risk within business and the banking industry. It also proposes internal controls 
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enforced using information security mechanism as the best means for dealing with it. A 
discussion of the techniques available to achieve the various fraud control objectives is 
done.  
Chapter four discusses the interaction of security and culture. It takes particular look at 
the culture of Ghana and how it might influence security management. Chapter five 
presents the methodology that was used in the study.  
A presentation and discussion of the information obtained from the field research is 
presented in chapter six. The identified threats and the vulnerabilities identified in the 
field research are also discussed in this chapter. The Seventh chapter discusses twenty 
fraud scenarios and their variants obtained from the field studies and derived from the 
analysis of the data obtained from the field research. 
The eighth chapter discusses the Rural Banking Integrity model which is a system 
design aimed at the mitigation of the risks identified during the field studies. The ninth 
chapter presents conclusions and future work. 
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Chapter 2 
 
 
2 Rural Banking and the Issue of Fraud 
This chapter introduces the rural banking industry and discusses the unique points of 
the industry that could potentially create fraud risks. It discusses some of the conditions 
created by the regulations that govern rural banking industry and its impact on risks. It 
next explores the issue of risks in general and operational risks in particular focusing on 
the nature of fraud. It classifies fraud into four main types and then discusses the 
conditions that enable fraud.  
2.1 Rural Banking within the Banking System 
Rural banks are commercial banks with restrictions on what services they can offer and 
where they can operate (Andah, 2005). This banking system was created to provide 
banking services to the rural Ghanaian population who most often do not have any 
form of financial intermediation. 
According to the bank of Ghana, banks are divided into three main tiers in Ghana 
(Editorial Committee, 2008) as shown in figure 2.1.  
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The bank of Ghana reported a total of 126 rural banks in their 2007 annual report 
forming one of the tiers of banking. The other tiers are 23 main stream commercial 
banks also known as class 1 banks and 42 Non Banking Financial Institutions (NBFI). 
Generally the main stream commercial banks and rural banks are separated from rural 
banks by their capital requirements and the scope of business activity. 
2.2 The Nature of Rural Banking 
A look at rural banks shows an industry closely interlinked to the communities they 
operate in. It also shows that they use alternative mechanisms which could be effective. 
There are currently 135 registered rural banks operating in various parts of Ghana at the 
end of June 2009 which is an increase of 9 banks from the 2007 figure.  
Bank of Ghana 
Class 1 banks 
 
Rural banks 
 
Non banking financial 
Institutions (NBFI) 
 
Figure 2.1 Structure of the Ghanaian banking industry 
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Region No. of Banks 
Ashanti 25 
Eastern 22 
Central 21 
Brong-Ahafo 21 
Western 14 
Volta 11 
Greater Accra 6 
Upper East 5 
Upper West 4 
Northern 6 
Total 135 
Table 2.1 Distribution of Rural Banks (Bank of Ghana, 2009) 
Table 2.1 shows the regional distribution of rural banks. Rural banks have branches and 
these are referred to as agencies. The ARB Apex bank reports a total of 439 agencies 
(ARB Apex Bank, 2008). Rural banks are limited liability companies with their main 
source of funds for operations (especially loans to customers) being government and 
international grants and loans. They are owned by the communities within which they 
operate with the Bank of Ghana having preferential shares.  
Rural banks are essentially community banks often referred to as such by the bank of 
Ghana. Their operations are however limited to rural Ghana. They are therefore meant 
to have close relationships with the communities they operate in. Community banks 
generally aim to help keep local communities vibrant and growing (Independent 
Community Bankers of America, 2009). They focus their services to their localities and 
in doing so, community banks have the unique advantage of understanding the locality 
and clientele much better than large commercial banks do.  
Rural and Community banking was started in 1976 when it became clear that main 
stream commercial banks were not meeting the microfinance needs of the rural people 
in Ghana (Essel and Newsome, 2000). The focus of their activities is therefore not 
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solely commercial but also developmental. They focus their attention on the needs of 
local families, businesses, and farmers. Like community banks around the world, rural 
bank officials are usually accessible to their client with most officials having close 
physical, social and emotional involvement in the local communities. Since community 
banks are themselves small businesses, they understand the needs of small business 
owners who form the bulk of their clientele. 
Rural banks are meant to operate like traditional community banks taking deposits and 
lending it back but in this case to the same communities where depositors live and work 
(Community Bankers of Wisconson, 2009). Large commercial banks are however 
structured to place a priority on serving large corporations and less intimate urban 
clientele. Unlike community banks, large commercial banks move deposits from one 
community to lend to another community. 
The other unique characteristic of community banks is that they use very intimate 
methods in the provision of their services and tend to know their customers. Even in 
advanced countries like the United States, community banks are likely and willing to 
consider character, family history and discretionary spending in making loans 
(Independent Community Bankers of America, 2009). This is in sharp contrast to large 
commercial banks who often apply impersonal qualification criteria, such as credit 
scoring to all loan decisions without regard to individual circumstances. Community 
banks are also reputed to offer nimble decision-making on business loans. This is 
because decisions are made locally as opposed to using loan approval committees who 
do not have the benefit of local knowledge. It is also worth noting however that many 
commercial banks are introducing some elements of customer relationship banking to 
get to know customers for the purpose of introducing some form of customisation of 
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services and risk rating. This is an indication of the credibility of methods employed by 
organisations like community banks to deliver their services to their clientele.  
Though rural banks share a lot of similarities with other banking institutions, they have 
many characteristics that make them very unique. Various factors account for the 
unique nature of rural banks. Key among the factors is that the legislation that creates 
rural banks put various restrictions on them. These restrictions have resulted in creating 
unique operating conditions very different from all the other financial institutions in the 
country. The main restrictions put on rural banks are the type of services they can offer, 
their area of operation (catchment area) and capital requirement. The effects of these 
are discussed below.  
2.2.1 Banking Law and Rural bank’s Catchment Area  
Restrictions on rural banks limit the extent of their operations and this has an impact on 
their size and the security of operations. Rural banks operate as commercial banks 
under the banking law, Act 673 and its amendment Act 738, except that they cannot 
undertake foreign exchange operations and their clientele is drawn from their local 
catchment area (Andah and Steel, 2003). They therefore accept deposits and offer 
lending to their clientele.  
Rural banks are also allowed a 20 mile radius as their rural catchment area and are not 
permitted to operate outside this catchment area. They cannot therefore open branches 
in different localities outside the catchment area which they have been authorised to 
operate in. Due to the restriction placed on their area of operation, a transaction that has 
parties beyond their catchment area has to involve another organisation or bank to 
deliver the one end of the transaction. One of the main parties is usually the ARB Apex 
bank which was created to provide such services.  
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Though rural banks are not limited in the number of branches they can operate within 
their catchment area, there are so many branches they can operate to make business 
sense. This situation could be a severe barrier to their growth especially when they 
operate in poor rural communities. 
2.2.2 Characteristics of Rural Ghanaian Communities  
Rural banks operate in unique environment. As mentioned earlier the rural banking 
concept was created to provide banking services to rural communities they are 
therefore limited to operating mainly in rural areas. The Ghanaian government defines 
“rural” to be a village of 5,000 inhabitants or less (Essel and Newsome, 2000). The 
nature of rural communities has a huge influence on the operations of the banks due to 
the character of the rural folk and the lack of access to technology. Rural Ghana is by 
and large 100% African and has various traditional and cultural characteristics that are 
very different from other cultures and have unique characteristics unlike many 
communities around the world. These include family cohesion and community identity 
and is characterised by high illiteracy which has various implications in implementing 
business protection mechanisms. These are discussed in Chapter 4.  
Rural population of Ghana forms about 63% of the country‟s population (IFAD, 2007). 
It is  characterized by a largely agricultural economy, high levels of poverty 
contributing about 90% of national poverty (Yeboah, 2007) and high illiteracy level of 
62% (Aryeetey and Kwakye, 2005). With such characteristics of the population, 
solutions involving cutting edge technology and that require human interventions and 
or formal education could be a problem to implement and is unlikely to be successful.  
For rural banks, the nature of the rural community could present opportunities and 
threats in the management of organisational risks. This is because human beings are 
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very easily conditioned to accept the social framework around them as though it was a 
part of the natural world, and therefore no more under their control than the weather 
(Hilder, 1995). Most rural folk could accept family norms and practices without 
question. In designing control mechanisms it becomes crucial that the nature and 
character of the communities are understood in order to develop or adopt mechanisms 
that can work under those circumstances. 
2.2.3 The Paradox of Rural Bank Regulation  
Rural banks are regulated by the ARB Apex bank which presents a regulatory paradox 
as would be seen shortly. This could have an impact on fraud control. The primary need 
for regulating financial institutions is the protection of public depositors in financial 
institutions (J. Gallardo. 2002). This is a result of conflict of interest between the bank 
seeking its own interest and that of its customers. Hence the need for an impartial third 
party usually the state or an agency of the state. The state‟s interest is usually in 
sustaining the integrity of the whole of the sector and this also attracts the interest of 
the state to the entire payment system. 
The regulatory framework usually defines the regulatory authorities and the scope of 
business in terms of their products. It also defines the entry and exit requirements and 
most importantly standards of sound operation of the business in order to ensure 
sustainability.  
Regulations of financial institutions are usually in two forms: prudential and non 
prudential regulation. According to Christen et al (2003) prudential regulation is aimed 
specifically at protecting the financial system as a whole as well as protecting the safety 
of small deposits therefore, it involves the government overseeing the financial 
soundness of the regulated institutions.    
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Non-Prudential regulation relevant to Microfinance span a wide spectrum and Christen 
et al (2003) indicates that they include enabling the formation and operation of 
microfinance institutions, protecting customers, preventing fraud and financial crimes 
and setting up credit information services. It also supports secure transactions and also 
develops policies with respect to interest rates, setting limitation with respect to foreign 
ownership, management and source of capital and identifying tax and accounting 
issues. Most of these are done by the banks themselves. 
The Bank of Ghana is mandated by law to regulate banking and non banking financial 
institutions. Rural banks are therefore ultimately regulated and supervised by the Bank 
of Ghana. Andah (2005) indicates that the regulatory process of Bank of Ghana is 
based on the type of institution rather than the type of transaction. The implication is 
that rural banks have a different regulatory from that of the main stream banks. 
Rural banks are regulated by the ARB Apex bank as mentioned earlier. Association of 
rural banking (ARB) in 2001 set up the ARB Apex bank. The purpose of the bank was 
promotion, check clearing, specie movement, treasury management, training and 
product development. The Bank of Ghana has however ceded regulation of rural banks 
to the ARB Apex bank. The bank of Ghana however remains the main regulator of all 
financial institutions in Ghana. The paradox in this structure is that the ARB Apex bank 
exercises control over its owners. There is the likelihood that ARB Apex bank would 
seek to satisfy the state which requires prudential regulation to maintain the integrity of 
the financial system since the state also supervise it. On the other hand they could be 
soft on non prudential regulation because it is not the priority of the state and 
management of rural banks might not want to cede such control to a bank they own. 
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This puts more responsibility on the banks and the creation systems that could remove 
the weaknesses in controls which could result from this regulatory regime. 
2.2.4 Capital Requirement and the Nature of Rural Banks 
Rural banks are generally small banks set up with a small amount of capital. This is 
partly a result of the low capitalization requirements of rural banks which has led to the 
small sized operations of rural banks. This limits the ability of the banks to undertake 
an extensive IT and risk management programs.  
The minimum capitalization requirement for a rural banking license is 150,000Gh 
Cedis (Banking Supervision Division, 2006), about $150,000 which is significantly 
lower than that required for class 1 commercial banks. The Bank of Ghana‟s licensing 
requirements for main stream banks is 60millionGh Cedis (Banking Supervision 
Division, 2005) the equivalent of $60 million and about 400 times the requirements for 
a rural bank. Of the capital requirement of rural banks, ownership by corporate bodies 
should not exceed 50% and individuals not exceed 30%. (Jha et al., 2004 , BoG, 2006).  
Though there are some relatively big rural banks, they are generally small businesses 
with low level of technology usage mainly because they do not have the financial 
resources to implement big computerization projects. The solution to the lack of 
technology has been to implement a government sponsored information technology 
systems projects under the Apex bank. In 2006 the Millennium Development Authority 
announced a $20 million Ghana Rural Bank Computerisation & Interconnectivity 
Project (GRBCIP) under the Millennium Challenge Account (Editorial Committee, 
2009). This is to automate the accounting system of most rural banks using a common 
software platform. I will link them in a wide area network under the Apex bank to 
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further integrate them into the economy and offer better savings, credit and cash 
transfer services to the rural population.  
The new system would create a distributed system linking autonomous organisations. 
Laudable as this project is, it raises several issues to do with information security risks, 
fraud and operational risks. Key among them is the issue of who has control over what 
information. If information is being transferred from one bank to another the question 
of where the responsibility of one bank ends and another starts arises. The new system 
is also bound to be more susceptible to increased fraud because of the increased ease 
and speed of money transfer between rural banks. There is therefore the urgent need to 
understand the nature of rural banking industry, the risks they face and to urgently 
design and implement control measures to mitigate them.   
2.3 Risks and its Manifestation in Banking  
It is important to understand the nature risks faced by businesses in order to develop 
mitigation systems. This is more so when there are varied risks in banking. Risk is 
described as the uncertainty with an exposure to loss, the undesired, unplanned, 
reduction of economic value (Tung-Chien, 1987) alternatively it has been described as 
the exposure to a proposition for which the outcome is uncertain (Holton, 2004). Risk, 
no matter the context refers to the possibility of suffering loss and this invariably refers 
to a probability of impending danger. The issue of risk in business is not about the 
existence of risk but rather what is to be done about the risky situation. Risk 
management therefore defines the discipline of balancing the opportunities you seek 
against the loss you wish to avoid (Alberts and Dorofee, 2005). Closely associated with 
business operations are risks which prevent business organisations from attaining their 
business goals. Conventionally risk is estimated as a measure of two components. 
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These are exposure and uncertainty which are both required for there to be risk. 
Uncertainty is the likelihood of the risk event occurring and exposure the amount of 
loss that could potentially occur. 
Today‟s banking systems are heavily dependent on complex computer based 
information for majority of their services and it is critical to ensure optimum security 
protection to ensure that strategic goals are attained. Rural banks would self destruct 
together with their goals of using financial intermediation as a tool for development if 
identification of risks is not done and the subsequent translation of these risks into a set 
of mitigating systems to manage them.  
In banking risk is manifest in various ways it could be customers defaulting on loans, 
or an investment resulting in a loss. On the other hand banks could suffer a loss as a 
result of a lawsuit, loss of reputation, errors and fraud among others. Normally banks 
classify risks into three main categories (Eccles et al., 2001). These are market risk, 
credit risk, and operational risk.  
Market risk refers to the uncertainty of future earnings due to changes in the value of 
financial instruments caused by movements in market parameters. Credit risk refers to 
the uncertainty of loss that may arise as a result of obligators mostly borrowers failing 
to meet the terms of a financial contract or otherwise failing to perform as agreed. 
Operational risk on the other hand refers to the possibility of loss as a result of human 
error, management, or deficiencies in the operational systems (Eccles et al., 2001).  
Market and credit risks are transaction based in other words they depend on or differ 
from transaction to transaction whereas operational risk on the other hand is systemic 
(Mainelli, 2002 , Thirlwell, 2002). 
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2.4 Operational Risks in Banking  
Operational risks are rare and highly varied. The Bank for International Settlement‟s 
Basel Committee(BCBS) in a document supporting the new capital accord defines 
operational risk as the direct or indirect loss resulting  from failed internal processes, 
people and systems or from external events (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 
2001). It is worth noting that various organisations and authorities have given different 
definitions of operational risk. A popular description of operational risk refers to it as 
every risk source that lies outside the areas covered by market risk and credit risk 
(Jameson, 1998). Operational risk has also been defined as the uncertainty of loss in the 
book value of the firm due to failures in the manufacturing of the firm‟s goods and 
services (King, 1998). The second definition in particular gives an indication of the 
varied nature of operational risks. 
In banking however the definition by the Basel committee seems to have widespread 
use. The Basel Committee further defines seven activities that fall under operational 
risk. These activities are: 
i. Internal Fraud 
ii. External Fraud 
iii. Activities relating to client products and business practices. 
iv. Damage to physical assets 
v. Business disruption and systems failure 
vi. Execution delivery and process management (Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, 2001) 
Operational risk problems that have surfaced in banking institutions like Barings bank, 
Daiwa bank, Sumitomo, and National Westminster Bank (Thirlwell, 2002) not to 
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mention the 2008 Société General Bank rogue trading problems have shown the 
significance of operational risks management to the survival of banks. Though the 
mechanism used to perpetrate each of the fraud is different, the underlying cause is the 
failure of the banks procedure to deal with the risks, the lack of adequate controls 
processes or the inadequate enforcement of control processes leading to huge losses. 
Economic factors are frequently blamed for several banking crises whilst the real 
problem comes from the banks‟ own strategies or operations. Unauthorised transactions 
associated with the failure of internal controls appears to have increasingly become the 
major source of bank losses as shown in the cases of Barings, Jardine Fleming, Morgan 
Grenfell and Daiwa. All these loses have been linked to either a deficient organisational 
structure inadequate,  poor recording and audit trails and Lack of controls and 
verification (Holton, 1996). The rest include the lack of proper audit arrangements 
coupled with the deficient understanding of the systems; conditions that have presented 
an opportunity for fraud. Needless to say the problems above had nothing to do with 
credit worthiness of customers or market fluctuations but a failure to control activities 
of employees and the banking processes.  
As shown by the range of activities that could result in operational risks, the range of 
losses is very wide and they can be a direct or indirect result of failure of internal 
processes. The direct impact of failures ultimately results in the loss of bank assets.  
Find below examples of direct financial losses attributed to operational risk failures 
between November 1995 and March 1997. Since then there have been other high 
profile cases notable is the 2008 Société General trading loss costing 4.9 billion euro 
(Arnold et al., 2008). It is well worth noting that all of these frauds were perpetrated by 
internal operatives. 
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Date Type of firm Loss (USD) Brief Description of allegation 
Nov – 95  Bank  4 million Computer problems with Fed payment connection 
Feb – 93  Corporate  1.04 billion Unauthorized futures trading 
Apr – 94  Brokerage firm 350 million False profits reported for two years 
Sep – 95  Bank  1.1 billion 30,000 unauthorized trades over 11 years 
Feb – 96 Bank 1.3 billion Losses from NIKKEI futures hidden in 88888 account 
Jun – 96  Bank  1.8 billion Unauthorized copper trading – futures, etc. 
Aug – 96  Fund  19.3 million Deal allocations delayed for personal profit 
Sept – 96 Bank  750 million Dummy companies used to avoid compliance 
Mar – 97  Bank  130 million Option volatilities used to inflate prices 
Mar – 97  Bank  100 million Funds transfer to personal account 
Table 2.2 Example of financial loss attributed to operational risk (King, 1998) 
Indirect losses on the other hand could be in the form of reputational risk resulting loss 
of confidence in the bank as a consequence of operational risks. Legal risk could also 
arise resulting in fines, criminal liabilities and special penalties being imposed by 
supervisors and regulators. In reality credit and market risk could be affected by 
operational risk.  
As indicated by the Basel committee in their definition of operational risk, threats could 
come from both internal and external sources. However due to the proximity of internal 
operatives to the system and their familiarity with it they tend to be more of a threat and 
indeed threaten the system more than outsiders. Although external fraudsters, Hackers 
and virus attacks are well publicized, the insider remains the greatest threat to an 
organisation in terms of potential to cause financial loss (Small, 2004). This is clearly 
shown by the notable fraud cases in table 2.2. Unlike fifty years ago when it was 
difficult for a single employee to bring down an entire multinational company, it has 
happened too often now and could easily happen again.  
The risk of internal operatives notwithstanding, all other forms of threats should not 
under any circumstances be underestimated especially since a single incidence of fraud 
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or security breach could cost a bank several millions of dollars and could eventually 
lead to its collapse.   
Due to advances in technology especially manifested in computer networking 
particularly in the form of the internet and distributed systems, various business 
processes have been linked together in complex interrelations. E-commerce has arisen 
out of these technological innovations and has created distributed work processes that 
cuts across organisation boundaries. Typically no one has end to end management 
authority in a distributed work process, which makes risk assessment and management 
an extremely difficult proposition in these environment (Alberts and Dorofee, 2005). 
Such is the model which is expected to be created by the proposed extranet based 
system for Rural banking system which would be used to run services like the Apex 
link (local money transfer scheme). In such a system no single rural bank or the ARB 
Apex bank would be able to have complete control of certain types of transactions. This 
scenario creates a complex risk environment considering the current operational risk 
problems of the rural banking system.  
2.5 The Nature of Fraud  
Fraud is a major form of operational risk and is hence rare and varied. It has been 
described as a moving target and that its control is highly dynamic (FORE, 2005). This 
is because of the varied forms in which they are manifest and because fraudsters always 
devise new methods when old methods cease to work. It is therefore difficult to 
extrapolate past fraud cases as a means of predicting future fraud situations. It is rather 
more important to thoroughly understand the issues surrounding fraud and its patterns 
in order to prevent it. Organisations should be thoroughly understood in order for good 
anti-fraud measures to be designed and implemented.  
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The Oxford English Dictionary defines fraud as criminal deception intended to gain 
money or personal advantage (Oxford University Press, 2002). Lanza (2003) refers to 
fraud as all multifarious means which human ingenuity can devise, and are resorted to 
by one individual to get an advantage over by false suggestion or by suppression of the 
truth. As is indicated in the definitions, the key action to committing fraud is the use of 
deception for the purpose of personal gain leading to a loss to the firm or another 
person. It includes surprise, tricks, cunningness or dissemblance and any unfair way in 
which another is cheated. Occupational fraud refers to a case where an organisations 
falls victim to its own member, has also been defined as the use of one‟s occupation for 
personal enrichment through the deliberate misuse or misapplication of the employing 
organisation‟s resources or assets (Lanza, 2003).  
The indication from the above definition is that fraud could be from internal or external 
sources however about 69% of frauds are perpetrated by an inside fraudster with 
another 20% being collusion between and insider and outsider (KPMG, 2007). This 
makes the insider the biggest perpetrator of fraud. One of the main reasons for this is 
that the insider understands the organisations systems and hence able to spot and 
exploit any weaknesses and also because they have physical access to systems which is 
often poorly managed (Wilson, 2005).  
Generally for a fraud to occur, an individual or an organisation intentionally makes an 
untrue representation about an important fact or event. The untrue representation is 
believed by the victim be it a person or organisation to whom the representation has 
been made. The victim relies upon and acts upon the untrue representation and suffers 
loss of money and/or property as a result of relying upon and acting upon the untrue 
representation. Fraud operates in a paradigm where deception induces the victim to act 
 29 
to their own detriment and to the fraudsters benefit (Doig, 2006). Deception is therefore 
critical to fraud and without it fraud cannot occur. The difference between conventional 
theft and fraud is that while the perpetrator uses threat of violence or intimidation to 
coerce the victim to hand over property in conventional theft, fraud uses deception and 
misrepresentation through words or documents.  
Generally fraud has often been classified based on what the victim was buying or what 
medium was used for the transaction that the fraud occurred in. So fraud is classified 
into many groups like credit card fraud, benefit fraud, dance instruction fraud, internet 
fraud etc. This description does not ensure a proper understanding of these fraud types. 
Fraud has been classified as an operational risk and therefore the process used to 
perpetrate the deception should be a more appropriate as a means of describing it. 
When the focus is put on the deception process used, they seem to come in a few forms. 
Below is an analysis of some of the notable fraud instances and the patterns they seem 
to follow.   
2.5.1 Deception by Adopting an Identity 
In a fraud case a customer of United Mizrahi bank Philip Ashley in the UK wanted 
loans amount for his company which was in excess of the bank‟s loan limit. He 
therefore set up different shell companies which he used to apply for separate loans 
which were individually below the bank‟s loan limit but to the tune of £3.7 million in 
total (Office, 2003). He was only found out when the companies went bankrupt. In 
fraud cases of this type the fraudster hides his real identity or adopts another person‟s 
identity to gain a status of a “genuine customer” for which he uses to request for 
transactions. In this case you have an imposter gaining genuine banking authority that 
allows them to request transactions. In this case of Philip Ashley for example the bank 
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was not able to match the real identity of the person behind the company to the natural 
person. The ability to match the identity on the bank‟s records to a natural person 
becomes very important. 
2.5.2 Fraudster Assuming Forged Authority  
In this type of fraud you have a non customer who has been authorised in many 
instances to perform transactions on behalf of the customer using forged documents 
and signature to perform a fraudulent transaction. A notable example of this type of 
fraud was committed by Joyti De-Laurey who has been described as Britain‟s biggest 
female fraudster. De-Laurey, a secretary at Goldman Sachs used access to her boss‟s 
cheque books and signature and the fact that she had to perform such transactions for 
him to steal up to £4.3 million from his account (Harding, 2004).  
In this type of fraud the perpetrator though not the account holder was seen as acting on 
behalf of his boss and with access to genuine documents performed fraudulent 
transactions. Though she had been authorised to perform many transactions on behalf 
of her boss she obviously did not have the authority to perform the fraudulent 
transactions but was able to pass herself off as an authorised actor in that instance. 
Obviously the bank was not able to detect when she had genuine authority and when 
she did not. In this case it is important to be able to verify that a customer has 
authorised a transaction especially when it is being requested by another person.   
2.5.3 Unauthorised Transaction  
There are also fraud cases where an authorised person, usually an insider, perform what 
is seemingly a normal transaction but for their own benefit. Here you find an authorised 
person using a genuine document performing an unauthorised transaction. A case is one 
where Mel smith deputy director of the finance department of the Metropolitan Police 
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committed a £5 million fraud (Doig, 2006). Smith was in charge of the ordering and 
dispensing fund for the informant and covert work relating to terrorism in 1986. Due to 
the level of secrecy and the faith of the department in him he was able to withdraw 
monies from the fund for his personal use. In this type of fraud the perpetrator is in a 
responsible position and authorised to perform these transactions however he uses this 
authority to deceive his organisation performing transactions that were rather to his 
benefit.   
In this type of fraud you can find employees put in positions of trust performing 
unauthorised transactions to benefit themselves.  
2.5.4 Trust Based Fraud 
This type of fraud is based on the trust the victim has for the perpetrator. This enables 
the victim to hand over money and other valuables to the perpetrator on trust.  One 
form of this type of fraud is investment fraud. It arises when a seemingly lucrative 
business proposal is made to be invested in. It could be in the form of a pyramid 
scheme as was perpetrated by Bernard Madoff (Clark, 2008 , British Broadcasting 
Corporation, 2008) or the Salvation Army /Stuart Ford £6.6 million fraud (Doig, 2006). 
The former described as the biggest financial scandal in the history of markets, Bernard 
Madoff set up a company and took the money belonging to investors to the tune of £33 
Billion and just run a ponsi/pyramid scheme where he paid returns from their own 
money or from subsequent investors.   
In the latter Stuart Ford took £6.6 million from the Salvation Army and sent it to banks 
around many countries claiming to be investing it for them. Of the £6.6 Million he paid 
£200,000 to the Salvation Army. In all the cases supposedly reputable investors 
presented investment proposals to investors and took their money. 
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Another form of this fraud is the 419 advance fee fraud named after the section of the 
Nigerian criminal code which made such activities a criminal offense. It originally 
focused on gaining the victims account details to execute a fraud against the account. 
However recent cases seem to focus on convincing the victim to make an advance 
payment to facilitate a transaction that would enable them to share in a large sum of 
money (Doig, 2006). This type of fraud is used in many instances. An example is the 
corporate advances /peninsula holdings fraud case. In this case, an advance due 
diligence fee of between £25,000 to £50,000 was paid to Peninsular holdings after a £6-
7,000 fee was paid to Corporate Advances before being referred to Peninsular holdings 
(Ramage, 2005). As with all fraud there is a relationship that is built between the victim 
and the perpetrator. This type of fraud takes advantage of the trust in the relationship 
request a fee which commits the victim to the deal and further makes them susceptible 
to more demands of payments. It is not very likely for banks to suffer this form of 
fraud.  
Other forms of this type of fraud arise when a victim is conned based on trust into 
entering a fraudulent contract or agreement which only benefits the perpetrator. 
In all the various types of fraud, a perpetrator acquires a trusted profile that enables 
them to conduct some transactions with the victim. This might involve the acquisition 
of a new/fake identity to enable this profile to be created or pretending to have the 
authority to do that they don‟t have. When the perpetrator already has a trust profile to 
request a fraudulent transaction, certain documents might be necessary to enable the 
fraud. This could be forged if genuine ones are unavailable. Then with the profile and 
the relevant documentation a transaction could then be requested. What is however 
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common among these fraud instances is the lack of controls that made the deception 
possible (Doig, 2006).  
From the preceding it shows that to detect or prevent fraud there must be controls that 
can reliably match an identity to a natural person and verify reputation, verify that 
documentation and verify authority to perform the requested transaction.  
2.5.5 Profile of a Fraudster 
It is very difficult to profile a fraudster because their known characteristics seem to fit 
many people. An example is Jerome Kerviel the perpetrator of the 2008 Societe 
Generale €4.9 million fraud. He has often been described as a low level trader who did 
not distinguish himself from others with no hint of glamour or brilliance (Carvajal and 
Brothers, 2008).  
A KPMG survey of fraud in Europe, India, Middle East and Africa found that most 
fraudsters seem to be ordinary at first glance because they are generally seen to be 
helpful, polite and inconspicuous and most importantly are colleagues that enjoy the 
absolute trust of both colleagues and superiors (KPMG, 2007). The report however 
found that in about 85% of cases, fraudsters were males with 70% between the ages of 
36 and 55 years acting alone 68% of the time. Most fraudsters were long time 
employees or the organisation with 36% having worked for the company 2-5 years and 
22% working for the organisation for more than 10 years. This makes it very difficult 
to profile a fraudster based on the fact that there are many ordinary, trustworthy male 
colleagues who can easily fit the description.   
Cressey‟s Fraud triangle refers to three elements present in every fraud. These are 
motivation, opportunity and rationalisation (Johnstone and Wong, 2008). Others state 
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personal characteristics of the perpetrator, motivation and opportunity (Sampson, 1999 
, KPMG, 2007). Motivation for fraud refers to the situation that drive people to commit 
it. These could be economic or even peer pressure. Opportunity on the other hand is the 
condition that allows the fraudster to create a deception to commit fraud. Lax control 
systems for instance can give opportunity to fraudster to create deception to execute 
their intentions of fraud.  Rationalisation refers to the behaviour of fraudsters to 
rationalise the act by convincing themselves that committing fraud is okay.  
Personal characteristics refer to the character of an individual that gives them the 
inclination to commit fraud. Cultural and personal values determine what people 
consider to be important and beneficial and these determine the standards and 
behaviour of people. Hence values certainly plays a part in the personal character of a 
person that could make him inclined to commit fraud or not. Cultural and Personal 
values should therefore be taken into consideration when the protections of systems are 
being designed.  
Though various programs can be implemented to dissuade fraudsters from committing 
fraud the only condition that could be controlled by targeting business processes is 
opportunity. This should be such that the mechanisms that enable deception is 
removed. 
2.6 Summary 
In summary rural banking regulation create small banks that need other organisations 
that could be susceptible to fraud. They also operate in a unique environment that could 
enhance or inhibit fraud control capability. To add to that they have a paradoxical 
situation where they are regulated by an organisation they own. On the other hand rural 
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banks as community banks use intimate business methods to understand their 
environment well and this could be an asset in fraud control. 
After discussing the issue of fraud the conclusion is that it is primarily a theft which is 
enabled by deception. Understanding the methods used to create the deception can be a 
useful means to dealing with it. Analysing notable fraud cases show four main types of 
deception.  
With the profile of a fraudster fitting so many people targeting certain people in fraud 
prevention cannot be effective. However it was also shown that among the conditions 
which enable fraud opportunity to commit fraud is the one that can be controlled most 
by an organisation and this should be the focus of fraud prevention programs. The next 
chapter discusses the approach to dealing with fraud risks. 
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Chapter 3 
 
 
3 Dealing with Fraud 
This chapter explores the issues that have to be taken into consideration in controlling 
fraud. It starts with the analysis of the issue of managing risks and then discusses 
internal control as the primary means of dealing with fraud focusing on information 
security as a key tool. It further discusses translating and aligning internal control goals 
and information security goals and to the goals of all stakeholders. A discussion of 
conventional fraud and banking controls is also done. Finally a discussion of various 
fraud and banking controls are currently in use is done. 
3.1 Managing Risks 
Having analysed the nature of fraud risks the question is how to deal with it. The task 
of managing risk involves two main activities namely risk analysis and risk 
management (Gerba and Solms, 2005).  
Whiles risk analysis involves the process by which an organisation identifies, estimates 
(in terms of probability of occurrence and the level of damage) and finally evaluates 
risk (level tolerance of the organisation). Risk management on the other hand refers to 
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the process of planning, monitoring and controlling activities based on the information 
produced by the process of risk analysis. Risk management explores the possibility of 
risk avoidance, risk transfer, risk acceptance or risk mitigation (Hillson, 1999). In 
dealing with banking risks, there are different approaches depending on the type of 
risks. The main aim of this research is to identify mitigation mechanisms. 
In the case of managing market or credit risks the key is in acquiring the knowledge 
and understanding of these risks and applying this knowledge transaction by 
transaction. Parameters like credit rating and expected default rate are used to measure 
credit risk of specific borrowers. These methods assess the risks associated with each 
transaction and the parameters used form the basis for deciding how to handle the risk 
associated with each transaction.  
Managing operational risk on the other hand cuts across various functions in the 
organisation and may exist in marketing and credit risk areas (Shabudin, 2007). The 
2008 credit crunch that affected banking systems around the world had its roots in the 
failure to manage credit risk properly and hence engaging in subprime lending 
(Wallace et al., 2008) however the main cause of this is the failure of risk management 
and regulatory processes to identify the credit risk. It was in essence an operational risk 
failure. In managing operational risk it is very important to have a holistic view of the 
organisation.  
Loss data does not seem to be a very effective means of predicting operational risk 
incidents as is the case for other forms of risks (Thirlwell, 2002). This is partly because 
when organisations are hit by incidents, controls are changed immediately and also 
because empirical evidence is a poor guide to predicting rare events like operational 
risks. Also in the particular case of fraud the adversary is intelligent and is trying to 
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create a deception and so would seek avenues to do just that. In dealing with these type 
of threats, it is most effective when one does not make arbitrary assumptions about the 
threat (Schneier, 2005b). The argument is that with a large number of potential risks it 
is irrational to focus on individual targets as a means of mitigating potential attacks. A 
more proactive systemic approach seems to be the best means to deal with operational 
risks and fraud. This approach stands a better chance at covering it in all of its 
manifestation. It also has a better chance to identify the risk before it is causes a loss.  
There are various recommendations for dealing with operational risks. The Risk 
Management Association recommends that a good operational risk management 
framework must have four basic elements namely leadership, management, risk, and 
tools (Taylor, 2006). Leadership determines the right culture and environment with 
management being a set of processes that channel and control the institution's risks. 
Risk element of the framework involves understanding the pattern of operational risks 
the organisation faces and takes on whereas tools refer to the collection of guides, 
templates, libraries, services, training, and software that are available to fight the risks. 
A similar framework for dealing with operational risk also has four element these are 
strategy, process, infrastructure, and environment (Haubenstock, 2001).  
There is an increased awareness to develop operational risk management models 
looking up to international and national regulation and standards for guidance 
(Crawford and Hoppe, 2005). Each organisation or industry is however different 
whereas standards like the COSO framework and models are always generic (Crawford 
and Hoppe, 2005). According to the well known McKenzie‟s 7 s‟ model developed by 
Tom Peters and Robert Waterman, two consultants working at the McKinsey & 
Company consulting firm, there are seven internal aspects to consider in the analysis of 
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an organisation. The general premise is that for companies to be effective there must be 
a fit between these seven elements. This should be the start to customising standards 
and generic models. The McKenzie seven S‟s comprise of three hard elements and four 
soft elements. The hard elements are strategy structure and systems whilst the soft 
elements are shared values, skills, style (management) and staff. This means that a 
workable model for one institution could be very unsuitable for another similar 
organisation sometimes in the same industry. Hence there is the need to find suitable 
operational risk management model for every organisation especially for a complex 
business environment as is the case in the Rural Banking system in Ghana. In designing 
systems to deal with risks it is important to transform the needs of the systems context 
into the requirements for the new system and to redesign the application context around 
the new system to better exploit its capabilities and avoid negative reactions from users 
(Donzelli and Bresciani, 2004). There is also an emerging view that quantitative 
processes for managing risks are adequately known and applied however failures and 
problems arise more because of the softer issues (Turnbull, 2004). These soft issues 
within an organisation relates to issues such as politics and people's feelings, 
leadership, organisational culture, readiness for IT upgrades, behavioural style, job 
involvement, commitment, fairness, motivation and job satisfaction among others. 
3.2 Internal Control  
Good internal control reduces operational risk and fraud (General Accounting Office, 
2002). Internal controls can be used to better manage the way in which employees, 
partners and customers and how their access to corporate resources is controlled and 
audited to mitigate some of these operational risks (Small, 2004).  They are therefore 
put in place to keep companies on course to avoid unforeseen events, reduce risks of 
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asset loss, promote efficiency and help ensure the compliance with laws and regulations 
(Committee of Sponsoring Organisations of the Treadway Commision, 1994). Internal 
controls are necessary because of mental, moral and physical weakness inherent in 
people who run business systems (Bower and Schlosser, 1965) (Calbom, 2002). They 
are therefore needed to make a system more reliable and reduce the opportunity for 
people to make errors or to perpetrate various types of fraud and other improper 
actions. They are mostly aimed at controlling the unreliability of people; a situation that 
leads to errors and fraud. It is therefore important that internal controls are not left to 
the discretion of people which it aims to control.  
Internal control has been described as the systems, policies, procedures and processes 
effected by the Board of Directors, Management and other personnel to safeguard 
banks assets, Limit or control risks and achieve a banks objective (Comptroller of the 
Currency Administrator of National Banks, 2001). The board of directors of an 
organisation determine business strategy, and determine all major goals of an 
organisation. This could therefore be used to ensure that internal control is totally in 
line with business goals and aimed at achieving such goals. Though internal control 
processes and procedures operate at the lower level of the organisation, it is important 
for the board to set the tone and create a culture of internal control within an 
organisation.  
Another definition of internal control has referred to it as the mechanisms used by 
organisational leaders to convey strategy, vision and desires to the rest of the 
organisation (Pathak, 2005). This further point to the fact that internal control must be 
in line and be used as a means to achieving organisational goals and supports the 
position that internal controls are very important to the achievement of compliance in 
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organisations. According to Pathak (2005) internal controls is manifest in the form of 
standards, policies, procedures and rules and that proper internal control allows the 
organisation‟s risk management support to work effectively and in harmony. Internal 
control works at all levels of the organisation. Control policies and procedures must 
therefore be designed into every system in the organisation rather than as separate 
superficial rules that sit on a potentially insecure system that has been designed without 
control considerations.  
Whiles it is recognised that internal control is the responsibility of all the people in the 
organisation, the identifiable groups within the organisation mentioned in the COSO 
framework are management, board of directors, internal auditors and other personnel. 
What is clearly not mentioned is the role of information systems personnel. For most 
modern organisations, business processes are run by computer systems where 
computers modifying data in databases form the core of transactions. The 
implementation of any internal control system should in effect be the control of the use 
of these computer systems. Obviously the mechanism which can be used in controlling 
these systems is information systems security.  
The United States General Accounting Office (GAO) and the Bank for International 
Settlement‟s Basel Committee both consider the following as the elements of internal 
control;  
1. Management oversight and the control culture (Board of directors, Senior 
management, Control culture)  
2. Risk recognition and assessment,  
3. Control activities and segregation of duties,  
4. Information and communication,  
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5. Monitoring activities and correcting deficiencies  (Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, 1998 , General Accounting Office, 1999). 
Though internal control means different things to different people it is generally seen as 
a process and that its effectiveness is measured at any point in time by the condition of 
any of the five components mentioned above.   
3.2.1 Control Environment 
There have been different descriptions of the environment relevant to internal control. 
The Committee of Sponsoring Organisation of the Treadway Commission  indicated 
that the control environment generally sets the tone of the organisation influencing the 
control consciousness of the people (COSO, 2005). It is the culture that encourages the 
implementation of control measures in it. The GAO (1999) refers to ethical behaviour, 
guidance for ethical behaviour, removal of temptation for such behaviour, discipline 
and the need to competence and provision of the right skill for people doing specific 
jobs. There is the need to create the culture within the organisation such that its 
members are security conscious. All these are achieved through the leadership style of 
management.  
The control environment however has been referred to by some authorities as the 
internal environment and described as the people within the organisation and the 
organisational culture (Committee of Sponsoring Organisations of the Treadway 
Commision, 1994 , General Accounting Office, 2002). Whilst there is no doubt that the 
internal environment is very important to the success of the internal control function it 
neglects a very important factor which is the external environment. No organisation is 
an island hence systems and their external environment are intertwined so need to be 
treated and analysed as a larger socio-technical system. This is to ensure that their 
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overall needs can be understood in order that the most appropriate socio–technical 
requirements can be identified (Offen, 2002 , Donzelli and Bresciani, 2004). The Risk 
Management Association however defines the business environment with regards to 
internal control measures as the internal and external circumstances of a firm‟s 
businesses that can materially affect its operational risk profile (The Advanced 
Measurement Approached Group, 2008). This definition seems more appropriate given 
the emphasis on both the internal and external environment. Marketing and business 
strategy experts have long sought to understand the environment they operate in as a 
means of increasing likelihood of the organisation achieving their objectives. The idea 
is that various factors within and outside the organisation can present opportunities or 
threats to its goals. Though these experts cannot influence most of the elements of 
external environmental factors they study it to take advantage of it. This is because they 
are well aware of the advantages of using these characteristics to their advantage. In the 
same way risk managers and information security specialists could start using an 
external environmental scan as a means of identifying the opportunities whilst 
identifying the threats.  
In the rural banking system, the control environment should be expanded to take into 
account the socio cultural character of the industry to be able to ensure better protection 
of the banking system. 
3.2.2 Risk Assessment 
The second element of internal control involves a risk assessment. The Basel 
Committee recommends that risks that could adversely affect the achievement of a 
bank‟s goals be identified and continuously assessed (Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, 1998). Whilst it is of utmost importance to determine the risks that an 
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organisation faces in order to determine controls, the methods for deriving what risks 
are to be taken into account makes a lot of difference. Risk assessment is said to 
generally involve a process by which an organisation identifies, estimates and finally 
evaluates risks to achieving objectives (KPMG, 1999). It is therefore the process of 
analysing and interpreting risk as a basis for determining how they should be managed. 
Risk assessment must look at all relevant interactions between various objects or 
subjects and their impact on the risk events. The Basel committee indicates that an 
effective risk assessment identifies and considers all internal and external factors that 
could adversely affect an organisation‟s performance (Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, 1998). Some of the issues that should be considered are the complexity 
and effects of the organisation‟s structure, the type of the business activity and business 
processes, the quality of personnel, organisational changes and employee turnover. 
External factors like fluctuating economic conditions, changes in the industry and 
technological advances must also be considered. 
The national institute of standards and technology proposes a nine step process to 
conducting an IT risk analysis (Stoneburner et al., 2002). These are system 
characterisation, vulnerability identification, Control analysis likelihood determination 
impact analysis risk determination control recommendation and result documentation. 
Others also propose a process involving system characterisation, threat identification, 
vulnerability identification, risk analysis, control recommendations and results 
documentation (Bowen et al., 2006).  
System characterisation establishes the scope of the risk assessment effort, delineates 
the operational authorisation boundaries, and provides information whilst the threat 
identification undertakes a comprehensive identification of threat sources with the 
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potential to exploit weaknesses in the system. Vulnerability assessment identifies all 
vulnerabilities which are flaws or weakness in system security procedures, design, 
implementation, or internal controls that could be exercised accidentally triggered or 
intentionally exploited and could result in a security breach or a violation of the 
system‟s security policy. 
Next is risk determination or estimation of risk to the system. This analysis primarily 
aims at reducing the range of vulnerabilities to the ones that matter. Whilst this is 
desirable it could have a potential of being counterproductive. This is primarily due to 
the methods currently used to achieve this. 
Risk determination aims to consider closely intertwined factors, such as the security 
controls in place for the system under review, the likelihood that those controls will be 
either inadequate or ineffective protection for the system and finally the impact of that 
failure. These activities involve control analysis, likelihood determination, impact 
analysis and risk determination. Generally risk is determined as a product of the impact 
or the impact/value (V) of loss with the occurrence of the risk and its 
likelihood/probability (P) of the occurrence of the risk.  
Risk = P x V 
When this value is computed for a single event it is called single loss expectancy 
(SLO). Multiplied by the annualised rate of expectancy (ARO) a value referred to as 
the annual loss expectancy (ALE) is obtained.  
 ALE = SLO x ARO 
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The annual expectancy model (ALE) seeks to estimate the value of risk as a means to 
decide whether possible losses are such that mitigation measures need to be taken. It 
also seeks to use that as a basis to prevent the cost of mitigation from exceeding the 
possible loss. It is therefore used as a measure of the cost of effective security 
(Anderson et al., 1994 ).  
Another popular model involves the use of a risk matrix. See figure 3.1. This involves 
assessing the likelihood and impact of risk events as high, medium or low. Risk events 
are classified as Risk Scale: High if the value is between 50 and 100); Medium if 
between 10 and 50; Low if between 1 and 10. 
 
  
 
 
 
Both methods of assessing risk require that risk events must be identified and their 
probability of occurrence estimated. This can however be a difficult thing to do 
especially in operational risk estimates where occurrences of risk event are rare and 
varied. 
The problem with both models is therefore the inability to accurately estimate the 
probability and the value of the corporate resources that would be at risk if the loss 
event occurs. An assigned probability depends on the information available to the 
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Figure 3.1 Risk Matrix (Stoneburner et al., 2002) 
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analyst at the time of the analysis. At best, probability measures perceived risks and 
even when it does its usefulness is limited because of its level of subjectivity in the 
absence of an objective means of measurements (Holton, 2004).  
Now even when objective probabilities are known the issue of whether the loss event 
grabs ones attention comes to being. This depends on the perceived level of potential 
damage that could arise commonly referred to as exposure or the impact. Usually the 
final exposure that is settled on depends on what the preferences of the analyst are and 
what information is available (Arrow, 1964). This also indicates that you most often 
than not end up with a perceived exposure.   
Holton (2004) has indicated that risk is a human condition where self awareness is key. 
In other words there is no risk in the absence of self awareness. This implicitly raises 
the question of using risk determination as the basis of managing adverse events that 
could befall an organisation especially when information on the level of uncertainty 
and exposure is scanty. 
Generally risk is relative and in certain cases intuitive (Holton, 2004). The likelihood of 
an adverse event occurring is different from bank to bank. On the other hand there 
could be as many exposures as there are propositions. The bottom line here is that there 
are many variables in rural banking and depending on the size and other operational 
factors certain risks could be more serious than others. In that regard, effective controls 
and protection mechanisms for the rural banking system must be designed based on the 
entire range of existing vulnerabilities. This would leaving implementation within 
individual rural banks to individual risks manager based on the condition of the bank at 
any particular time. This will also allows the system to have an element of human 
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configuration and also enables it to be shaped to suit the nature of the each 
organisation. 
3.2.3 Control Activities 
Control activities are supposed to occur at all levels and functions of an organisation it 
involves.  Control activities include top level and performance reviews, compliance 
with exposure limits, approvals, authorisations Verifications and reconciliations 
physical and activity controls (Basel Committee, 1998). Other activities include 
reconciliation, and the creation and maintenance of related records which provide 
evidence of execution (KPMG, 1999). Others propose seven basic kinds of internal 
control duties (Bower and Schlosser, 1965). They are supervision, clerical proof, 
acknowledging performance, transferring responsibility, protective measures, review 
and finally verification and evaluation. On the surface these controls could be 
implemented in all organisations in any part of the world. This might however not be 
the case see Chapter 4.  
Banking regulatory regimes most often do not introduce or enforce control mechanisms 
that reduce operational risks. This is because supervisors and regulators concentrate on 
prudential regulation aimed at protecting depositors and the banking system as a whole. 
Regulators use mechanisms like reserve requirement, capital adequacy ratio etc to 
achieve this. The Basel Committee recommends that a portion of a banks working 
capital be set aside to cover operational risks (Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, 2001). Though it is desirable to have these measures in place to deal with 
adverse events when they occur, it is always desirable to prevent it from occurring in 
the first place and they do not so that. Reserve requirements can however be an 
incentive to compel bankers to put in place internal control measures usually referred to 
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as non-prudential regulation. Aside the benefits of reduced risks, there are other 
collateral benefits of good internal control. This is because the quantum of a bank‟s 
reserve requirement depends on the level of operational risks it is exposed to. A 
reduction of risks could therefore lead to a reduction in reserve requirements.  
Information security is becoming important in implementing controls. This is because 
when organisations are computerised and linked together, they exchange information 
and engage in transactions in ways unanticipated before. The importance of 
information becomes core to most business activities without which business will fail 
to operate (Owen, 1998). With this in mind, the security of information could become 
the key to securing corporate assets. With the increasing use of information systems in 
operations, internal controls need to be supported by a system that is in step with the 
nature of the risks. Information security also becomes important to ensure enforcing 
adherence to controls. A good information security system which is set up to deal with 
the risks is the best way to deal with the current nature of threats.  
The paradigm being discussed here is the use of information security techniques as a 
tool for reducing operational risks. Traditionally information security has been 
concerned with securing information within information systems and not as a tool to 
reduce the overall risk of the organisation. This paradigm is captured in the statement  
“failures of information security are clearly adverse events which cause losses 
to business; therefore information security is a risk management discipline” 
(Blakley et al., 2001).  
No doubt that the introduction of information systems exposes business to new kinds of 
risks and the immediate focus is to put measures in place to deal with such risks. It is 
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however time for information security to be transformed totally from a self serving 
objective that focuses on the unique risks emerging from the use of information 
technology to looking at the opportunities of employing some of these techniques for 
general business risks reduction.  
With concepts like electronic money etc it is clear that information resources 
increasingly represent the resources of an organisation. There is the need to protect 
these resources and information security is the best means to do that because it is the 
means for controlling the activities of users within an information system. The 
preference of the use of these techniques in implementing control measures is because 
it can automate the prevention mechanisms and force employees to comply with 
internal control procedures.  
Granting access without understanding risks cannot prevent fraud. This position 
becomes more critical where operatives who have authorised access to these resources 
could misuses their genuine authority to defraud the organisation (Foundation of 
Research and Education, 2005). Risks should therefore be thoroughly understood 
before access controls are designed. It calls for information security specialists to look 
beyond issues like authorised access to look at issues relating to whether the 
information being accessed is used properly. In essence looking at either technology 
and risk management in isolation can be flawed, the two disciplines are intrinsically 
interlinked and the field of security tends to be the meeting point (Wilson, 2005).  
Information security, we must understand, is not a panacea to operational risk and 
internal control. However it can be an excellent operational risk reduction tool if it is 
deployed properly taking into consideration the environment in which it is going to 
operate and supported by appropriate policies to enforce the technical controls 
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(Anderson et al., 1994 ). As always with technological products, the behaviour of users 
goes a long way to determine its effectiveness. Assuming if the front door to your 
house is protected by the most reliable door lock and you do not care to engage the lock 
on your back door the security of your house is as good as nothing. People should 
always be considered in designing protection mechanisms. 
3.2.4 Information and Communication 
To make an internal control system effective, pertinent information must be identified, 
captured and communicated in a form and timeframe that enables people to carry out 
their responsibilities. Information such as operational, financial and compliance related 
reports that help the control of the business must be disseminated. It is very important 
that all the members of an organisation are made aware of the laws, policies and 
procedures. Employees are also given information to help them understand their role in 
relation to others in the organisation. In addition reports on performance need to be sent 
across to users to awaken them to their control responsibilities.  
When disseminating information the content, timeliness, accuracy, accessibility and 
how up to date the information is must be taken into consideration (Committee of 
Sponsoring Organisations of the Treadway Commision, 1994). 
3.2.5 Monitoring 
Internal control systems need to be monitored to ensure that internal control continues 
to operate effectively. This is a process that assesses the quality of the system‟s 
performance over time (Committee of Sponsoring Organisations of the Treadway 
Commision, 1994). A good internal control environment requires that there is a clear 
organisational structure and clearly defined areas of authority and responsibility and 
appropriate lines of reporting. Ongoing monitoring occurs during the course of 
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operations or as separate evaluations which depend on the level of ongoing monitoring. 
A combination of ongoing and separate evaluation processes is also possible when it 
comes to reporting on deficiencies and these reports must be directed upstream. 
3.3 Information Technology Compliance and Business Controls  
It is important that the goals of a fraud control system are aligned with the goals of all 
stakeholders in an organisation. In the case of the rural banking industry it is important 
to align the goals of a fraud protection system to all stakeholders and these would 
include shareholders, communities, management and regulators. Security systems have 
multiple players and each player has an agenda which might not necessarily be in line 
with other players (Schneier, 2006). In that regards, for mechanisms aimed at achieving 
the security objective to succeed, the player made responsible for enforcing it must be 
in line with the player‟s vested interest. 
Many frameworks support the alignment of security goals to corporate goals (Swanson 
and Guttman, 1996 , Information Technology Governance Institute, 2005). 
Unfortunately, security is sometimes viewed as thwarting the mission of the 
organisation by imposing poorly selected, bothersome rules and procedures on users, 
managers, and systems. Security rules and procedures however do not exist for their 
own sake. They are put in place to protect important assets and support the overall 
organisational mission and they are a means to an end and not an end in itself (Swanson 
and Guttman, 1996). IT governance aims to match corporate goals and information 
technology goals and to ensure that information systems promote corporate goals and 
takes the responsibility of this function from the IT department and gives it to the board 
of directors. It is however desirable not only to align the goals of security and control 
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systems to corporate goals but to the goals of all other stakeholders to ensure its 
success. 
3.4 Threat Identification, Security Requirements and Specification 
Security goals usually referred to as security requirements are optative descriptions of 
what the system is to do (Haley et al., 2004). Security requirements do not describe 
how security is to be implemented but instead describe what is desired. Generally 
internal control objectives arrived at in a risk management exercise should be the basis 
of the security requirement. The identification of security requirements must therefore 
be looked at from the point of view of what is required to make the system secure and 
not the specific solution to be implemented.  
In identifying vulnerabilities and threats, reasonable trust assumption should be made 
and that would require that we trust the properties of some domains and to go no 
further in the analysis (Haley et al., 2002). This means that we would have a belief that 
the domain would participate competently and honestly in the satisfaction of the 
security requirement. However there must be a basis to arrive at such a trust 
assumption.  
In analysing security vulnerabilities and threats it is important that all the parameters of 
domains outside a trust assumption are optative hence one would have to question all 
the properties and operations of objects to confirm them as objectively true (Haley et 
al., 2006). In deriving the security goals of a fraud control system for the rural banking 
system, the concern would be whether the information being passed on to the next 
subject (whether a person or the computer system) is objectively true. For instance 
when a cheque is presented to withdraw cash an issue would be whether we can 
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reliably confirm that the account holder wrote and issued the cheque. This should form 
the basis of identifying vulnerabilities and threats to the system and designing solutions 
to deal with the threats.  
Security specifications is the description of the behaviour of the domain in terms its 
phenomenon indicative or optative visible at its interface (Haley et al., 2004). In other 
words security specification looks at how the security requirements are to be achieved 
through specific externally visible characteristics. They are therefore technically 
inclined. Control activities come under security specification these are the mechanisms 
that are to be implemented to deal with the threats identified and described in a risk 
assessment. A fraud control system would therefore focus on what external visible 
characteristics would be of interest and how they can indicate that there is not fraud. 
3.5 Information Security 
With a clear specification of what a security systems is to achieve there is a toolbox of 
security mechanisms and models to help in operational risk management and fraud 
control. Information security has been defined as “the protection of information from a 
wide range of threats in order to ensure business continuity, minimize business risk, 
and maximize return on investments and business opportunities” (British Standards 
Institution, 2005). Information security principles cover various inherent elements of an 
information security system. The primary elements of information security are widely 
accepted as confidentiality, integrity and availability, commonly known as the CIA 
triad (Stewart et al., 2005). Though these are considered the core aspects of security 
other elements have been presented by various researchers. One of such models 
presented the six elements of security namely availability, utility, integrity, 
authenticity, confidentiality and possession (Bosworth and Kabay, 2002).  
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The CIA triad has been classified under two characteristics. These are protection or 
fault introduction and behaviour in terms of the output (Jonsson, 1998).  Protection 
involves influence of the environmental on the system whiles behavioural is concerned 
with the behaviour of the system that are manifest. The emphasis on any particular 
element of security depends on what security means to the user. Whiles military 
systems emphases confidentiality commercial systems emphasised integrity (Clark and 
Wilson, 1987).  
To develop an information security system it is important to start with a security policy 
which describes the information security needs of an organisation (Anderson et al., 
2001). Security policies are only statements describing the security objectives of an 
organisation that must be enforced. To enforce these policies a combination of 
procedural and technical measures are used. These measures designed to deal with 
information security risks fall into 4 main groups (Blakley et al., 2001). These are 
namely: 
 Protection measures that prevent adverse events from occurring 
 Detection measures to discover unauthorised activities 
 Response measures to deal with adverse events when they occur and to return 
the system to a safe condition. 
 Assurance measures to validate the effectiveness of the protection, detection 
and response measures 
3.5.1 Confidentiality 
Confidentiality refers to the security property that concern controlling unauthorised 
access, disclosure and use of information in an information system whether it is stored, 
in transit, being processed. The security objective of confidentiality is the element of 
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information security that preserves authorised restrictions on information access and 
disclosure, including means for protecting personal privacy and proprietary information 
(McCallister et al., 2009). Organisations require confidentiality to prevent critical 
information from getting into the hands of criminals who could use the information to 
perpetrate fraud or attack the organisation or its stakeholders in some way. These could 
lead to loss of resource or reputational loss. 
Organisations particularly desire to keep personal identification information 
confidential in a bid to prevent impersonation. Achieving confidentiality is therefore 
sometimes necessary to achieve other security requirements of organisations like 
integrity. This can be seen in a case where passwords have to be kept confidential to 
prevent unauthorised access which can lead to breaching integrity requirements. 
Achieving confidentiality however would not be a primary focus of this research.    
3.5.2 Integrity 
Integrity on the other hand deals with controlling how information resources in an 
information system are changed or used. It has been described as an element of security 
guarding against improper information modification or destruction, and includes 
ensuring information non-repudiation and authenticity (Barker, 2003).  Achieving this 
objective is important to prevent fraud. 
Integrity is examined in three perspectives (Stewart et al., 2005)  
1. Unauthorised subjects should be prevented from making modifications 
2. Authorised subjects should only make intentional modifications and must be 
prevented from making unauthorised modifications that as a result of error or 
fraud 
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3. Objects should be internally and externally consistent so that their data is 
correct and a true reflection of the real world and any relationship with a child, 
peer and parent object is consistent and verifiable. This is the main requirement 
that is breached in the bid to create deception in the process of committing 
fraud.  
3.5.3 Availability 
Availability on the other hand looks at providing prompt access to the information 
stored on the system. Availability ensures timely and reliable access to and the use of 
information (National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2004). Availability is not 
a key objective in preventing fraud. 
Aside the three main elements of information security in the form of the CIA triad there 
are other security attributes that are also very important. These include accountability 
and non repudiation.  
3.6 Accountability and Non Repudiation 
Accountability is the property that gives the security system the ability to track who has 
had access to or changed information resources. It is important to ensure that every user 
is the one who actually performed an activity being attributed to them. This brings in 
the issue of non repudiation which is the security objective that seeks to prevent users 
from denying previous commitments or actions performed within the system (Menezes 
et al., 2001). Mechanisms used in a security system must be such that there is little 
room for doubt what subject has performed a particular transaction.   
Non repudiation is usually achieved using digital certificates and digital signatures. The 
idea is to mark an identity with a public encryption key such that a transaction can only 
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be traced back to the subject bearing that identity without the possibility of denial. This 
is discussed shortly. 
3.7 Authorisation and Access Control 
Authorisation is the right to undertake certain actions within an information system. 
This naturally follows authentication of an identity. In other words when a subject is 
verified to be who they say they are then the issue of what they are allowed to do 
comes in. Authorisation is usually determined within access control policies and 
models. Most authorisation models are based on traditional three-way concepts of a 
subject object and access type (Jøsang et al., 2006). The relationship is such that the 
subject requests access to an object which is a resource. Access type refers to the type 
of access granted to the subject for an object. This three way relationship is determined 
by the owner/custodian of the object/resource. The objective of access control is to 
manage this relationship (Anderson, 2001). There are two main types of access control 
concepts; mandatory access controls and discretionary access controls. To prevent 
fraud, access control would exactly be the framework within which the control of 
relationships between customer and employees and various banking objects would be 
done. 
3.8 Mandatory and Discretionary Access Controls 
The formal definition of mandatory access control (MAC) describes it as information 
flow restrictions enforced independent of user actions as opposed to the discretionary 
access control (DAC) where the user has the ability to change security attributes of the 
object. It is generally accepted that discretionary access control is not a desirable policy 
for managing systems (Farraiolo and Kuhn, 1992 , Anderson et al., 2001) because 
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organisations information do not belong to individual users. It is therefore inappropriate 
to leave security management of these resources to individual users. Also DAC cannot 
ensure the implementation of a unified security policy because access to resources is at 
the discretion of users and not enforced centrally like MAC (Anderson et al., 2001). To 
use an access control model to enforce fraud controls, it will require enforceable 
mechanism as they exist in MAC because discretionary form of access control can 
undermine an organisation‟s fraud control policies.    
3.9 Multilevel and Multilateral Security 
Multilevel security models classify security properties into various levels some higher 
than others. Data objects are assigned a security label. Models then determine which 
security levels can be accessed by which subjects and the rules about the type of access. 
There are other security models that have been designed based on other principles other 
than a vertical graduated scale of security labels. There is sometimes the need to 
compartmentalise information with the same security label to prevent lateral flow 
making different compartments available to different subject with the same security 
label or classification. It is usually assumed that subjects with the same security level 
would have the same access to information but in certain cases there is the need to 
regulate such information access. Multilateral security is necessary especially when 
there is a conflict of interest situation. Models like the Brewer-Nash‟s Chinese wall 
security model to be discussed shortly deals with such situations.     
Though it is argued that multilevel security policies cannot deal with commercial 
security concerns (Clark and Wilson, 1987), lattice based security designs are shown to 
deal with some considerations depending on what attribute is most desired (Sandhu, 
1992 , Sandhu, 1993). The inference of this is that different models fit different 
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contexts and there is the need to craft a security model to enforce the fine details every 
context requires.  
3.10 Information Security Policy 
A security policy is a succinct statement of the protection properties that a system, or 
generic type of system, must have. In other words a security polices expresses clearly 
and concisely what a systems protection mechanisms are to achieve.  
With a clear statement of what these objectives are, security models are constructed as 
an abstract presentation of how these security goals are to be achieved and are designed 
to implement the security policies of an organisation. The general pattern that most 
security policies follow is that a subset of the states of the system as secure is first 
defined (Anderson et al., 2001). Transition rules that guarantee that objects remain in a 
secure state when they move from one secure state to another are then defined and this 
is the basis of preserving the security of the system. These models are generic and 
value neutral. They are also not constrained by the technological considerations needed 
to implement them.  
3.11 Bell-LaPadula Security Policy and Security Properties  
Confidentiality was the prime motivation in the military for security is characteristic 
that drove the early security models (Sandhu, 1993). The Bell-LaPadula model was the 
first such security model to appear to address the issue. It met security requirements by 
classifying data and information into confidentiality classes based on the sensitivity of 
the information whiles users were allowed to access these classified information based 
on their level of security clearance/category. It introduces many principles to support 
classification and user clearances. These principles are useful in many of the models 
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that have followed. The Bell–LaPadula model makes use of various properties like the 
high or low tranquillity property which looks at changing security properties during 
system operation (McLean, 1982). This is linked to high water mark property which 
requires every subject, no matter the security label, to start each session with the least 
privilege and be upgraded when an object with a higher security label is accessed 
(Anderson et al., 2001). This is to avoid disclosure problems. This however could arise 
in over classification where the gradual upgrade of a subject‟s security label results in it 
writing only high label objects. It could become a problem when an application which 
has been upgraded cannot see lower files to continue work when it has been upgraded. 
Other properties like non-interference (Goguen and Meseguer, 1982) and non-
deducibility (Sutherland, 1986) were introduced to control what users can see and what 
they can do with the information they see. In non-interference actions by higher 
subjects does not affect what a lower subject can see whilst in non deducibility lower 
subjects can see but cannot understand or make deductions from actions of higher 
subjects. 
Some difficulties were also brought to light and these include composability, covert 
channels, polyinstantiation and aggregation. A security property is composable if it 
remains intact even when it runs alongside other security mechanisms in the same 
system (Canetti, 2008). It looks at the issue of different secure systems becoming 
insecure when connected together. Covert channels refer to situations where backdoor 
channels allow the flow of information from a high security label to a low security 
labels. Polyinstantiation on the other hand occur when an effort to have different 
versions of data for different security labels ends up with inconsistent data.  
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3.12 Brewer-Nash Model (Chinese wall Security policy) 
The Brewer-Nash policy is a multilateral security policy in that it deals with the 
disclosure of information hence focus on confidentiality. The Chinese wall security 
policy (CWSP) is a mandatory access control policy. It however has a voluntary 
element to it in where users can choose which information they would like to see 
implicitly denying themselves the right to information from conflicting classes. It was a 
specific design with the financial industry in mind. Financial institutions providing 
corporate business services to other organisations can have insider knowledge of its 
rivals making and the disclosure of such information is highly unethical and could lead 
to legal action. When an analyst in the firm has information on a client they must be 
denied information of rival firms in order to prevent unauthorised disclosure. In other 
words such an analyst must uphold the confidentiality of information provided to him 
by his firm's clients and not advise organisations where he has insider knowledge of the 
plans, status or standing of a competitor. The CWSP operates at three levels. 
1. At the lowest level individual objects containing specific data items are 
considered, each concerning a specific company. 
2. At the intermediate level all objects concerning the same company are grouped 
together. These are referred to as „company data sets‟. 
3. At the highest level all company data sets whose corporations are in 
competition or conflict, are grouped together. They are referred to as conflict of 
interest classes (Brewer and Nash, 1989). 
The main rule in the CWSP is that once a subject has accessed an object the only other 
objects accessible by that subject can come from the same company dataset or from a 
different conflict of interest class (Minsky and Ungureanu, 1998). In other words an 
analyst can get information about any company but once the analyst gets information 
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about a given company, they are not allowed to get information about any other 
company in the same conflict of interest class. This means that a subject can at most 
have access to one company dataset in each conflict of interest class and any 
information that an analyst can get from a system depends on what they have accessed 
in the past. 
The problem with this model is that it assumes that conflict of interest is static. This is 
not so especially when the interest of companies constantly change and may have 
different types and levels of interest in other companies. Conflict of interest(CIF) 
classes can therefore overlap, and the assertion of having completely disjoint conflict of 
interest classes is challenged in the variant known as the Aggressive Chinese Wall 
Security Model (ACWSP) (Lin, 1989). In the CWSP conflict of interest are mutually 
disjoint sets however the ACWSP conflict of interest classes can overlap. The scenario 
used was that if an airline company A has an interest in company B and a petroleum 
company C also has an interest in company B they could be considered as being in the 
same CIF. In the CWSP such a conflict cannot exist were CIF classes are disjoint and 
this is one problem the ACWSP resolved. 
The access control model for data mining environments, a model based on the Chinese 
wall policy, draws from the aggressive Chinese wall security policy and makes use of 
overlaps in conflicts of interest data classes to ensure data integrity. It however 
identifies two other problems that were thought to be outstanding (Loock and Eloff, 
2005). The first is that the severity of the conflict between two companies should be 
definable. This is because the level of conflict may be such that it is negligible and may 
not affect access to information. The other issue was that the security policy model 
should be dynamic. That is to say situations change and if a company acquires an 
interest in another company it might come into conflict with other companies that it 
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previously was not in conflict with. On the other hand if a company ceases having an 
interest in a company that it previously had an interest in, it also ceases to be in conflict 
with companies that it was in conflict with. Loock and Eloff (2005) propose two 
mechanisms to dealing with these problems. The first is to define a conflict of interest 
sphere around a company and this is defined by a radius r. The second is to define the 
severity between two companies which is defined as the distance. On one hand when 
the radius is higher, the more interests a company has and potentially more companies 
it could be in conflict with. On the other hand the higher the distance between two 
companies the lower the conflict between them.  
The CWSP and its derivative models looks at the historic activity of a user and assigns 
the users rights to other data objects. Applied to transactions, a user‟s historic activity 
on a system could be used as means of preventing fraudsters from executing two 
unrelated transactions to enable fraud. The introduction of concepts like the sphere of 
conflict and the extent of the conflict could be used to determine the extent to which 
transactions performed by employees in the past conflict with current transactions. 
3.13 Biba Integrity Model 
The Biba integrity Model was the first security Policy to focus on integrity issues 
(Anderson et al., 2001). The Biba model recommends that no information can be 
written from a lower security/impure level to a higher/pure security level in direct 
contrast to Bell-LaPadula. Whilst Bell-LaPadula can allow a higher security level to 
read from a lower level Biba cannot allow a higher security level to read from a low 
level for the fear of the lower level contaminating the higher level. On the other hand 
the lower security level is not allowed to write to a higher level for the same fear of 
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contamination but BLP would rather not allow a higher security level to write to a 
lower level for the fear of leaking confidential information. 
A key principle introduced by the two models is the tranquillity principle which looks 
at the issue of changing the security label of a subject and object based on what it has 
accessed or has accessed it respectively. This can be linked to the mechanisms of the 
Chinese wall policy where a change to the level of conflict is made when circumstances 
regarding a subject‟s activities regarding an object changes. 
3.14 Clark – Wilson Model 
The Clark – Wilson Model was inspired by the double entry bookkeeping system 
(Anderson et al., 2001) to maintain integrity in commercial transactions. Double entry 
bookkeeping is a primitive accounting practice that requires that a transaction is entered 
into two accounting books one as a credit and the other as a debit. At the end of the day 
all the accounts add up and balance out to zero. With most organisations having 
different clerks in charge of different books it requires more than one clerk to commit a 
fraud.  
The Clark – Wilson model identifies two important mechanisms that are at the heart of 
control of fraud in commercial organisations. These are a well formed transaction and 
separation of duty (Clark and Wilson, 1987).   
3.14.1 Well formed transaction 
A well formed transaction is generally an operation on a data item. The concept of the 
well-formed transaction is that a user should not manipulate data arbitrarily, but only in 
constrained ways that preserve or ensure the integrity of the data. A well formed 
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transaction is also referred to as a Transformation Procedure (TP).  It recognises the 
importance of the mechanisms of a business process in the maintenance of integrity. 
3.14.2 Separation of Duty 
The principle of separation of duty involves the practice of dividing and allocating 
different tasks in a business process to different individuals to prevent a single 
individual from misusing the process (Hu et al., 2006). Perhaps the most basic 
separation of duty rule is that any person permitted to create or certify a well-formed 
transaction may not be permitted to execute it. This rule ensures that a minimum of two 
people are required to cause a change in a well formed transaction. The rationale for 
separating duties is to discourage fraud. By distributing the responsibility and authority 
for a task over a number of people it raises the risk by introducing the mandatory 
involvement of more than one individual in a fraud (Simon and Zurko, 1997). 
The basis for dividing a business process into tasks for the purpose of implementing a 
separation of duty policy is the existence of a conflict (Perelson, 2001). Conflicts are 
said to arise when the execution of two tasks by a person creates a vulnerability which 
exploited could threaten the business and its goals or lead to the loss of some resources. 
Table 3.1 showing the various levels of conflict that can arise.  
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Conflict  Static  Dynamic 
Conflicting Roles May not have the same 
user or conflicting users as 
members 
May not be assumed by 
the same user (or 
conflicting users) in one 
process instance 
Conflicting Permissions Must be assigned to 
conflicting Roles 
May not be exercised by 
the same user (or 
conflicting users) for a 
specific process instance 
Conflicting Users May not belong to 
conflicting roles 
May not perform 
conflicting tasks in the 
same process instance 
Conflicting Tasks Must be assigned to 
conflicting roles 
 
May not be executed by 
the same user (or 
conflicting users) in the 
same process instance 
Table 3.1; Conflict of entities paradigm (Perelson et al., 2001) 
In defining separation of duties the focus has always been either on the user, the role or 
on the permission with one factor being the focus at any one time. So there can be 
situation with conflicting users, conflicting roles or conflicting permission. 
Simon and Zurko(1997) classify separation of duties into two main classes strong 
exclusion or static separation of duty and weak exclusion or dynamic separation of 
duty. Implementation of separation of duty during design/administration time known as 
static separation of duty or runtime which is known as dynamic separation of duty 
(Perelson and Botha, 2000). Static separation of duty permanently prevents the user 
from performing any tasks that are conflicting to tasks within his permission and does 
not change given under any circumstances. Dynamic separation of duty on the other 
hand prevents the exercise of permission when certain conditions exist. Therefore 
based on the context under which a transaction is being processed a user can be 
prevented from executing a task. Simon and Zurko(1997) further classifies dynamic 
separation of duties into simple dynamic, object based, operational, history based, order 
dependent and order independent dynamic separation of duty. 
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A benefit of implementing dynamic separation of duty is to prevent the execution of 
valid assigned roles and permissions within the same transaction if there is a conflict in 
any of these roles or permission. In other words, though permissions have been validly 
assigned, a subject cannot exercise these rights together in one transaction if they are 
seen to be conflicting. The risk in this approach is in cases where subjects have 
exercised validly assigned roles or permissions within different transactions at different 
times to perpetrate fraud. As a matter of fact subjects have used such mechanisms as a 
means of creating deception to commit fraud. An example of such a case is when a 
bank staff opens a fraudulent account and at a later date approves a fraudulent loan for 
the account and then performs a withdrawal transaction as occurred in the 2006 fraud 
case of Donald McKenzie in the Royal Bank of Scotland (British Broadcasting 
Corporation, 2006). Object based separation of duty seem to deal with this. 
Object based separation of duties was first proposed by Nash and Poland (1990). Under 
this policy, users are allowed to perform a transaction if they are authorised to perform 
the task in question on a data item if they have not executed any other transaction upon 
that data item. This applies perfectly to a transaction voucher or cheque in the banking 
sector for instance where the voucher is the object. For example a clerk who has issued 
say a bankers draft to a customer cannot process the same draft when it is presented to 
the bank for processes. There are however risks that cannot be dealt with using this 
type of policy. For example it cannot deal with situations where customer accounts are 
the object. The problem is that unlike cheques which can be processed once, customer 
accounts are reusable therefore if this rule is enforced, users can only perform one 
transaction on an account. The implication would be that some accounts cannot be 
operated on when all the banking staff have performed one transaction on the account. 
Implementation of object separation of duties could however be modified to take into 
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consideration the level of conflict created due to the transaction history of a user on that 
account. Loock and Eloff (2005) modification to the Chinese wall security policy is a 
very practical means to determining the level of conflict between a current transaction 
that a user wants to perform and the transaction history of the user with respect to that 
customer account.    
3.14.3 Rules of the Clark – Wilson Model 
Central to the Clark – Wilson model is the classification of data elements. Data can be 
described either as an Unconstrained Data Item (UDI) or a Constrained Data Item 
(CDI). The Clark – Wilson model also introduces the Integrity Verification Procedures 
(IVP). 
Access control is between the subject, the data object (UDI) and the Transformation 
Procedure (TP) a concept known as the access control triple. The Clark – Wilson model 
revolves around 9 rules which are described as follows: 
1. The system will have an IVP for validating the integrity of any CDI. 
2. Application of a TP to any CDI must maintain its integrity. 
3. A CDI can only be changed by a TP. 
4. Subjects can only initiate certain TPs on certain CDIs. 
5. CW-triples must enforce an appropriate separation of duty policy on subjects. 
6. Certain special TPs on UDIs can produce CDIs as output. 
7. Each application of a TP must cause enough information to reconstruct it to be 
written to a special append-only CDI. 
8. The system must authenticate subjects attempting to initiate a TP. 
9. The system must let only special subjects (i.e., security officers) make changes 
to authorisation-related lists (Anderson et al., 2001). 
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One other requirement which the Clark – Wilson model recommends is that TPs must 
be run serially for concurrency control and that CDI in the middle of a TP there is no 
requirement that the system is in a valid state. This requirement therefore demands that 
TP must be atomic as a key requirement in addition to separation of duty. That is to say 
that the whole TP must be completed or it will not be valid. 
3.14.4 Role Based Access Controls  
Role based access controls (RBAC)  is a mandatory access control framework which 
attempts to match the functions/roles that members of an organisation perform within 
an organisation with the access granted to them (Farraiolo and Kuhn, 1992). RBAC is 
flexible in that it can take on organisational characteristics in terms of policy and 
organisational structure. It is seen as a framework which works well with other security 
policies taking advantage of their mechanisms for securing information.  
The principle in RBAC is that users are made members of specific roles in line with the 
function in their organisation. Appropriate permissions are then assigned to the roles. 
These permissions are the actions that users require to take to enable them to perform 
functions assigned to them in their various capacities in organisations. Roles have been 
described as logical groupings of permissions that reflect a particular task that can be 
assigned to some user (Aziz et al., 2006). Permissions on the other hand are referred to 
by Aziz et al (2006) as representing actions capabilities applications or any kind of 
active behaviour that can be performed and to which we want to control authorization.  
Role based access control provides the option to create a hierarchy of roles where roles 
can be composed of other roles. Hence sub-roles inherit all the permissions of the 
super-roles plus additional relevant permissions assigned to it. This gives the 
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opportunity to implement the principle of least privilege which has been seen as an 
important means in achieving integrity.   
There are three basic rules in implementing role based access controls as described by 
Farraiolo and Kuhn (1992). These are: 
1. Role assignment: A subject can execute a transaction only if the subject has 
been selected or been assigned a role. Transactions in this case are a 
transformation procedure therefore login is not classified as a transaction.  
2. Role authorisation: A subject's active role must be authorised for the subject 
3. Transaction authorisation: A subject can execute a transaction only if the 
transaction is authorised for the subject's active role. 
In addition a role may be assigned more than one transaction and a user can be assigned 
more than one role. Transformation procedures are transactions in the Clark-Wilson. In 
that sense read only access which do not transform any data object can be implemented 
by defining various modes for data objects and assigning subjects the right to access the 
objects in read only mode using transactions.  
In the process of implementing role based access controls there is the need to ensure 
that conflicting roles or permissions are not assigned to a user. In other words the 
administrators must ensure that the principle of separation of duty is strictly enforced to 
avoid situations where vulnerabilities which could be taken advantage of are created.  
3.15 Cryptography, Protocols and Transaction Security 
Cryptography refers to the science and art of designing ciphers with mathematical 
techniques. The focus of these techniques is to achieve information security objectives 
such as confidentiality, data integrity, entity authentication, and data origin 
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authentication (Menezes et al., 2001). Each cryptographic algorithm has its strengths 
and weaknesses hence they are used in concert to provide a complete suite of security 
services. Combined in a particular order, cryptographic tools form protocols which 
information security engineers use to protect systems against malicious use or errors. 
Protocols are therefore described as a series of steps, completed by two or more people 
designed to complete a task (Schneier, 2000).  
Generally there are three main types of types of cryptography; symmetric asymmetric 
and hash functions. Each type of encryption has its advantages and use. Symmetric 
encryption, message authentication codes, public key encryption, hash function, digital 
signatures schemes and random number generation  comprise the cryptographer‟s tool 
box (Schneier, 2000).  
Symmetric/secret key encryption uses the same key for both encryption and decryption. 
It is therefore critical that the key is kept secret at both ends of the communication. 
Asymmetric/public key cryptography on the other hand uses one key for encryption 
and a different one for decryption. One of the keys is freely distributed whereas the 
other key is kept private. The freely distributed one is known as the public key whilst 
the private one is known as the private key. Asymmetric cryptographic algorithms are 
highly effective for integrity, authentication, and key distribution (Khun et al., 2001). 
When encryption is done with a public key only the intended recipient can decrypt the 
message using a private key. The intended recipient is the only person that can read the 
messages ensuring confidential communication (Anderson, 2001). Due to its 
computational cost public key encryption is normally used to exchange keys to be used 
for symmetric encryption (Weise, 2001).  
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Alternatively when encryption is done with the private key any recipient can decrypt 
the message with the public key but it ensures that only the private key owner could 
have sent the message. Hence this form is used to digitally sign messages (Khun et al., 
2001).  
A public key infrastructure serves as a platform for implementing an effective public 
key encryption system (Weise, 2001). It refers to a system of hardware, software, 
people, policies, and procedures needed to create, manage, store, distribute, and revoke 
digital certificates. A digital certificate is an electronic certificate that binds a pair of 
electronic keys to an identity. By certifying a person„s public key it provides the 
assurance that electronic information communicated with the private-public key pair is 
authentic. Digital certificates are issued by Certification Authorities (CA) and it 
basically verifies a claim of a person to use a public key. Such mechanisms could tie an 
identity to a document a feature shown in chapter 5 to be critical in avoiding fraud. 
Driver‟s licenses and passports should provide similar assurance in the physical world 
but the issuing authority and process is critical to avoid fraudulent certificates. 
Digital certificates operate with digital signatures or encrypted message digest which is 
a hashed form of the message. The message digest serves as a digital fingerprint of the 
message. Alice encrypts with her private key and sends both the message and the 
digital signature to Bob. When Bob receives them, he decrypts the signature using 
Alice's public key, thus revealing the message digest. Bob verifies Alice‟s public key 
using the digital certificate issued by a certification authority. To verify the message, 
Bob then hashes it with the same hash function Alice used and compares the result to 
the message digest received from Alice. If they are exactly equal, Bob can be confident 
that the message did indeed come from Alice and has not changed since it was signed. 
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If any part of the message is modified, the hash function returns a different result. Hash 
functions on the other hand employ mathematics to do irreversible encryption. They are 
designed to have the property such that it is not feasible to either find a message that 
hashes to a given value or to find two messages that hash to the same value.  
Cryptographic protocols like the Secure Socket Layer/ Transport Layer Security 
(SSL/TLS), IPSec or Kerberos are used widely in electronic commerce transactions to 
ensure security. They are used to ensure secure communications; digitally sign and time 
stamp transaction to protect customer details, prevent non-repudiation and ensure that 
integrity of commercial transactions are maintained. The cryptographic toolbox could 
therefore be very useful in controlling fraud. 
3.16 Security Modelling, Verification and Validation 
A model in science is a physical, mathematical, or logical representation of a system of 
entities, phenomena, or processes. Basically a model is a simplified abstract view of the 
complex reality. In designing a complex system it is desirable to create a model for the 
purpose of analysis and to communicate the design.  
In the effort to produce a suitable security for a system a model becomes a useful tool 
for analysis and for accurately representing the system that be used to solve the issue at 
stake. This is especially so because it is expensive to use real life systems. Models can 
be manipulated more cheaply, conveniently and with little risks to the organisation. 
Models at one extreme can be used to automate routine decision which has a 
characteristic of regularity while at the other extreme are used as tools for thinking 
(Pidd, 2004). The uses to which models are put to, whether for thinking or replacing 
decision making, are a result of the issues to be considered.   
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Aside analysis, models are also used to describe new or proposed systems it sometimes 
becomes necessary to show that the model can do what it says. This process of 
verification or validity of models could be done by informal or formal methods. A brief 
distinction between verification and validation is that verification is “building the 
system right”, while validation is “building the right system”.   
Generally the main objective of performing a validation exercise is to test the 
correspondence between the policy and the requirements or model. This exercise deals 
with the system at the conceptual or logical level. It is known that a logical system 
expressive enough for mathematics is inherently undecided (Kuhn et al., 2002). This 
leaves two options for validation; to either reduce the system to make it decidable or to 
use human judgement. Validation is therefore an informal process and it addresses the 
questions whether the model designed can meet the requirements or the proof of 
correspondence between the policy and the system requirements. This is more so 
because in testing security models. The reason is that security testing focuses on 
proving the absence of undesirable behaviour rather than testing for design features and 
functionality. This presents a very difficult situation as there are always endless 
possibilities for failure. 
On the other hand requirements specification could be done formally. The aim is to 
confirm proof of correspondence that the system, as described by the specification, 
establishes and preserves the properties in the requirements policy (Kuhn et al., 2003). 
If they are in a formal notation, rigorous proofs can be constructed, either manually or 
with machine assistance. Effectiveness of the model however would depend on the 
technology used to implement the solution. Hence the implementation of a model is 
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also critical to achieve the security requirements stated in the security requirements 
policy.  
Though models of systems which are biased towards soft issues usually relating to 
social sciences/human behaviour are used for brainstorming and supporting decisions 
and require informal methods for validation. On the other hand models for more 
mechanical machine related systems can be used to automate routine decisions and its 
verification can be automated.  
Security modelling in the rural banking systems especially for fraud control will be 
mostly deal with soft issues. This is due to two factors. Firstly it is because large 
segments of the problem are determined by socio-cultural factors which cannot be 
verified by automation. Secondly the study aims to design the right system for fraud 
control devoid of most implementation issues. 
3.17 Fraud Identification and Control 
Aside the generic models discussed earlier various specific fraud control mechanisms 
are available. Generally to undertake preventive control of fraud it is useful to be able 
to identify situations that indicate fraud. Fraud seems to be characterised by certain 
externally visible symptoms. According to Albrecht et al (2003) they can be divided 
into six categories:  (1) document or record symptoms, (2) analytical symptoms---
things that are too large, too small, unusual or out of the ordinary, (3) internal control 
symptoms---overrides of internal controls, (4) lifestyle symptoms---increases in 
lifestyle or exorbitant spending, (5) behavioural symptoms---changes in one's 
behaviour to cope with the stress of being dishonest, and (6) tips and complaints 
(Albrecht et al., 2003). Based on the above symptoms a search was done by Albrecht et 
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al (2003) of a database of 16 years of bank records from Microfiche and Corporate 
databases was made. The following results were found. The frequencies of occurrence 
of fraud with the above symptoms have been described below; 
 Exception reports, reflecting fraudulent transactions that exhibited unusual, 
atypical and otherwise questionable patters of supervisor overrides, 
transactions with no apparent business purpose, and transactions involving 
unusually large amounts.  This symptom came from internally used bank 
records and occurred at least 221 times. 
 Journal vouchers containing only one signature or incorrect information and/or 
reflecting transfers between different customers' accounts.  This symptom was 
found on internally used bank records and occurred at least 22 times. 
 Deposit slips completed by the fraud perpetrator with missing information, 
incomplete customer names or where the name of the depositor did not match 
the name on the passbook and/or the account name in the bank's records.  This 
symptom was found on internally used bank records and occurred at least 56 
times. 
 Deposits and withdrawals exceeding $5,000 in the perpetrator’s passbook 
account.  This symptom was found on internally used bank records and 
occurred at last 90 times. 
 Withdrawal vouchers completed by the fraud perpetrator missing customer 
names or signatures and/or containing incomplete or inaccurate information.  
This symptom was found on internally used bank records and occurred at least 
35 times. 
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 Bank checks reflecting transfers between different customers' accounts or 
checks with altered dates.  This symptom was found on internally used bank 
records and occurred at least 22 times. 
 Withdrawal vouchers and checks containing purported customer signatures by 
the fraud perpetrator readily distinguishable upon comparison from the 
customer's signature.  This symptom was found on internally used bank records 
and occurred at least 73 times. 
 Withdrawal vouchers completed by the perpetrator showing a different name 
from the account name.  This symptom occurred on internally used bank 
records and occurred at least 60 times. 
 Large negative available balances in slush and other customer accounts.  This 
symptom was found on internally used bank records and occurred at least 15 
times. 
 Split deposits of customer funds between accounts of different customers and/or 
deposits of customer checks where the fraud perpetrator received cash back.  
This symptom was found on internally used bank records and occurred at least 
9 times. 
 CDs closed prematurely with proceeds placed in lower interest-bearing 
passbook accounts, sometimes with large penalties.  This symptom was found 
on internally used bank records and occurred at least 42 times. 
 Customers not being present when accounts were opened and closed or when 
transactions were affected in the account.  This symptom occurred on internally 
used bank records and occurred numerous times in 26 different slush accounts. 
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 Large withdrawals of cash by the fraud perpetrator from customer accounts.  
This symptom was found on internally used bank records and occurred at least 
221 times. 
 The mailing of customer account statements to the fraud perpetrator's home 
instead of to the customer, without written authorization.  This symptom was 
found on internally used bank records and occurred in at least 40 different 
accounts. (Albrecht and Albrecht, 2006). 
Even though good screening practices can always be used to keep risky people out of 
an organisation, new motivation to commit fraud can arise and the character of people 
who have been admitted into an organisation can change. These fraud promoting 
conditions cannot be entirely controlled hence they must be observed. Mechanisms that 
remove the opportunity and prevent people from committing fraud can however be 
implemented and controlled to prevent people who might have a reason to commit 
fraud incapable of doing so. In designing an antifraud system the focus should be on 
implementing controls in such a way that the opportunity to commit fraud is reduced. It 
is important to include mechanisms that deal with or prevent symptoms and ensure for 
example that there are genuine source documents and that these controls cannot be 
overridden. Unusual parameters like large amounts could be used as an indicator for 
detection. Employee lifestyle, change in behaviour and tip offs could be indicators of 
fraud as indicated earlier and so mechanism must be put in place to investigate them. 
Detecting such symptoms however cannot be designed into the service delivery 
processes.   
Really large frauds cases, over a billion dollars, have involved lax internal controls 
(Anderson, 2001). The general view is that good fraud control comes in the form of 
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better management, control and audited access of employees, partners and customers 
control systems (Small, 2004). A theme identified by (Foundation of Research and 
Education, 2005) as a good control of fraud is to build standardised and accepted 
management practices and processes that are aligned with new technology. Though it is 
desirable to align the fraud control system with technology, their standardisation could 
reduce their impact since fraudsters use highly dynamic techniques as discussed earlier. 
It is therefore preferable to have systems that are tailored to the circumstances of the 
organisation in question and capable to the changing threat situation. Systems that 
usually rely on technology are inflexible whereas people dependent systems can be 
regularly configured to reflect changing risks and are more responsive than static 
systems (Foley, 2003). To achieve the level of dynamism that is able to deal with fraud 
it would be desirable to use technology but retain some level of human configuration. 
Foley (2003) further states that Systems among others must be designed to be resilient 
to infrastructure failures and to achieve this, designs must be flexible enough to deal 
with the changing risk and fraud environment. Proactive forensic data analysis tools 
like sophisticated analytic testing, computer-based cross matching, and non-obvious 
relationship identification can be important in the detection of fraud (KPMG, 2007). 
This can help identify potential fraud and misconduct that otherwise would remain 
unnoticed by management, possibly for years. Some of these tools are however post-
transaction where detection occurs when the fraudster could be long gone. Detection 
and prevention in a timely manner more desirable because it makes good business 
sense and can provide cost savings by minimizing the resulting damage (Deloitte 
Development LLC, 2004). 
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Fraud detection systems usually use intrusion detection mechanisms (Kvarnstrom et al., 
2000). Intrusion detection involves techniques that are used to detect events in a system 
that violates a security policy. One of the main problems using intrusion detection 
methods for fraud detection is that fraud involves a deliberate attempt to mislead, and 
so fraud instances that do not violate security policies might not be detected. This is a 
particular problem in anomaly based detection where normal system behaviour does 
not necessarily indicate the absence of fraud. Traditionally intrusion detection of 
undesired activities in an information system is done either through the use of 
signatures of the undesired activities, detection of an anomalous situation or the use of 
state patterns. Pattern based detection depends on knowing the characteristics of the 
undesired activity. On the other hand anomalous behaviour depends on knowing the 
characteristics of normal behaviour of the system without any undesired activity 
(Kumar, 1995).  
Detection based on signatures is done through the use of matching signatures to 
observed events. Signatures are patterns of known undesired activity. Signature based 
detection is very rigid and could be very reliable in detection in some cases. There are 
some problems that arise with using signature based detection. First there can be a high 
level of high false positives especially in simple pattern matching as is done in 
signature based detection (Cisco, 2002). The second problem is that when an attack 
does not match exactly the signature the fraud can be missed. Another problem that 
arises in using signatures to prevent fraud is that fraud is highly dynamic with many 
variations for deception hence each case of fraud is a rare incident. Also as discussed 
earlier historical incidents which can be used to create signatures are not very good 
pointers to future incidents.  
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Anomalous based detection on the other hand is able to detect previously unknown 
attacks and detection is highly dependent on the system learning what is normal. The 
problem with this kind of detection method for fraud however is that networks can be 
isolated in the case of intrusion detection to ensure that no undesired activity is done. 
One can never be sure that the supposedly normal state is devoid of fraud or that users 
cannot use “normal” processes to commit fraud.     
It is clear that both techniques involve the use of a current activity being inside or 
outside a set of predetermined set. The problem with both approaches is that it depends 
on prior knowledge of how a fraud should look like and does not make use of possible 
vulnerabilities a system might have. A vulnerability analysis looking at weak points in 
the system is necessary to bridge these two forms of detection. This would cover 
known and unknown fraud patterns and unacceptable transaction patterns which could 
result in fraud based on vulnerabilities and weaknesses of the system. 
3.18 Banking Systems and Banking Controls 
Currently there are a number of banking controls that are used to control fraud. These 
involve the physical and electronic controls that are implemented to forestall in this 
case any operational risks. This involves protecting the banking operations. A banks 
operations involve a branch bookkeeping system comprising customer account master 
files and a number of journals that record and keep track of day to day transactions 
(Head, 1966). The main threat to this system is thought to be the bank‟s own staff. 
There are also high-value messaging systems behind the scenes that move large sums 
of money between banks locally or internationally. These systems are used to trade 
securities, to issue letters of credit and guarantees among others. Banking systems are 
generally protected by bookkeeping mechanisms. In addition, access control 
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mechanisms and cryptographic mechanisms are also used to support the protection of 
these systems especially in area of interbank messaging systems  (Anderson, 2001).  
Banks also use physical security mechanisms like safes and vaults with burglar alarms 
with cryptographically protected messaging system linked to control centres run by 
security companies. 
Recently most banks have an online presence which gives customers the ability to 
manage accounts and perform some transactions on the internet. They integrate back 
into main bookkeeping systems of banks and traders. These systems require secure 
communications between the customer and the bank and or merchant usually secure 
socket layer/transport layer security (SSL/TLS).  
Generally banking information systems serve two purpose of providing real time 
responses to enquiries about individual account status and providing more complex 
combination of information for management (Head, 1966). A typical banking system 
has various data structures usually an account master containing each customers current 
balance and previous transactions covering a period of say 90 days, a number of 
journals tracking assets which are going through the system (Anderson, 2001). It also 
has various journals which hold transactions from teller stations, cash machines check 
sorters etc but which have not yet been entered into the ledgers and finally audit trails 
recording which staff member did what and when. 
Vulnerabilities within these banking systems enable fraudsters to commit frauds such 
as rogue trading, fraudulent loans, wire/transfer fraud, forging documents to commit 
fraud and identity theft. Other frauds like including forged or altered or stolen cheques, 
cheques kiting, payment card fraud, impersonation or identity theft, prime bank fraud, 
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fictitious bank inspector fraud, phishing and money laundering have been committed 
(Henderson, 2000).  
3.18.1 Customer Identity and Identity Crime 
Arguably the most important issue in banking security is identity management. This is 
because a person's identity is central to almost all commercial activity. Identity is 
however a social and personal construct (Fearon, 1999). It involves marking the person 
by a set of distinguishing characteristics which are socially consequential but more-or-
less unchangeable. Social identity therefore involves a set of persons marked by a label 
and distinguished by rules deciding membership and characteristic features or 
attributes. Though certain categories of identity in current usage are not seen as central 
to a person‟s identity, identity however evokes the idea that social categories are bound 
up with the bases of an individual's self-respect (Fearon, 1999).  
Banks open accounts for legal entities that have the capacity to enter into a contract and 
can be held liable in the event of a breach. To distinguish an individual is to identify an 
individual (McCallister et al., 2009). To do this organisations use a collection of 
personal information that commences at birth, expands throughout life and terminates 
upon death to create and verify identity (CIFAS, 2009 , Fafinski, 2005). Identity in that 
sense describes a data construct or a series of attributes that represents an actual entity 
in a particular context and by extension an identifier is simply data signifying an 
identity (Office of the Corporate Chief Information Officer, 2003). This information 
arises in two ways; biologically and socially (Grant, 2007).These include personal 
details such as a person‟s name, date of birth, address, mother‟s maiden name etc. Each 
piece of information forms a partial identity of an individual and each personal 
identifiable information or a combination of such information can distinguish an 
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individual to an extent (McCallister et al., 2009). These details are in turn verified by a 
mosaic of documents and records, including passports, driving licences, birth or 
marriage certificates, utility bills, bank statements, payslips, educational qualifications. 
To use this form of identification requires reliable systems that can produce such 
documents and records.  
Identity crime is a generic term covering identity theft and identity fraud. It is used to 
describe a crime in which a perpetrator uses a false identity to facilitate the commission 
of a crime like fraud (Police Commissioners‟ Conference-Electronic Crime Steering 
Committee, 2003). A false identity involves creating a fictitious identity by 
manufacturing, forging or fraudulently obtaining legitimate documentation to satisfy 
proof of identity requirements. It also includes altering one‟s personal identifiable 
information. Identity theft on the other hand occurs when the perpetrator uses the 
personal identifiable information of another living or dead person. Bruce Schneier 
(2005) has referred to identity theft as an oxymoron because identity is the one thing 
that cannot be stolen and that identity is not a possession that can be acquired or lost.  
The actual crime that occurs in identity theft is fraud through the use of impersonation 
(Schneier, 2005a). Identity fraud occurs when a false identity or someone else‟s 
identity details are used to support unlawful activity, or when someone avoids 
obligation/liability by falsely claiming that he/she was the victim of Identity Fraud. 
Identity crime has however gained currency in recent times mainly because of the 
increase use of information-based credentials. There are two issues that arise as a result 
of identity theft. These are access to personal identifiable information which raises 
privacy issues and the second is the ability to use this acquired personal identifiable 
information to deceive another person. Most often solutions have focused on achieving 
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privacy (McCallister et al., 2009) even though the problem is to do with one person 
using another person‟s identity to create deception.  
To control this organisations use of robust controls to ensure that users are who they 
say they are and they can only see the information they are authorized to see  
(PricewWaterhouseCoopers, 2004). It also ensures that identities are set up on systems 
when people join and deleted when they leave an organisation in an efficient and 
prompt manner. Properly identifying customers when they open accounts in a bank is 
very crucial and a key part of customer due diligence in banking. It is commonly 
accepted in banking that customer due diligence popularly known as Know-Your-
Customer (KYC) is key to ensuring security of banking operations and the prevention 
of the use of banking facilities to engage in criminal activity and money laundering. 
The Bank for international settlements indicates that KYC policies should involve a 
customer acceptance policy, customer identification, an on-going monitoring of high 
risk accounts and risk management (Working Group on Crossborder Banking, 2001 , 
WGCB, 2001).  A customer acceptance policy is essentially a policy on customer 
profiling involving how to identify high risk customers and deal with them. An 
important part of a carrying out a customer acceptance policy is customer identification 
and this forms part of the identity management process.  
The processes involved in identity management are the creation, management and 
deletion of identities of users within an organisation. To create an identity, most 
organisations rely on identity credentials packaged by another party and presented by 
the person who is requesting to be a member of the organisation. The problem is that 
the initial identity credentials presented by a person to create an identity could be 
 87 
fictitious hence there is the need for business institutions including banking 
organisations to adopt mechanisms that are reliable to prove the identity of a person. 
There are therefore three parties involved in creating an identity. These are the subject, 
the accrediting party and the relying party(Lowry, 2003). The first step is for the 
accrediting party to verify the identity of the subject. This involves proving that the 
individual is who he says he is. In other words the unchangeable personal identification 
information for which society identifies the subject must be shown to be true. When the 
identity is verified a credential must be created and packaged. The credential must be 
such that the relying party can trust it. This requires that the credential be reliable and 
that it proves that the bearer is the true owner of the personal identification information.  
Two main issues are important to ensure the reliability accreditation process. The first 
is whether the accrediting party has reliable information to certify the subject‟s identity. 
Secondly, the form of packaging of the credential awarded to the subject for 
presentation must also be such that it is reliable. The credential package must be such 
that it is difficult to forge, clone, alter or the subject cannot be impersonated (Working 
Group on Crossborder Banking, 2001). The best ways to deal with these problems 
depend on the context and the environment within which the parties are operating and 
the accreditation is being done. Grant (2007) indicates that it is important to have the 
accrediting authority accept liability for certifying the identities of person and for 
creating an audit trail for the purpose of traceability. 
3.18.2 Customer Authentication 
When an identity has been created in an organisation, the issue of verifying their 
identity when they return arises. This involves a process where the person professes an 
identity usually issued by the company and presents an identifier or some credentials. 
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This identity credential forms the basis for determining different levels of service use 
for users. It is the main reason a fraudster would want to assume the identity of another 
person to receive his level of service. Customer authentication is therefore very 
important. It refers to the process by which a subject is recognised and this is when the 
presented identity is verified and accepted to be valid (Stewart et al., 2005). Computer 
systems usually do not know one person from another so what a computer would 
typically verify is the credentials presented to it by the subject. One of the mechanisms 
which organisations use in the management of identities is a digital identity. This 
involves the codification of personal identification information and to assign a unique 
identifier for which the computer system can use for the purpose of authenticating the 
natural person in a computer system.  
There are three main forms of verifying an identity in authentication (Stewart et al., 
2005). The first is “what a person knows” for example a PIN or password. The second 
is based on “what on what a person has” for example a smartcard. The third form of 
authentication is based on “who the person is” which is a biometric factor like a 
fingerprint or iris pattern. In addition to these there can also be authentication based on 
“something you do” or “somewhere you are” in terms of location. These means of 
authentication can be combined to increase the security. 
In banking, PIN‟s are normally used a for identity authentication for Automated Teller 
Machines, online banking and point of sale transactions. They are usually a four 
number digit with each number ranging from 0 to 9. This gives 10,000 possible 
combinations of PINs and a 10
4
 (0.001) probability of successfully guessing a PIN. 
PIN‟s can be used multiple times until it is actively changed by the user. They are 
usually used together with other authentication mechanisms to form a two factor 
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authentication system. This could either be with a chip, a username, a password or a 
Transaction Authentication Number (TAN). TAN‟s are one time use passwords that are 
invalidated when used. Its current use in Europe is in online transactions where is it 
used together with a PIN to validate transaction. Though various two factor 
authentication systems using PIN‟s seems to have drawbacks (Wiesmaier et al., 2005 , 
Bond and ski, 2003), it offers a secure authentication mechanism in reducing face to 
face fraud (Association for Payment Clearing Services, 2007).  
In modern banking, the token used are credit or debit cards. A requirement of a token is 
that is must have a unique identity. Bank cards therefore have unique numbers and in 
some cases have a magnetic strip or chip. Bank card numbers are ISO 7812 numbers 
hence follow a convention (The Fraud Practice, 2008b). The first digit represents the 
Major Industry Identifier (MII). The next six digit is known as the Bank Identification 
Number (BIN) or recently Issuer Identifier Number (IIN) with access to the BIN or IIN 
a merchant has an opportunity to check if the card issuing bank is in the same country 
as the transaction. The BIN or IIN is then followed by an account number. The last 
digit is derived using the Luhn algorithm a checksum usually used to validate card 
identification numbers. The use of card numbers give merchants the opportunity to 
identify the origin of the card and when compared to say the billing address they can 
make a decision as to how risky the transaction is or whether it requires further 
investigation. Credit and debit cards also have the Card CV number which is the three 
digit number found on the signature strip of the card. Card can therefore be accurately 
identified but the way the information is used or checked and verified could determine 
how useful it is in deterring fraud. The problem with the identifier of banks cards is that 
it does not change so it can be copied when fraudsters get access to it.  
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Biometric identification, the third factor, involves a pattern-recognition mechanism that 
recognises a person based on a feature derived from a specific physiological or 
behavioural characteristic that the person possesses (Delac and Grgic, 2004). Involves 
the use of unique personal characteristics of an individual to identify and distinguish 
them from another person. These characteristics include fingerprints, retinal scans, 
DNA, voiceprints and facial characteristics. The difficulty in using this measure is that 
criminals can use another person‟s identity and their own biometrics to set up a 
fraudulent account from the start and can be difficult to detect if the bank does not have 
a record of the persons biometric information. The attractiveness of biometrics which is 
its difficulty to change is also a disadvantage. However when it gets into unauthorised 
hands it cannot be cancelled and reissued. It can however be very useful when the 
initial identification is correct. In using biometrics banks can match an identity to a 
natural person and this can prevent the person from assuming any other identity.  
3.18.3 Transaction Authorisation 
In certain cases an authorisation is required before a withdrawal or purchase transaction 
can proceed. This usually involves verifying that there is enough money to cover a 
withdrawal or transaction at the time it is processed and that the card used has not been 
reported as lost or stolen (The Fraud Practice, 2008c). Seeking authorisations gives a 
merchant the all clear to process then transaction. An authorisation does not guarantee 
that a transaction is not fraudulent (UK Card Association, 2009). This is because the 
checks are limited and does not do a wide range of checks to prevent deception.  
3.18.4 Cheque verification 
Merchants can cross check with a bank to verify if a cheque is valid or not. Typically 
cheque verification can provide information about an account that can help a merchant 
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to make a decision to stop a transaction. Information about an account that can be 
verified include the account number or the routing number (The fraud Practice, 2008a). 
If any of these details are found to be invalid the transaction cannot go ahead. On the 
other hand if the account is currently in a non-sufficient funds balance position to cover 
the cost of the transaction it cannot go through. Also when instructions like a stop 
payment order for the cheque number being used for the purchase or account is given 
by the account holder, it would be revealed during verification and the transaction 
would be stopped. Finally if the account is a non demand deposit account, closed or 
does not exist it or whether the cheque is stolen, forged or fraudulent it would be 
disclosed and so payment cannot go through. 
Cheque verification processes can verify that the details on the cheque and also prevent 
a transaction to be processed if there is insufficient funds in the account. It is not an 
effective fraud detection mechanism because it cannot detect a forged cheque which 
has correct account details on it. 
3.19 Summary 
Analysis in this chapter has revealed various issues that must be taken into 
consideration in managing fraud risks especially in rural banking.  
Information security techniques could be used to enforced internal controls and it 
should therefore be seen as a tool that can be effective in implementing internal 
controls. Security however is said to be like a layered onion: on the outside are the 
users, further inside is the relation between user and system and between system, 
further inside is the software that enforce security rules and in the centre is 
cryptography that enforce security (Schneier, 2000). Security is never simple and it is 
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more than a series of counter measures rather it is a complex system that interacts with 
itself, the assets being protected, and the surrounding environment (Schneier, 2006). 
These interactions affect security in a profound way in that they are the points at which 
the systems fails when attacked. Security systems have multiple stakeholders with each 
stakeholder having an agenda which might not necessarily be in line with the others. 
For the mechanisms aimed at achieving the security objective to succeed, the 
stakeholder made responsible for enforcing it must be in line with their vested interest. 
It is very important that the context within which the organisation operates must be 
taken in to consideration in designing effective controls and that fraud risks must also 
be managed in compliance with business goals. To achieve the most effective controls, 
the system must be looked at holistically. It is important that the human context within 
which the technology is going to operate is not be sidelined. It is also important the 
controls put in place are responsive and adaptive. To achieve that it is important to have 
some level of human configuration for the system to maintain the flexibility. Though 
risk mitigating mechanisms could be inspired by standards and best practices, they 
must be modified to fit the organisation in which they are to be deployed and how the 
various stakeholder goals are aligned.  
Also shown in this chapter are several security models available to achieving various 
security goals within a business system and to put together into an access control 
system to controlled access to resources. 
The next Chapter explores the issue of human behaviour and culture in security 
systems. 
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Chapter 4 
 
 
4 Information Systems Security and Culture Interactions 
This chapter discusses issues relating to culture and security interactions. It first 
discusses the social component of information systems. It then looks at the types of 
culture and how they might affect success of technological change and security 
systems. There is subsequently a look at the culture of Ghana and how it might affect 
the success of any security system implemented to deal with any fraud risks within the 
rural banking industry. 
4.1 Social Dimension of Information Systems 
Information systems are made up of information stored or processed by an 
organisation, the hardware and software that constitute system configuration and 
procedures that guide user actions and people. Besides a structural view, there is a 
functional view of systems which is in terms of its inputs, processes and outputs of 
material, energy or information. There is also a set of relationships between various 
parts of a system creating functional as well as structural relationships with each other. 
The interaction between the various components of an information system creates a 
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culture within an organisation which has an impact on security (Veiga and Eloff, 2010). 
This perspective indicates the presence of a technical part but also a social dimension 
which arises as a result of the interaction between users. In that sense information 
systems have a social system that is formed by the actions and relations among the 
users (Karyda et al., 2005). These elements of information systems should be taken into 
consideration in designing controls. This is because organisational issues like the loss 
of organisational memory and the lack of community mechanisms and changing threat 
environments are not just a contributory factor in security failure they can often be the 
primary cause (Anderson, 2001).  
4.2 Culture and Technology Interactions  
Both cultural determinism and technological determinism are perceived to be 
unsuccessful in the management of technological change (Jackson and Philip, 2010). 
Technological determinism takes the view that technology is the key determinant for 
driving cultural change and bringing about techno-change success and that change can 
be planned and implemented in a top-down fashion by senior management. This 
approach lacks the attention to culture. On the contrary cultural determinism takes the 
view that the main cause of techno-change failure is the neglect of human and cultural 
factors and that the major causes of resistance are factors inherent in people either as 
individuals or in groups. There is therefore an attempt to radically change 
organisational culture prior to IT implementation in an attempt to achieve successful 
introduction of technology. From this perspective, the major causes of resistance are 
factors inherent in people and groups. In cultural determinism, culture is viewed as 
behaviour that cultivated, manipulated and controlled by management (Veiga and 
Eloff, 2010). This approach therefore lacks attention to technological issues like 
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deriving requirements developing technologies suitable to existing culture. Aligning 
technology and culture to each other could be a more successful approach.   
4.3 Human Behaviour and its Influence on Security  
A variety of reasons and explanations have been put forth for explaining the lack of 
effectiveness in the use of IS security policies. Whereas the security objectives for 
individual entities like servers, workstations, files and networks are similar across 
different organisations, there is no single security solution, nor a single security policy 
that can fit all organisations. The indication is that the human factor and context affects 
the success or otherwise of an information security system. In order to be effective 
there is the need to align security requirements, organisational goals and other 
stakeholder objectives that depend on the specific organisation and its environment.  
In attempting to understanding the influence of the human factor it is important to 
recognise that people are more than just the roles that embody their work identity for 
example an accountant. Each individual also has a unique set of attitudes, beliefs and 
perceptions (Ashenden, 2008). These attitudes could affect security in a profound way. 
It is always said that the strength of the security of a system is dependent on the 
weakest link and humans are said to be the weakest link.  
One reason often cited includes the view that security controls often constitute a 
„barrier to progress‟. This view indicates an antagonistic view of human security 
interaction which would result in security policies being circumvented by employees in 
their effort to perform their tasks efficiently. The impact of social element on 
information security makes it more imperative for information systems to take internal 
control systems on board since they are designed to deal with weaknesses inherent in 
 96 
humans. In the eight principles of information security one of the principles cited is that 
information security is constrained by societal factors (Swanson and Guttman, 1996). It 
indicates that the ability of security to support the mission of an organisation may be 
limited by various factors, such as social issues. It however admits that the relationship 
between security and societal norms is not necessarily antagonistic. Although it admits 
that security can in some cases help meet societal goals like increase the achievement 
of privacy goals, the general view is that societal factors only limit the ability to 
achieve desirable security.  
Security however is not always constrained by societal factors it can be enhanced by 
societal factors. The vigilance and the willingness of a community to cooperate with 
police for instance is a critical factor in the success of police investigations hence the 
character and culture of a community is a crucial factor for a security measure to 
succeed or not. Reliable controls can only be achieved by understanding the failure 
modes of the system and most of these are a result of human failures. The success of 
many attacks on computer systems can be traced back to the security engineers not 
understanding the psychology of the system users they meant to protect (Stajano and 
Wilson, 2009). This further shows the need to consider culture in the design of systems.  
Social factors can affect security mainly in two ways. They do so by thwarting or 
supporting the implementation and management of security systems. They also do so 
by being exploited by the attackers to achieve their ends. The latter is known as a social 
engineering attack. It is worth noting that the difference between these two is about 
who takes advantage of human characteristics; the security manager/designer or the 
attacker. Whatever the case is, it is important for the security manager to understand the 
nature of humans. 
 97 
4.4 Social Engineering 
The exploitation of human weaknesses by attackers to breach IT security has recently 
become a topical issue. This involves someone manipulating others into revealing 
information that can be used to steal data, access money, information on computer 
systems, phones, or even an identity (Peltier, 2006). Social engineering attacks are the 
most difficult to prevent mostly because they are not predictable and are based on the 
manipulation of humans who tend to be illogical and unpredictable.  According to 
Peltier (2006) the goal of the social engineer is to prey on the attributes of humans such 
as the desire to help others, the tendency to trust people, the fear of getting into trouble 
and their willingness to cut corners. Social engineering therefore uses human and social 
characteristics to aid an attacker. 
Social engineering attacks usually involve two elements: the physical aspect and the 
psychological aspect (Orgill et al., 2004). The physical aspect makes use of location 
where victims have a false sense of security whereas the psychological aspects prey on 
the human nature and emotion. Most often social engineering attacks combine these 
two aspects in a single attack.  
An audit conducted by Orgill et al (2004) showed that solitary employees were more 
easily manipulated than those in groups though peer pressure could sometimes be 
detrimental. Building trust between the victim and the attacker was vital for a 
successful attack. Education of would be victims is seen as the main method of 
preventing such attacks.  
It is also worth noting that in these attacks the behaviour of people is not changed, 
rather they are exploited. This is an important hint for security system designers and 
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managers to understand the behaviour of users to help set up more robust systems and 
to help educate them.    
4.5 Human Behaviour and Culture  
Culture has been described as the customs, ideas and social behaviour of a group of 
people (Oxford University Press, 2002). It describes the set of shared attitudes, values, 
goals, and practices that characterises an institution, organisation or group. National 
culture has been defined as the programming of the mind that is manifested in the 
values and beliefs of a society (Hofstede, 1980). Values are reflected in an individual‟s 
preferences for certain states of affairs. There are two main cultures that comes to the 
fore when discussion its impact on information security. There is the culture within the 
organisation and then the culture within the larger community outside the organisation. 
In an organisation an individual‟s cultural conditioning would come together with their 
interactions to determine their way of life how they react to technological solutions. 
Individuals have a personal and social culture that they bring with them to work 
(Ashenden, 2008). This further indicates the importance of not only the internal culture 
of an organisation but also its external culture and character.  
The main levels of organisational culture has been described artifacts, espoused values 
and shared tacit assumption (Niekerk and Solms, 2009). Artifacts are what can be 
observed, seen, heard and felt whilst espoused values consist of the organisation‟s 
official viewpoints usually expressed in mission statements etc. Shared tacit values are 
assumptions beliefs, and values that have become shared acquired from a joint learning 
process. Shared tacit values are usually taken for granted in an organisation. Though 
organisations may have some control over the culture within the organisation it does 
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not have much control on the culture outside it. This however should not make it any 
less important.  
Security problems are shaped by the outer and the inner context of an organisation 
(Karyda et al., 2005). Whilst the outer context includes factors that are found in the 
economic, political, social, competitive and industrial environment of the organisation, 
the inner context on the other hand includes structural, political and cultural elements 
within the organisation. Both the outer and inner context determines the nature of the 
organisation. These two contexts shape the outcome of processes through the activities 
and behaviour of the actors. In developing and implementing policies it is important to 
understand the emergent, situational and holistic features of the processes within the 
context of their occurrence in order to find the appropriate policy.    
4.6 Taking Advantage of Culture in Security Design 
It is suggested that the type of culture that a group has determines the effectiveness of 
controls. The argument is that social interaction gives a world view of an individual and 
this combines with the individual‟s cultural bias which in turn determines a person‟s 
way of life (Jackson and Philip, 2010). Figure 4.1 shows the four classes of social 
positions that a person could be classified as. 
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The four types of social characteristics are determined by the level of two dimensions 
grid and group (Jackson and Philip, 2010). Whilst grid refers to the extent to which an 
individual‟s life is governed by rules and regulations, group individual are controlled 
by the group in which they live or work members and are compelled to act in 
accordance with the collective interests of the group. 
Fatalism is characterised by strong grid and weak group. People in this group display 
values of apathy and fear. Hierarchism is characterised by strong grid and strong group 
and emphasis on order, discipline and coordination of tasks to ensure that events stay 
on course. Individualism/market offers ample opportunity for creativity and innovation. 
Egalitarianism is characterised by group concerns which take priority over individual 
interests stressing the importance of group-ethos, teamwork and trust. 
There are other views proposing a four dimension model of work-related culture 
(Hofstede, 1980). These are power distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism and 
masculinity. It is suggested that the appropriateness of, or preference for specific 
controls depends on the dimension that a group falls in.  
Strong Grid + 
Strong  + 
Group 
Weak - 
 
Weak - 
Fatalism Hierarchism 
Individualism
/ Market 
Egalitarianism 
Figure 4.1 Cultural Theory and the four ways of life (Jackson and Philip, 2010) 
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Different cultural characteristics enable or hinder technological solutions. Whilst 
hierarchical culture could encourage visionary leadership and coordination of resources 
egalitarianism on the other hand could encourage teamwork trust and knowledge 
sharing. Individualists in contrast to collectivist are more inwardly focused and 
predisposed to thoughts and actions that benefit themselves over others in their peer 
group (Luo et al., 2009). Consequently their desires and perceived requirements for 
privacy are strong. Many organisational security activities like system and web traffic 
monitoring through proxy servers require some level of invasion of individual privacy. 
To achieve this there is the need to sacrifice some level of individual privacy in order to 
maintain organisational security. Questions about the extent to which an individual 
would forgo personal privacy to enhance organisational security arise. Individualism 
focuses on “I” but could encourage creativity, drive and innovation (Garcia-Sordo and 
Baren, 1999 , Jackson and Philip, 2010) but could hinder policies that invade privacy. 
For collectivist employees, organisational motives are of greater importance than their 
personal goals and the use of monitoring controls is likely to strengthen their sense of 
affective commitment to the organisation as long as they believe the monitoring 
activity benefits the firm. 
There is a suggestion that cultural values of the originators of some management and 
security systems underline these systems. These values might be significantly different 
from the values of the adopting countries and the difference in cultural values has been 
described as a potential barrier to implementing such systems (Al-Zamany et al., 2002). 
Models like the Clark-Wilson model and standards like that recommended by the Basel 
committee which were discussed in the last paragraph might not work in Ghana if they 
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are implemented in the same way they are in places like Europe and America. They 
should therefore be aligned to the culture of Ghana to ensure they are successful.  
Jackson and Philip (2010) have argued that cultural and technology interactions that 
impact the success of technological change are not static and recommend using techno-
cultural emergence as the most effective approach. That notwithstanding it is clear that 
the culture of a community must be thoroughly understood and that the design and 
implementation of a security system must be closely aligned with culture to ensure 
success.  
4.7 Culture of Ghana 
The values of the Ghanaian society is one set on social harmony and the well being of 
others not just the individual (Utley, 2009). There is a high attitude of social conformity 
and tribal loyalty which is in turn rooted in ancient tradition and religion. This makes 
for a close knitted society with clear rules and boundaries that affect interpersonal 
relationships, legal rights to property, social roles and obligations. 
4.7.1 Tribal and Families Roles in Ghanaian Societies 
Most individuals in Ghana belong to one ethnic group or the other and identify 
themselves as such, speak the language of their tribe and largely follow the traditions of 
their tribes (Utley, 2009). Tribes on the other hand are made up of families to which 
individuals belong to.  
A Ghanaian family has been described as a cohesive unit which ideally provides 
economic (in terms of land for farming among others), social and psychological 
security to all its members (Degbey, 1997). The Ghanaian family defines social and 
moral norms and safeguards material and spiritual customs and traditions as well as 
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providing a variety of role models for preparing for adulthood. Mutual help, collective 
responsibility and reciprocal obligation are the important norms (Utley, 2009). This 
system with the dominance of its elderly members being a safe of society knowledge 
has a relatively high degree of social control on the individual especially the youth. 
Families therefore form a very important community unit for identity and cohesion in 
rural Ghana. Families are the owners of land in Ghana and Chiefs and family heads are 
caretakers of land (Ubink, 2007) on behalf of their family members and this is an 
important source of family cohesion. When two individuals meet and decide to get 
married the families from both ends must come together to witness the ceremony to 
make it valid. Families are the ones who meet to contribute resources and arrange a 
funeral when an individual dies. Families also serve to mediate between two members 
when there is a problem, arrange to take care of an ill family member or offer support 
when a member gets into trouble. It is worth noting that the concept of a nuclear family 
is not popular in rural Ghana, rather extended family are the norm.  Ghanaians trace 
their roots to their ancestral village for identity and even in death they are sent back 
there to be buried. Such a society provides a context which is very different from most 
western societies.  
4.7.2 Family Reputation in Ghanaian Society 
Families desire respect within their communities and it is the responsibility of family 
members to handle a misbehaving member who threatens by his actions to disgrace the 
family (Herndon, 2009). Badly behaved children are seen as a disgrace to the parents 
and any adult who witnesses a misbehaving child does not hesitate to admonish them 
and then take them to their parents for more of the same (Utley, 2009). A morally 
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upstanding Ghanaian is expected to dress well and shabby dressing in public for 
instance reflects poorly on the family.  
There is further evidence of the importance of a family‟s reputation in the marriage 
process. When a man announces his intention to marry a woman for example, the 
woman‟s family would usually investigate the background of the family before they 
give their blessing (e-Harmony, 2009 , Salm and Falola, 2002). Some of the things they 
would look out for would be the reputation of the family. They would investigate to see 
that no immediate family member such as a sibling, an aunt or uncle is known to be a 
thief, prostitute or murderer or that there is no evidence of genetic disabilities or 
chronic illness in the family. They would also check to ensure the man is of good 
character and well matched to the bride and has no illegitimate children or has another 
marriage elsewhere. This is an incentive for families to maintain a good reputation. 
Utley (2009) describes the communal values that enable information of misdemeanours 
and scandals committed by individuals to spread within the community. This is a 
situation that further dissuades members of the community from committing 
undesirable behaviour which might embarrass their families.  
There is therefore the incentive for Ghanaian families to maintain their reputation. This 
character could be used to enhance fraud control since families do not want to be 
associated with bad behaviour like fraud. 
4.7.3 Traditional Ghanaian Art  
The Ghanaian concept of art differs from that of western cultures in terms of its 
importance to society (Salm and Falola, 2002). Whiles western art stirs emotion within 
the viewer Ghanaian art serves an aesthetic and functional purpose. 
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Ghanaian art is essential to society and symbolises all aspects of cultural and social life. 
It employs many levels of symbolism to show cultural and social structure and to depict 
the history, beliefs and values of the people. It acts as agents of communal and national 
unity. It comes in the form of textile, basketry, beads, leather work, sculpture and metal 
work. They are usually not separate from other forms of art like music. Ghanaian art 
link their aesthetic characteristic to their functional objectives like a performance or 
ceremony within a context like bereavement, a marriage or a birth. This feature of 
Ghanaian art could be adopted in modern day financial transactions.   
An example of such art is the adinkra symbols which is a system of traditional 
aphorismic symbols (Salm and Falola, 2002). Originally used among the Akans of 
Ghana it is currently used by all Ghanaians. See Appendix F or www.adinkra.org for 
more samples of adinkra symbols. Adinkra is a set of symbols that express various 
themes that relate to the history, beliefs and philosophy of the Akans. They depict 
historical events, human behaviour and attitudes, animal behaviour, plant life forms and 
shapes of objects. They are currently used in jewellery, textiles, carvings and company 
logos among others. This is a Ghanaian art form that could be tapped to enhance fraud 
control.    
4.8 Ghanaian Culture and Fraud Control 
There is an indication that the Ghanaian society is collectivist or egalitarian where 
group/family benefit supersedes individual interest. This has a potential to facilitate 
fraud control or create risks. On the other hand if bank interests are aligned to family 
interest it could be used to enhance fraud control.  
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A possible risk that could be faced by a rural bank is that they could have members of 
the same family working in the bank. With a high level of family cohesion within such 
communities, there is a high risk of employees exhibiting loyalty to their family 
members within a bank as opposed to loyalty to the bank. The risk of having two 
conflicting users for example becomes higher reducing the effectiveness of separation 
of duty for the purpose of fraud prevention. This characteristic could also increase the 
motivation for a customer or an employee to bend the rules in order to benefit a family 
member. Aligning the goals of a family and the security goals of a rural bank could 
ensure a collective effort by the two towards fraud reduction.  
Fraud control could also use art to promote anti fraud message just like corporate 
bodies currently use them to communicate their values. Alternatively some of the 
functional uses for which it has been put to for ages could be adopted for fraud 
prevention. It can be used to help bind or align a community to a fraud prevention 
system. Finally it could also be used to convey messages or codes which will only be 
understood by their users.    
4.9 Summary     
This chapter discussed the issue of culture in security. It pointed out that every 
information system has a social element that is a combination of both an internal 
culture but also a culture external to the organisation. It also showed neither that the 
lack of attention to culture or the view that failure is due to an inherent character of 
human cannot ensure successful implementation of technological systems. It also 
discussed the different social characteristics and its impact on the success of security 
systems.  
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Finally the culture of Ghana was discussed. The community and family structure and 
its art forms of Ghana were discussed. Also discussed was how cultural characteristics 
could be tapped to enhance or hinder a security of fraud prevention system. 
The next chapter takes a closer look at the research methodology that was used to 
collect data in order to understand the rural banking industry in an effort to craft a fraud 
prevention system.  
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Chapter 5 
 
 
5 Methodology 
From the discussion done so far it is clear that to be able to obtain a desirable fraud 
control model it is important to understand the nature of the rural banking industry. 
What is important is to understand the context in which these banks operate. To 
understand the context a field research was done.  
In this chapter a discussion of how the research was conducted is done. It covers the 
approach adopted for the research; it also discusses issues regarding the population 
studied how it was sampled. The methods used to collect and analyse data are 
discussed. It covers the methods used to collect which type of information and finally 
discusses how the information was analysed. 
5.1 Approach of the research 
The main theme of the research was that context is very important to achieve effective 
security. There was therefore the need to study the problem in such a way as to make 
culture visible. Various issues were considered to enable an understanding of the 
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context. Data collection was approached with the nature of operational risk and fraud in 
mind. As was shown in the previous chapters, the nature of operational risk and fraud is 
so varied and dynamic in its manifestation and that it can be manifest differently in 
different organisations. It is therefore not ideal to use conventional risk management 
mechanism that will lead to the focusing on some perceived serious threats neglecting 
the rest. This is especially so because there is no reliable record of previous fraud 
incidents to use as a guide and even if there were it would not be the most reliable 
means to predicting future cases. Also the problem of fraud is systemic and the profile 
of a fraudster fits many people. 
With the nature of fraud, it was therefore not ideal to focus on some elements within 
the industry. The study of the rural banking industry was rather done holistically to 
have a broader view of the vulnerabilities in the system. The focus of the data 
collection was rather on identifying the systemic vulnerabilities than on transaction 
based vulnerabilities. Also since fraud is a result of failure in business processes the 
focus of the field research was on the banking processes.  This approach was also used 
to help obtain a better understanding and to define the problems of the rural banking 
industry to ensure that designs can be made more resilient to threats. Several aspects of 
the industry were therefore studied to identify these vulnerabilities.  
The research was also approached with the view that the rural banking industry is 
unique in nature. There was therefore an attempt to focus on the how its unique nature 
affects its operations especially the processes used to deliver the services it offers to the 
public. 
Field research was chosen as the preferred means of data collection. This was to help 
obtain an in-depth understanding and explore the nature of the operations of rural 
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banking industry. This is because most research on the rural banking industry has 
usually focused on the impact of rural microfinance on poverty reduction and its impact 
on economic activity. It was therefore necessary to have firsthand knowledge of the day 
to day operations of rural banks. This approach was most desirable because of the focus 
on soft issues. The view taken was that quantitative and statistical approaches hide the 
soft cultural and contextual issues hence there was more use of qualitative data.   
In this regard the field research sought to understand how the nature of the rural 
banking industry, the dynamics within the banks, its interaction with the rural 
communities and other stakeholders relate to fraud. To understand the entire industry 
the field research was structured to study the various organisations forming the rural 
banking system, their regulator and also to get other perspectives from the mainstream 
commercial banks. The groups of organisations studied included the rural banks, their 
sub regulator, ARB Apex bank, and the main stream commercial banks.  
Though there were several hard issues to consider there were a lot more soft issues 
especially those issues cultural in nature which had to be taken into consideration in 
order to obtain a good security design. The bulk of the data collected was therefore 
mostly qualitative and unstructured. Also data collection was iterative incrementally 
collecting information to help understand the rural banking industry and to help 
develop a fraud control model. 
5.2 Coverage of Field Research 
Field research did not cover the entire country. Rather it covered rural banks in 6 out of 
the 10 regions. Various reasons accounted for the choice of these regions. Due to the 
level of detail that was required from the field study it was very time consuming and 
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expensive. There was therefore the need to use a small sample size. To be able ensure 
that the result holds for the population, a reduction in the size of the population was 
necessary. To achieve this it, was necessary to choose a more homogeneous population 
for which results from a small sample will hold true for the population. To attain this, a 
choice of six regions made. These were the Western, Central, Ashanti, Brong Ahafo, 
Greater Accra and Eastern regions. These regions were chosen due to historical and 
cultural similarity. They also had the bulk of the country‟s population and had the bulk 
of rural banks    
Historically the Ghana (formally Gold Coast) was made up of four main regions 
(McLaughlin and Owusu-Ansah, 1994). The first was the coastal regions making up of 
the Western, Central, Eastern and greater Accra region. The second was the Ashanti 
region which is made up of present day Ashanti and Brong Ahafo regions. The third 
region was the northern territory which was made up of current day northern upper east 
and upper west regions. The final region is the Volta region which became part of 
current day Ghana after the First World War when the League of Nations split and 
mandated the German protectorate Togoland to Great Britain and France. See Table 5.1 
below. 
 
Table 5.1 Historic and Current Regions of Ghana 
Colonial territory Current region 
Coastal region Central 
Western 
Greater Accra 
Eastern 
Ashanti Brong Ahafo 
Ashanti 
Northern Upper east 
Northern 
Upper West 
Togoland Volta 
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The six regions chosen for the study are the coastal regions and Ashanti which the 
middle belt of the country. According to the last population census in 2000, the 
population in these regions formed about 74% of Ghana‟s total population (Ghana 
Statistical Services, 2005). These regions are mainly made up of Akan tribal grouping 
which form about 44% of Ghana‟s total population (Gocking, 2005) and 61% of 
population of the six regions. The Akans are made up of tribal grouping like the Bono, 
Akwamu, Asante (Ashanti), Akyem, Denkyira, and Fante. The other major tribal group 
in the six regions are the Ga-Adamgbe. The Akan tribal grouping have a relatively 
homogeneous culture, language, and authority structures (Owusu-Ansah, 1994). The 
basic unit in the Akan society is based on the matriclan system. In the matrilineal 
system, family lineage, inheritance and succession to wealth and to political offices and 
even basic relations within the village are determined by the relationship to the mothers 
and sisters. Though traditional leadership roles are mainly held by men, they acquire 
the positions through their relationship to the female members of the family. This 
system remains economically and politically important. Each lineage controls the land 
farmed by its members. It also functions as a religious unit in the veneration of its 
ancestors, supervises marriages and settles internal disputes among its members.  
5.3 Organisations studied 
For the field research, three main types of organisations were studied. First the rural 
banks were studied, and then the sub regulator, ARB Apex bank was, also studied. 
Finally the main stream commercial banks were also studied. Figure 5.1 Shows the 
organisation of the field study. 
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In total ten rural banks were selected and studied due to assumed homogeneity 
discussed in section 5.2. This homogeneity was further confirmed from the consistency 
of the data collected. Two out of the ten rural banks were studied in more detail by 
observation. One branch of the ARB Apex bank and one commercial bank were 
studied.  The details of the field study are discussed more subsequently. 
Other informal contacts and interviews were done. This involved an informal interview 
with a former employee of a rural bank and some customers. Enquiries were made at 
the Registry of births and deaths and the Vehicle Examinations and Licensing Division 
on the process for obtaining a birth certificates and driver‟s license. 
Field Research 
Rural banks  
(10 Banks) 
In-depth Study 
(2 banks – 15 people 
interviewed) 
Commercial Banks (1 Bank – 2 
people) 
ARB Apex Bank  
(1 branch – 1interview with 
regional manager, Observation) 
Analysis 
Figure 5.1 Field Research 
Development of Model 
Expert Validation (10 interviews) 
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5.3.1 Rural banks 
The rural banks studied were drawn from the coastal and middle belt. Table 5.2 shows 
the distribution of rural banks in the regions studied compared to other regions.  
Region Number of rural banks Percentage 
Southern and middle belt 104 80.6 
Northern Ghana 14 10.9 
Volta 11 8.5 
Total 129  
Table 5.2 Distribution of Rural Banks by Segment of Country  
This region has a total of 104 rural banks making a total of 401 agencies. A sample of 
10 rural banks was selected representing 10% of the banks in those regions. The 
selected sample had a total of 50 agencies. Table 5.3 shows the sample taken and their 
respective regions.  
Region Sample Size 
Western 2 
Central 2 
Eastern 1 
Greater Accra 2 
Brong Ahafo 1 
Ashanti 2 
Total 10 
Table 5.3 Distribution of Questionnaire Sample 
With the rural banks being the ones delivering banking services to the public, they were 
able to give information on the banking practices and the day to day operational 
activities in the industry. They were also the best organisation to provide information 
on threats in the industry. Also information on the structure of the banks, their 
interaction with each other, with the public and with the regulators was obtained from 
the rural banks. 
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5.3.2 Regulators 
As discussed above the main regulator of banking in Ghana is the Bank of Ghana 
however there is also the ARB Apex bank which is the sub regulator. The ARB Apex 
Bank has a head office in Accra, five branches across the country and 7 clearing 
centres. Within the southern and middle belt there are three branches in Accra, 
Takoradi and Kumasi respectively. 
One of the apex bank branches was studied during the field research. This study was in 
the form of an interview with the regional manager. Limited observation was also done. 
This was done to collect data about and understand the role and operations of the Apex 
Bank within the rural banking industry and their view of the rural banking system.  
As mentioned earlier the ARB Apex bank regulates rural banking activities and also 
offers banking services like specie to the banks. They were useful in giving information 
about rural bank regulation in general and their role as regulators in particular. Being a 
regulator they also gave information on the regulatory regime, the rationale behind 
regulations and how it can help counter fraud risks. As the primary link between all 
rural banks they were also useful in giving information about the conduct of interbank 
transaction and the risks involved in interbank transactions. The ARB Apex bank also 
has a global view and could give a bird‟s eye view of the rural banking sector.  
5.3.3 Commercial Banks 
In order to understand the subject of banking in Ghana and what the industry standard 
is, it was necessary to contact bankers in the main stream commercial banking industry. 
Two bankers from one main stream commercial bank were interviewed. This was done 
after the initial survey of the rural banks and before the detailed study of the rural 
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banks. The commercial bankers interviewed were contacted a few more times for 
clarification and advice when certain issues arose.  
Commercial banks are not considered part of the rural banking system and for that 
matter not part of the population that was being studied. This part of the field work 
proved valuable in helping obtain another perspective to the one presented by the rural 
banks. It also gave information and leads that helped in the conduct the data collection 
exercise from the rural banks. It was very useful in deciding what questions to ask and 
gave an informed perspective.  
The commercial bankers also helped to understand the methods they use to control 
some of the common problems faced by the rural banks. It also yielded information on 
the banking processes used by these banks to deliver their services to the public. 
Studying the commercial banking organisation also gave the opportunity to compare 
the banking processes and controls. Information obtained was mostly used as input to 
shape the type of data/information to look out for especially during the personal 
observation stage of the data collection exercise.  
5.4 Data Collection Methods and Administration 
The data collection exercise was largely iterative. It collected data from the various 
respondents cyclically to aid understanding and incrementally develop and validate the 
resultant fraud control model. The data collection exercise made use of various data 
collection techniques. Methods used were a structured questionnaire, interviews, 
observation and document examination. The use of these different techniques was to 
benefit from the advantages of each technique. 
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As mentioned earlier the study of the rural banks was in two phases. The difference 
between the two phases was in the level of detail and the methods used. There were 
also some informal interviews. See table 5.4 for details. 
Organisation Position  Questionnaire Interview Informal 
Interview 
Rural Bank Chief executive 1   
 Manager 3 1 2 
 Operations/Credit Officer 6 3 4 
 Clerk  11 15 
 Ex-Rural Bankers  2 4 
ARB Apex 
Bank 
Regional Manager  1  
Commercial 
Bank 
Customer Relations Officer  2 7 
ID Document 
Issuers  
Electoral 
Commission/Vehicle 
examination and licensing 
department/Registry of births 
and deaths 
 3  
Total  10 23 32 
Table 5.4 Data Collection 
The first phase involved the collection of general information on the operations of the 
rural banks in terms of their organisational structure, internal controls, staffing levels, 
services and processes used to deliver these services. A structured questionnaire was 
used at this stage. See Appendix B for a sample questionnaire used. This phase covered 
the entire sample of all the 10 selected rural banks.  
The questionnaire was administered face to face and it involved travelling around the 
southern sector of the country to the various rural to administer. This was to ensure a 
good response rate. Difficulty in contacting the various rural banks necessitated this 
mode of administration. They were answered by either the manager or the operations 
officer with the permission of the manager. They were used to collect general 
information about the banking structure, risks, control measures, source of risks and 
information about the roles of employees in bank. It was used to collect information to 
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help understand the fraud risks that rural banks are subject to. Information regarding 
the structure and the mechanics of the rural banking system were collected and 
analysed to understand how they operate. Information on internal controls that were 
already in place to deal with fraud risks was collected to look at how effective these 
controls are. The aim of this data was to gain an understanding of the systemic 
weaknesses that can allow fraud to occur. The information from the structured 
questionnaire also formed a good background on which interviews and observation was 
done.  
The second phase was a more detailed study. It involved studying the dynamics of rural 
banking operations. Here 2 rural banks out of the original 10 were chosen for an in-
depth observation and study. These banks were observed and their staff and managers 
interviewed to give further clarification about observations made. A total of 15 
members of staff from the 2 banks were interviewed. The banks were observed and 
interviewed for a period of 4 weeks. This was to have as much detail as possible and to 
have an intimate understanding of the issues that come to play during their day to day 
operations. Observations made at this stage were discussed with the staff to gain a 
better understanding.  
Interviews and observations were used to probe further and collect more information. 
This was to help thoroughly understand the nature of the risks and how they are 
manifested in the banking processes and any possibilities of mitigating them. The rural 
banking processes were studied to uncover how the systemic weaknesses could be 
manifested within those processes. In total 23 in-depth interviews were conducted. 
They comprised interviews with 15 employees of the rural banks with different roles. 
They included 1 manager, 3 operations officers and 11 clerks.  
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Aside the interviews and questionnaires administered to the rural bank, 2 commercial 
bankers and a regional manager of an ARB Apex Bank branch were interviewed. 
Interviews were also conducted with 2 ex-rural bankers, and 1 operative each from the 
electoral commission, registry of births and deaths and the vehicle examination and 
licensing division.  
There were a total of 32 informal interviews iterative to collate the views of the various 
people. 10 of these interviews were to refine and validate the model using the expert 
views of 5 current rural banks. The rest were done to either help collect background 
information to design the research and or to seek clarification for various pieces of 
information collected earlier.   
5.5 Information Collected 
The views of employees and more detailed information about the banking process, 
reliability of controls and vulnerabilities existing in the system was found. Interviews 
and observations gave more new information than the structured questionnaire.  
Employees from two rural banks were observed performing their day to day duties. 
Issues that indicated their attitude to security were observed. The ease with which non 
employees were allowed into the back office, the level of scrutiny of documents 
presented by a prospective customer were observed and discussed further with the 
employees to understand the true nature of the risk. The display of control and authority 
by managers and officers in the bank was also noted and discussed. Follow up 
questions were asked to explain issues if they were not understood properly.   
Documents like application forms, vouchers, sample cheques, and banking procedures 
were studied. These documents were then discussed with employees to determine the 
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extent to which procedures for example were adhered to. Other things like the ability of 
forms and vouchers to force disclosure was also observed and discussed to understand 
the effectiveness of those documents in preventing fraud.  
The field research was also aimed at collecting information on any other possible 
controls that could be used to deal with the risks. Various mechanisms devised by the 
rural banks and the employees to deal with risks they had identified were also noted.  
Using a field research gave the opportunity to observe the operations of the banks to 
identify new information about their operations. It enabled the collection of information 
on the structure of the banking system and how the various parts relate to each other. 
The role of the employees and other stakeholder were studied since it is very important 
to help one understand the nature of fraud risks. The field research also gave the 
opportunity to interact face to face with these stakeholders and to ask follow up 
questions when the need arose. Details of the banking processes were closely studied.  
Finally information on the nature of the communities in which the banks operate in was 
collected. These covered the peculiar characteristics of the communities that make it 
different from other communities and that might make implementing mainstream 
banking controls difficult.  
5.6 Data Analysis 
Data collected were presented in two main forms. Data collected from the questionnaire 
was codified and presented in bar graphs. These bar graphs were then interpreted to 
identify any trends and or predominant views. All the other qualitative data was 
presented in the form of discussions. 
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Information gathered from the field allowed building a structure of the rural banking 
system. It also allowed measuring the objectives of control against the banking 
mechanisms to identify the weaknesses within the system. A profile of the 
vulnerabilities and systemic weaknesses were then built. Banking processes were then 
analysed to see how the identified vulnerabilities could be exploited to commit fraud. A 
number of fraud scenarios were built with the help of the bankers interviewed to 
illustrate the problem. These fraud scenarios were made up of cases that were said to 
have occurred within the rural banking and the main stream banking systems. It also 
included other possible cases of fraud that could occur as a result of the weaknesses 
within the system.  
Based on these scenarios and well known principles of system protection a model was 
designed to deal with fraud risks. The mechanisms adopted in the model were also 
discussed with banking officials to validate it. 
5.7 Limitations of the Approach 
There were a few limitations of the approach used. Since the approach adopted was to 
view the industry holistically there wasn‟t a lot of focus on how the various issues 
affect security individually in contrast to when they act with others.  
Also the methods used were very demanding by their nature. This is because 
conversation and action occurred at the same time. There were many things that 
occurred very quickly as part of complex interaction among a number of persons. It 
was therefore difficult to observe and note what is said, to whom, in what way, with 
what effect, and the kind of behaviour at the same time.  
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Rural banks like many banks find it very difficult to discuss the issue of fraud. It was 
therefore very difficult to get the rural banks to discuss the issues and the mechanics of 
fraud.  For instance it took so much time in the early stages of the field research to book 
an appointment and to administer the questionnaires face to face. It took up to four days 
to book an appointment to administer a questionnaire.  
5.8 In summary 
Due to the nature of fraud a holistic approach was adopted to study the rural banking 
industry. A field research was to collect information about the rural banking industry. 
An iterative process was used to collect information and to help develop and validate 
the resultant fraud model. A sample was selected from the southern and middle regions 
of Ghana for homogeneity and to ensure the best possible outcome of the field research. 
Also various data collection methods and instruments including a structured 
questionnaire, interview, observation and document examination were used to collect 
data. This was to take advantages of the various instruments and methods to help 
enhance the data collect exercise. The next chapter presents information collected from 
the field.  
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Chapter 6 
 
 
6 Rural Banking Systemic Weaknesses 
This chapter presents and discusses the findings of the field research. It discusses the 
weaknesses that exist in the rural banking industry that give opportunities to commit 
fraud. It discusses several systemic vulnerabilities in the rural banking system which is 
a result of the structure of the system, their operations and other soft issues that come 
into play within the bank and the community. The various issues discussed include 
services offered by the bank, Customer Identification, Staffing levels, Structure of rural 
banks and internal control in rural banks. It discusses the implication of these issues 
and its impact on controlling fraud.   
6.1 Services Offered by Rural Banks 
As mentioned earlier rural banks operate as commercial banks albeit offering fewer 
regular services than the main stream banks do. It was observed that a total of 14 
services or products were offered to customers of rural banks. They generally accept 
deposits, offer lending and offer inward money transfer services. The accounts opened 
for customers are current and or savings accounts. They also offer investment tools like 
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fixed deposit and an avenue for customers to buy government bonds like treasury bills. 
They are however prohibited from performing foreign currency transactions.  
It was noticeable that they had some innovative services which had been designed to 
get around the restrictions placed on them by law. These services were in line with the 
needs of the communities and some had been designed to get around the limitation of 
their catchment area. One of these services is an arrangement that allows people living 
in cities and other localities to open accounts with the rural banks. This scheme is 
known as “efie ne fie” or as home cash. The arrangement is such that the prospective 
customers, usually city dwellers, open their accounts from a bank in their locality. This 
means that ID checks and all form filing are done in the nominated bank different from 
where the rural bank operates. The documentation is then forwarded to the rural bank to 
open the account.  
They also offer a local money transfer scheme called the apex link money transfer for 
customers who want to send money to a person living in a locality outside a bank‟s 
catchment area. Payment to the recipient of such a transfer is through a different named 
rural bank which operates in the area.  
Aside these services, they also offer other specialised services in line with their 
clientele‟s needs. Some of these services include hire purchase/consumer credit 
arrangements for items like agricultural input items for their customers who are mostly 
farmers. Another such service they offer is a short loan known as the funeral loan. 
These loans are for a period of two weeks. In Ghana, funerals are elaborate events 
usually held at the deceased‟s home village (Utley, 2009). They are very expensive 
especially because families have to host guests or relatives who sometimes come from 
all round the country. However at the funeral ceremony the community make donations 
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to the family of the deceased. This means that most families end up recovering the 
initial cost of the funeral. Rural banks therefore offer short loans to cover the initial 
cost of the funeral which the families are able to repay after the funeral.   
Rural banks offer about 14 services in total. Out if these services seven cannot be 
provided without the involvement of other rural banks, the Apex bank or retailers (See 
figure 6.1 & 6.2). Most of this is a direct consequence of restrictions to the services 
rural banks can offer. The implication of this is that business processes for delivering 
these services start in one bank and end up in another bank or retailer. This creates a 
complex distributed work process in which no single rural bank has end to end 
management or authority thus making risk and security assessment and management 
very difficult. Questions regarding which bank are responsible for identity verification, 
creation and accreditation are immediately raised.   
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6.2 Customer Identification in Rural Communities 
It was evident that rural banks attempt to verify identities of their prospective 
customers however there was enough evidence that these mechanisms could not do the 
job. The various mechanisms used are shown in figure 6.3.  
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The field study revealed that the requirements for creating an identity for the purpose of 
opening an account in rural banks are a passport sized photograph, a filled application 
form and a sample of the customer‟s signature on a signature card. Information filled 
on the application form with name, address, occupation, employer (if employed) and 
salary. Two rural banks said they went a bit further to demand a referee whilst three 
banks demanded some form of photo identification like voter‟s identity card or driver‟s 
license. For corporate bodies one bank demanded company certificate and for 
associations they demanded the society‟s constitution. These identity verification 
requirements seem inadequate to confirm that the personal identification information 
presented belongs to the person presenting it and that it is correct. It only confirms to 
the bank employee what the prospective customer has already said.  
On the other hand implementation of western style identity checks recommended by 
the Basel committee does not seem feasible. This is because the underlying structures 
on which they are based are not present either due to the nature of rural communities or 
the ease of obtaining these documents. Western style customer due diligence requires 
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the validation of the provided address, birth certificates, occupation and nationality 
among others as proof of identity. See chapter 2. The essence of an address for instance 
is to be able to trace customers to that address. European banks usually require the 
submission of some form of correspondence from a reputable organisation like a utility 
company to proof ones address.  
As was found during the field study, banks in rural Ghana are unable to ask prospective 
customers to submit a document to show an address for a hut in a small village because 
they do not have recognised fixed addresses. This is because there are no named streets 
or house numbers hence most people cannot tie a document to their address. Even in 
relatively bigger villages or towns where some streets may be named, the living 
arrangement of a majority of the people is such that they do not have bills in their 
names or are from the informal sector of the of the economy so do not have payslips 
etc. Also in Ghana mail is routed through post office boxes hence a large number of 
mails cannot be linked to specific landed addresses. Bank employees mentioned that 
many prospective customers do not have a birth certificate mainly because a good 
number of them were born at home. As a matter of fact there is no proof that most of 
these rural dwellers are Ghanaian citizens. On the other extreme were people who have 
acquired multiple identities especially in the urban areas. Members of staff in the 
commercial banks spoken to admitted the existence of customers with more than one 
account which had different dates of birth for each account belonging to the same 
person. Enquiries at the Vehicle Examination and Licensing Division, the statutory 
body that issues drivers licenses and the electoral commission revealed that licenses 
and voters ID cards are issued without verifying the identities. Another enquiry to the 
registry of births and deaths also revealed that no proof of identity or evidence of a 
birth is required before a birth certificate is issued. This indicated the ease in getting 
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identity documents which seems to be confirmed by several arrests and prosecution of 
people who had obtained more than one voters ID card in the 2008 elections (Ghanaian 
Times, 2008 , Ghana News Agency, 2008). The conclusion is that identity verification 
is weak and that conventional mechanisms cannot work.  
Some employees had however devised various ways to verify the identity of customers. 
A teller in the rural bank mentioned that when third party customers bring in cheques to 
withdraw money from another person‟s account they sometimes ask for them to verify 
their identity by seeking a reference from someone in the community the bank could 
trust. The person usually fallen on to give such an undertaken is the customer‟s priest. 
This is however not a requirement in the bank it is only used by staff members to cover 
themselves against culpability.  
6.3 Staffing levels and its Implication on Security 
Field studies among rural banks also showed various staffing per bank of rural banks 
ranging from 6 to 97 per bank. These numbers were distributed amongst various 
agencies. Figure 6.4 shows the total number of staff and the number of agencies over 
which the staff are distributed.  
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There were a total of 459 employees within the 10 rural banks studied. These 
employees are distributed amongst 50 rural bank agencies and head offices giving an 
average of 9 members of staff per agency. However not all of these were operational 
staff. They included administrative and other roles like security. Also members of staff 
at the head offices were not directly involved in banking operations. Staff members 
who are therefore available and assigned to carry out banking operations were lower. 
Figure 6.5 shows average staff per bank for the 10 banks surveyed. 
 
6
35
29
36
16
58
75
97
40
67
1
7 5 6 2 6 7
8 3 5
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
N
o
 o
f 
S
ta
ff
/A
g
e
n
c
ie
s
Rural Bank
Figure 6.4: Total No. of Staff and the No. of Agencies of Rural 
Banks 
No of Staff
No of Agencies
6
5
6 6
8
10
11
12
13 13
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
N
o
 o
f 
S
ta
ff
Rural Bank
Figure 6.5: Average Number of Staff per Agency
 131 
One notable risk which is a direct result of operating with small staff numbers is that 
separation of duty cannot be effectively achieved given the number of services offered. 
With an average of 9 employees in total per branch there is an average 4 clerical level 
staff (2 tellers and 2 general clerks) or less left to initiate and execute the various 
transactions. There is therefore little room for achieving any meaningful level of 
separation of duty especially with as many as 14 products/services on offer.  The risk of 
allocating potentially conflicting or risky tasks to the same clerk is particularly high. As 
was pointed out by a former rural bank employee, this situation is exacerbated by the 
fact that some of the staff of the banks could be from the same family reducing further 
the options for separating duties. This former employee mentioned a case where an 
employee of his former bank continuously cleared the banks suspense account in 
anticipation of auditors. He even admitted having given unauthorised loans to friends in 
anticipation of their salary. Though the management of the banks recognised the 
security risk of having members of the same family working together, they did not 
admit they had the problem. Rather they mentioned that it is a problem in other banks.  
This therefore raises the need to devise other non conventional mechanisms to achieve 
an acceptable level of separation of duty and to provide an acceptable level of 
assurance.  
6.4 Implications of the Current Organisational Structure of Rural Banks  
All the rural banks surveyed had the same organisational structure. A generic structure 
is shown in figure 6.6. The various positions and their corresponding roles are shown in 
the table below as shown in table 6.1. 
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Job position Role/duties Category of duties 
Agency manager General responsibility of 
managing branch 
Approval role 
Operations officer Deals with all day to day 
operational issues at both the 
front and back office 
Approval role 
Project/Credit officer Appraisal of loans Initiating and appraising 
loan applications.   
Cashier Paying and receipt of all 
transactions 
Initiating regarding credit 
and debit transactions on 
customer accounts. 
Clerks Filing, opening and closing 
accounts, posting entries and 
balancing books, Customer 
queries and call over 
Initiating account opening, 
closing posting entries and 
balancing books 
Messenger  Non-Banking Role 
Security Guard  Non-Banking Role 
Table 6.1: Rural banking job positions, roles and category role  
Generally banking operations occur at the agency level. The observation which was 
made and confirmed by the staff was that there are two levels of authority. They are the 
clerical level and the officer/manager level. Clerical staffs were the ones who initiated 
transactions at the request of customers or when a banking instruction is received. 
Manager 
Project/Credit Officer 
Security Guard Clerk Teller Messenger 
Figure 6.6 Generic Organisational Structure of Rural banks 
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Transactions initiated by the clerical staff are then approved by the officer/managerial 
grade staff usually the operations officer. In most cases the branch manager did not get 
involved in the daily operational issues rather the operations officer did the approval of 
transactions unless when there was a case that requires the attention or advice of the 
manager. The Operations officer therefore has both front and back office control and in 
turn reports to the branch manager.  
According to bankers from the main stream bank, their structure is very different. In the 
main stream banks there is a customer services manager in charge of the front office 
and an operations manager in charge of the back office. See figure 6.7 
 
The front office deals directly with customers. They perform transaction like account 
opening deposits and withdrawals and the back office deals with bank suspense account 
clearing checks and other interbank and account transfers. The main characteristic of 
the front office is that a customer has the opportunity to present identification 
Manager 
Customer Services Manager 
Clerk Teller Back office clerks 
Figure 6.7 Generic Organisational Structure Main Stream Banks 
Operations Manager 
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information and authenticate themselves. On the other hand the back office which deals 
with transactions without a customer have to use other means to verify authorisation to 
perform such transactions. They always have to rely on the source document. 
A major risk arises as a result of the organisational structure of the rural banks. The risk 
is due to the control given to managers. The major issue here is that the operations 
manager who has most of the day to day supervision of transactions had control of the 
front and back office functions a situation that is found to be risky in financial 
operations.  
When a transaction is performed at the front office there is the presence of a customer 
with a signed cheque or some form of coded message in the case of the back office for 
the purpose of authentication. Combining the front and back office under one officer or 
manager blurs this distinction. The result is that deficient front office transactions can 
be hidden or passed off as a back office transaction and vice versa.  
6.5 Internal Control and Fraud Prevention 
The field research indicated internal control measures especially aimed at fraud was 
solely the responsibility of individual banks. A mixture of control measures were also 
used however only a few of these measures were targeted at transactions.  
Fraud prevention as discussed above is a non prudential regulatory issue and the 
interview of ARB Apex bank officials indicated that they are not involved in non 
prudential regulation. The rural banks are therefore left to decide which internal control 
methods and how they want to use them. 
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Christen et al (2003) indicates that the two main issues that is of much concerned to 
non-prudential regulators of microfinance institutions as far as customer protection is 
concerned are protection against abusive lending and collection practices (lending 
practices that lead to over borrowing by customers) and providing borrower with truth 
in lending (accurate comparable and transparent information about the cost of loans). 
Contrary to this position however, most of the rural bankers spoken to referred to fraud 
amongst customers and employees as the main threats to their day to day operation.   
The field research showed that the rural banks have a number of internal controls 
measures aimed at fraud control.  
One of the most used control mechanism is job rotation but equally used are 
authorisation of transactions, audit checks (call over) and the use of some physical 
security mechanisms. 
Figure 6.8 shows the internal control mechanisms used by rural banks in Ghana. 
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6.5.1 Job Rotation and Security Concerns 
Job rotation is one of the key internal control mechanisms rural banks used. This 
involved the clerical grade employees being assigned different roles for a specified 
time period.  
Figure 6.9 shows the period that members of staff stay in a particular role for the 10 
rural banks studied. A majority of 4 banks rotated their staff every year while 2 banks 
rotated them at random intervals.  
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Figure 6.8: Internal Control Measures Deployed by Rural Banks
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Job rotation or rotating employees among numerous positions is a known to help 
organisations improve on security. Aside providing knowledge redundancy it reduces 
the risk of fraud, data modification, sabotage, theft and misuse of information (Stewart 
et al., 2005). The view is that when a person stays longer in a position the more likely 
they are to be assigned more responsibility and gain more privileges and access. They 
are also more likely to become more familiar with tasks and gain the ability to abuse 
privileges and commit fraudulent or malicious activities. Job rotation also provides the 
opportunity for peer auditing and enables employees to detect fraudulent activities of 
their peers. 
Job rotation seems to have benefits however it also presents clear risks in the case of 
rural banks. The risk here is that employees get the opportunity of performing two 
unrelated but conflicting tasks that could create opportunity for fraud. This risk is also 
compounded by the system of deputising for the purpose of filling in for unavailable 
staff even though these require a manager‟s approval. Bank staff who know or 
anticipate what job they would be doing next can do certain preparatory activities in 
their current job and perform other activities in their next job to complete the fraud.  
Similar frauds like what occurred in the Société General fraud case could occur. In this 
case, Jerome Kerviel took advantage of his knowledge of the banks back office and 
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control systems – a computer system called Eliot – to enter false hedging contracts to 
make it appear as if he was taking minimal risks (Arnold et al., 2008). He did this by 
logging into the system under different names, he then cancelled the fake contracts 
before they were settled, replacing them with new ones. This type of fraud can be 
replicated if an employee is rotated from position to position especially if the next 
position is known. 
6.5.2 Effectiveness of Authorisations  
Rural banks used transaction authorisation as an internal control measure. This means 
that all members of staff have a maximum amount for which they can perform a 
transaction without authorisation. Transaction with amounts beyond that of a staff 
member has to receive authorisation from another member of staff who has a higher 
limit usually the operations officer or manager. This mechanism is useful by offering a 
second opportunity to examine large withdrawals. On the other hand authorisation only 
looks at the amount and the bank officials admitted it‟s deficiency in dealing with false 
identity and deceptive mechanism used to perpetrate fraudulent schemes.  
6.5.3 Effectiveness of Call over 
Call over is another internal control measure is used by rural banks to detect fraud but it 
also has some defects. This measure involves a daily cross check of recorded 
transactions against their source documents. This measure is practiced by most rural 
banks. It was thought to be very effective in detecting fraud and errors by the banking 
staff. The problem with this approach is that it is a post transaction audit process hence 
if a fraudster has left the banking premises then there is a huge problem to apprehend 
the perpetrator. On the other hand since it is a manual process and therefore depends on 
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the ability of the staff in question to be vigilant. After working a long day it is easy for 
tired staff members to miss discrepancies.  
6.6 Role of the Various Stakeholders in Fraud 
Banking institutions have traditionally been very secretive especially when it has to do 
with revealing activities that might impact public confidence. They are therefore very 
wary of reporting fraud. At the least, banks attribute fraud to customers.  
Banking institutions are usually reluctant to report on failures in internal controls 
especially when it leads to losses (Blakley et al., 2001). It is not therefore unexpected 
that rural banks do not seem to have any fraud reports. Banking staff were asked during 
the field study to rate the various stakeholders role in non adherence to banking 
procedures which could lead to fraud. See Figure 6.10. 
 
 
The result revealed that the two main saboteurs of banking processes were the 
customers and the staff. It is significant that whilst the bankers admitted their 
complacency in perpetrating fraud they contradict literature which sees the insider as 
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the main threat to business systems. The implication however is that with customers 
and staff forming the weakest link, remedial solutions should be targeted at them.  
ARB Apex bank was however largely seen as the least problematic. Interviews with 
managers of rural banks and a regional manager of ARB Apex Bank revealed that rural 
banks are autonomous organisations. They are therefore not under any form of direct 
control from the Apex bank; they are manage themselves the way they see fit. In that 
regard the Apex bank does not concern itself with the fraud within individual rural 
banks. The ARB Apex bank is only interested in the possibility of fraud regarding 
transactions they are processing at their end.  
With regards to regulation, the ARB Apex bank is only involved in prudential 
regulation thus conducting banking inspection on behalf of the Bank of Ghana. They 
are not involved in non- prudential regulation and for that matter fraud prevention 
within rural banks.   
The ARB Apex bank in several respects operates like a commercial bank for the rural 
banks maintain accounts and offering services for them. In addition they provide 
various non banking services. The banking services provided include: 
 Specie services which involve physically transporting cash to and from Bank of 
Ghana.  
 Clearing services; between rural banks on one hand and between rural banks 
and commercial banks on the other hand. 
 Apexlink local money transfer. In this type of transaction Apex bank does 
clearing between the paying and the receiving bank‟s account.  After verifying 
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that all the transaction details received from the paying and the receiving banks 
are correct they effect a transfer between the account of the two banks 
 Efie ne fie (Home cash) which enables account opening and operation from a 
different locality 
 Placid and Surichange International money transfer – the ARB Apex bank 
serves as the last leg of international transfers receiving inward transfers and 
passing it on to rural banks 
Non banking services provided by ARB Apex bank include;   
 Treasury and management advice 
 Training and capacity building 
 Product development and introduction to rural banks 
 There are plans to let the Apex bank take over completely the function of 
prudential regulation of rural banks. Currently the bank of Ghana does the 
inspection of the rural banks however the LI1825 mandates the apex bank to do 
inspections which they are going to carry out in due course. 
Though Apex bank is not involved in fraud control within individual banks it can play a 
crucial role in any security system to protect the integrity of transactions. Due to 
restrictions placed on the operations of rural banks the ARB Apex bank serves as a link 
between rural banks. The most important role the ARB Apex bank can play in securing 
transactions of rural bans is to serve as a platform for implementing mechanisms for 
transactions that cover more than one bank.  
Currently it directly participates in transactions involving more than one bank.  Due to 
this role it has access to all rural banks hence it could serve as a repository of 
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information and knowledge relevant to fraud prevention unlike individual rural banks.  
Information such as risky customers or employees could be shared with rural banks. It 
could also serve as a secure means of transmitting transfer information between rural 
banks. Currently rural banks have to call each other on the phone to relay transfer 
information. ARB Apex bank could also serve as a means of reconciling information 
about transactions which cross organisational boundaries to prevent fraud.  
6.7 Summary of Systemic Weaknesses 
Several systemic weaknesses were identified during the field study. These weaknesses 
were mainly due to two main causes. The first is the regulatory regime that the rural 
banking system operates under. The second is the nature of the rural communities the 
banking system operates in. There were many structural and soft issues within the 
community that made some conventional banking practices inadequate.  
Half of the services offered by rural banks have business processes that cross 
organisational boundaries. This increases the vulnerability of the process and increases 
the risk of fraud since you have more than one entity being responsible for ensuring 
security.  
It was also observed that rural banks have small staff sizes. Small staff sizes reduce the 
ability to effectively implement separation of duty. The ability to deal with fraud is 
therefore reduced.  
Others involved non existence of structures and mechanisms to properly identity 
prospective customers. Also identification documents available are not reliable to be 
used for effective identity verification.  
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Other internal control mechanisms like job rotation, call over and authorising 
transaction were used to prevent fraud. These were thought to be inadequate in dealing 
with the risks. Staff and Customers were thought to undermine the implementation of 
some of the banking processes including internal control mechanism. Any new control 
mechanism should therefore be aimed at these two main groups of people who from the 
weakest link. 
The ARB Apex bank is not involved in fraud prevention however they were involved 
in a number of transactions and had access to all rural banks. This puts them in a 
position where they could serve as a platform for implementing measures to control 
fraud. 
The next chapter looks at the manifestation of these systemic weaknesses in banking 
processes. In other words what possibilities exist for example a criminal if they could 
obtain two drivers license and if the banks rely on a driver‟s licenses to create customer 
identities in the account opening process.   
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Chapter 7 
 
 
7 Rural Banking Processes and Fraud Risks 
This chapter is primary aimed at presenting how fraud can be manifest within the 
banking processes. First it looks at the flow of money within the rural banking industry 
as a target for fraudsters. It starts by looking at accounts as the main vehicle for 
banking it also does a general discussion of in account transactions and the risks 
associated. There is also discussion of source documents, loans, the importance of 
customer static data and the risks associated with it. 
There is subsequently a presentation of twenty fraud scenarios that illustrate the 
manifestation of fraud in the banking processes. These scenarios are instances of fraud 
that have occurred in the past or cases that could occur as a result of systemic 
weaknesses that were found during the field research. They were created with the help 
of rural and commercial bankers.  
Finally there is a discussion of the issues that give opportunity to commit fraud in rural 
banking. This discussion leads to requirements for a fraud control. 
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7.1 Flow of Money within the Rural Banking Industry 
Fraud occurs when the flow of money represented by transactions targeted in such a 
way that unauthorised people benefit. Figure 7.1 shows the rural banking system and 
the flow of money around the system. The diagram shows three main types of entities. 
They are the customer, the rural bank suspense account and the customer account. It is 
worth noting that bank employees are involved in all transfers. These are the main 
points through which money flow in rural banking. ARB Apex bank is also represented 
as a participant when money flows between two banks. The arrows show the flow of 
money around the system which occurs during transactions. It also shows flow of 
money between accounts which does not involve cash.  
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Account 
Prestea RB 
Account 
Bank 
Suspense 
Account 
Customer 
Account 
Customer 
Account 
Customer 
Account 
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Figure 7.1 Rural Banking Process and Flow of Money 
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Where the transaction is within a rural bank it involves employees of that bank. On the 
other hand if it occurs in the ARB Apex bank then it involves apex bank staff. When a 
transaction occurs between two organisations the part that occurs in an organisation is 
dealt with by its staff. Details of the banking processes are in appendix C. A detailed 
discussion of how this fraud occurs is discussed shortly. 
7.2 Bank Account and Account Transactions  
The basic banking service in rural banking is the customer account which could be in 
the name of an individual or organisation. Accounts are created to record monies owed 
by the bank to a customer or the customer to the bank (in the case of a loan) and it has a 
record of all transactions performed by a customer. They are therefore opened in the 
name of a specified customer(s) who might be an individual or a company. Hence 
customer identity is closely linked to the opening or creation of an account. It is this 
individual that the bank assumes they are doing business with. It is therefore critical 
that the identity of the person who requests a transaction on an account be thoroughly 
verified.  
There are various types of customer accounts in rural banking but the two most 
common are the savings and current account. Rural banks offer current accounts which 
usually come with a cheque book which serves as a means for withdrawing money 
from the account and for making payment to another person. They also offer savings 
accounts that pay interest on deposits but do not offer a cheque book and so cannot be 
used to make payments like a current account. These accounts usually have a credit or 
positive balance which means the customer has money deposited in the bank. A 
customer account can occasionally have a debit balance when an overdraft facility is 
granted and used in such a case the customer will owe the bank.  
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For the purpose of discussing scenarios customer accounts have been grouped into one 
because they basically have similar account opening processes which have been 
described in the preceding chapter.  
Rural banks also open various accounts to enable their operations. The suspense 
account is one of such account. These are used for funds receipts that are doubtful or 
may have discrepancies pending resolution and subsequent disbursements. When 
accounts do not balance the excess money is usually placed in a suspense account. 
They are also used when funds belong to a person who does not have an account in the 
bank usually referred to as money in transit. They are also used to hold monies in 
transit like in the Apex money transfers. Generally suspense accounts are meant to be 
zero balance account (O'Gara, 2004) and bankers from both the main stream and rural 
banks confirmed this. When there is a balance on a suspense account the indication is 
that some funds have not gotten to its destination account or money has gone out of the 
bank which needs to be in the bank. The implication is that all discrepancies must be 
resolved. During the field study, suspense accounts were said by the bankers to be one 
of the targets of inside fraudsters. Access to and use of Suspense accounts, they said, 
must be tightly regulated to ensure that they are used for the purpose for which they 
have been created and accessed by only those who are authorised to do so. 
All banking processes involve transactions on an account. Account transactions are 
either a credit transaction or a debit transaction which would deposit or withdraw 
money from an account respectively. In an account transfer transaction for example, 
there is a debit transaction and a credit transaction taking money from one account and 
depositing it in another. The various account transactions are described in Appendix C. 
Being the main focus of transactions, insertion, deletion or modification of a record in 
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an account gives legitimacy to a transaction at least on the surface. It is therefore 
critical to prevent fraudsters from assuming the identity of a legitimate customer to 
enable a transaction to be performed on an account. It is equally critical to prevent 
rogue staff from illegally amending records of an account to enable them to take money 
from the bank. On the other hand it is important for a bank to have the ability to prevent 
a customer from denying that a transaction was authorised by them. One such abuse 
which employees were said to have used to commit fraud in the past was reversing 
transactions. Employees are allowed to reverse a transaction which has already been 
processed if there is a mistake or some problem with it. They were however said to 
have in the past reversed the transactions to have access to the monies involved. 
Another risk occurs in cross organisational transactions like the Apexlink money 
transfer. This service enables customers to transfer money from a bank in one locality 
to another person through another bank in another locality. This is in essence a series of 
account transfers but it also includes various mechanisms for clearing and the proper 
identification of the recipient. With neither of the banks having end to end management 
of the whole process and therefore fraudster could insert amendments to the transaction 
for their benefit. With recipients of these transfers are not required to be customers of 
the paying bank therefore it increases the risk of the money ending up in the wrong 
hands. This is because banks pay money to non customers based on the identification 
provided by the recipient hence if the ID provided is fictitious there will not be a 
mechanism to trace them. 
7.3 Cheques and Source Documents 
Source documents are used to initiate transactions. They are issued internally or issued 
from a customer. A cheque is an example of a source documents. It is a document that 
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is used to instruct a bank to pay a specific amount of money from a specified account 
held by the bank. It is therefore a very sensitive document because when filled and 
signed it could put money in the hands of a criminal.  
The use of forged documents especially cheques to make a fraudulent withdrawal was 
noted as a problem recently by all the bankers interviewed. An account can fall to the 
mercy of a criminal given that the account number is known and the customer‟s 
signature can be reasonably forged. 
Generally a cheque would bear the details of the bank, the drawers name, the account 
number and the cheques number printed on it. Cheques also have the amount to be 
drawn both in words and numbers, the signature of the drawer/ customer, the date and 
the name of the payee.  
Though the printed details are printed in machine readable Magnetic Ink Recognition 
Character (MICR) cheques can be forged when the fraudster has access to the 
technology. In any case all the banks visited did not have machines to read the cheques 
anyhow so if they are forged with non machine readable ink it would not have been 
noticed.  
Again the signature of the customer which is usually the main verification mechanism 
can be forged together with the amount and the date. Access to cheques is therefore 
seen as critical in fraud prevention.  
7.4 Amendment of Customer Static Data 
Static data like name, signature, and contact details like address and phone number are 
kept on account holders when accounts are opened. As in most banking institutions all 
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over the world, banking customers go through various circumstances that cause them to 
change their personal identifications information. It is not unusual for customers to 
change their addresses when they move house, a phone number or even a name during 
the life of an account. Additional signatories could be added for corporate customers in 
a case where management changes.  
In changing account details customers are asked to bring letters or powers of attorney 
to prove that the customer has given consent to the bank to change the details. This is to 
ensure the customer does not deny authorising the change in the future. This request 
assumes that the letter supplied came from a genuine attorney. In the case where a letter 
is purported to come from the customer, the assumption that it came from the customer 
is based on having the letter bearing the customer‟s signature. This brings into question 
the reliability of signatures and the ability to detect forged ones. New scanner 
technology makes forgery easy and undetectable (Deposit Account Fraud Committee, 
2000) while criminals can even go further and fraudulently use autopens. Experiments 
conducted with signature forgers who were new to the task of forging indicated 29.4% 
were successful forgeries. This was despite the fact that thorough inspection done by 
people who knew there were forged signatures samples (Cvrcek et al., 2005). This 
shows that the whole process of human signature identification is at best unreliable.    
Changing static data introduces another person or a means for another person to 
impersonate an account holder. In a case where the fraudulent change is perpetrated by 
an employee who changes or adds a signatory to an account, the whole mechanism of 
fraud detection becomes dead from the start because the signatory will subsequently be 
seen as an authorised party for that account.  
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7.5 Loan Application  
Bank loans involve a bank lending a sum of money to its customer to be repaid at a 
later date. In giving out loans, banks willingly give out money to customers. It is 
thought an easy way to take money out of a bank is to take a loan and this is because 
bankers most often encourage customers to take out loans. Criminals can either use 
misrepresentation of their financial circumstances or set up fictitious accounts for 
nonexistent customers to contract a loan. 
In the rural banking system the project officer is usually the one who receives and 
appraise loan applications. Within this process they can easily aid in making a 
misrepresentation for such an application for a loan. This risk is high when it is 
combined with the mechanism of job rotation, a project officer who has already set up 
fictitious accounts could apply for loans for such an account.  
Overdrafts are facilities that banks give to their customers to enable them to take more 
money from their account than they actually have. In other words it could be seen as 
another form of loan. Generally overdraft facilities in the rural banks are only allowed 
when there is prior arrangement with the manager. Overdraft which is a form of a loan 
could be used by criminals to siphon money from a bank especially when the account 
which is offered the facility is a fraudulent one.    
Hire purchase arrangements are also offered by rural banks where the bank finances for 
example equipment for the customer. These hire purchase arrangements are done to 
ensure that loans given to customers are used for what they are given for. Loans and 
hire purchase are also put into the same category because they also follow a similar 
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process for applying, appraisal and approval irrespective of the amount or whether it is 
part of a larger government program. 
7.6 Fraud Scenarios 
As mentioned earlier the fraud scenarios were arrived at based on the frauds which 
have either occurred or had a high possibility to occur due to systemic weaknesses. 
They were arrived at after observation, interviews and discussions with various 
employees of rural banks and other commercial banks.  
In presenting the fraud scenarios various fictional characters have been created to 
discuss possible scenarios that were arrived at during the field work. Three fictitious 
banking institutions are used to illustrate the fraud scenarios. They are made up of two 
fictitious rural banks operating in different localities. These are Tarkwa rural bank and 
then Prestea rural bank. There is also a class 1 main stream bank commercial bank 
Accra bank. 
The scenarios also make use of various fictitious characters. Within Tarkwa rural bank 
there is Yaw who is an employee has various roles in the bank. Yaw assumes the 
various positions through job rotation. There is also Ato who is an operations officer of 
Tarkwa rural bank. 
There are also customers within the scenarios. There are Fiifi and Ebo who are both 
account holders of Tarkwa rural bank. There is also Jojo who is an account holder of 
Prestea rural bank. Then there is Esi a fraudster who is not a customer of any of the 
banks. Ama is a fictitious identity used to commit fraud. The last two characters are 
Kwasi and Yaa who are not account holders.  
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7.6.1 Fraud Scenario 1 - Unauthorised withdrawal  
Yaw a bank employee uses his status as an authorised officer of the bank which allows 
him to perform transactions. He uses this to perform a fraudulent withdrawal. Yaw 
performs an unauthorised withdrawal from Ebo‟s account with the intent of stealing the 
money. This means that Yaw does the withdrawal without a cheque or internally 
generated voucher which should act as a source document on which the transaction is 
initiated. Normally the bank does a call over which is an end of day audit to match all 
transaction for the day with their documentation. This mechanism is meant to detect all 
errors or fraud. The risk that could allow this fraud to occur is that if the call over is not 
done properly or there is an oversight by the call over staff. On the other hand if Yaw 
decides to leave before the end of the day the fraud would succeed. This is because the 
mechanism can only detect the fraud at the end of the day when the fraud has been 
perpetrated. Also in certain cases the work load or absenteeism prevents banks from 
performing the call over. 
Unauthorised withdrawal from an account could be done in two ways: 
a. In the first instance the withdrawal from Ebo‟s account could be transferred 
by Yaw into Fiifi another customer of the bank‟s account. A subsequent 
withdrawal could then be made by Fiifi from his account and given to Yaw 
this is to avoid a trail leading to him. 
b. Alternatively Yaw can just withdraw the money from Ebo‟s account.   
Every transaction must have a source document but it is possible to carry out a 
transaction without one. It only becomes an issue during audits. The weakness being 
exploited here is the ability to process transactions without a source document.  Some 
members of staff in the rural banks indicated that this form of fraud was possible in the 
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rural banking system. This and the next scenario had actually occurred in a commercial 
bank. 
7.6.2 Fraud Scenario 2 - Unauthorised withdrawal/loan  
In this scenario Yaw claims to have authorisation to make withdrawals from Ebo‟s 
account based on verbal instructions. Here he is not a teller so cannot perform the 
transaction so requires a document that would enable him to demand that the 
transaction be performed. Yaw claims the instruction was given by a telephone call 
from Ebo based in this fictitious claim he generates an internal withdrawal voucher on 
which a transaction would be based to make a withdrawal. This scenario can have two 
variations. With this type of fraud the customer‟s vigilance is the only means by which 
the fraud can be detected. Customers who go through their statements thoroughly are 
the only ones who can detect transactions they have not done. A careful choice of a 
customer can easily deal with this risk of detection. Here Yaw  
a. In the first instance Yaw gives the money to Kwasi as a loan. Kwasi who is 
a not a customer of the bank and needs a loan Kwasi then returns money in 
a week and Yaw then pays the money back into Ebo‟s account taking 
interest on the loan. 
b. In the second case Yaw makes the unauthorised withdrawal transaction on 
Ebo‟s account as per verbal instruction and an internal voucher, takes the 
money and does not return the money back to the account. 
The weakness being exploited here it the possibility to use deception to gain fraudulent 
authority of the customer and access to a valid source document under pretence. In one 
of the rural banks surveyed a case was related where an officer used this mechanism to 
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withdraw money from a customer account but returned it after using it. With the 
weaknesses in the call over mechanism the second variation could also occur.  
7.6.3 Fraud Scenario 3 - Same day reversal  
Yaw working as a teller processes a deposit transaction for Ebo however after the 
transaction has been processed, he under the pretext that the transaction is a mistake, 
reverses the transaction before it goes through call over and is validated. In all the rural 
banks visited, employees need additional authorisation to reverse a transaction if a 
mistake is detected. In this scenario, Yaw has the authority to perform the transaction 
but he needs additional authority to reverse so he creates the deception to obtain the 
authorisation to perform the reversal. It was indicated that when a transaction is 
processed and is immediately detected to be wrong it is reversed but not as a separate 
transaction from the original one just a correction. On the other hand, a transaction 
reversed a day or more later is usually treated as a whole new transaction and would 
therefore require more rigorous checks. Yaw therefore makes a request for a reversal of 
Ebo‟s deposit transaction minutes after Ebo‟s original transaction. He keeps the money 
without going through rigorous checks.  
This transaction could also be manifest in two ways; 
a. When Yaw credits account of Ebo he could reverse the transaction claiming the 
amount as a mistake. He would then substitute the original pay-in voucher for 
his fictitious one with a lesser amount and taking the balance of the money in 
cash. 
b. On the other hand Yaw could reverse the transaction taking the money from 
Ebo‟s account and then credits it to Fiifi‟s account. Here Yaw would claim that 
to be the original transaction basically substituting the original pay-in voucher 
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with his fictitious one for Fiifi. He would then ask Fiifi to withdraw the money 
for him at a later date. 
Employees could commit fraud by taking advantage of weaknesses in control 
measures. Here the ease of employees to undo a transaction could be exploited to 
commit fraud. The bankers in the commercial banks spoken to said it used to be a 
problem in the past and some of the rural bankers agreed that it could occur in their 
banks.  
7.6.4 Fraud Scenario 4 - Job Rotation Fraud  
As discussed in chapter 5, one of the main internal control measures that rural banks 
use is job rotation. This in itself is a good mechanism however it has a down side which 
presents fraudsters with an opportunity. In many cases some transactions may not by 
themselves be risky in terms of direct loss to the bank. They can however create an 
opportunity to create deception for the purpose of committing another fraudulent 
transaction. With this fraud type Yaw needs to create a new identity to enable him to 
request for a loan and also to enable him to avoid being traced hence the need to create 
the deception with a new identity.    
Yaw opens a dummy account for nonexistent customer Ama when he is on rotation as a 
customer services officer. Now in another capacity Yaw can apply for credit for the 
fraudulent account. When the said credit has been accessed the nonexistent owner 
cannot be traced. This fraud can be manifest in 4 ways. 
a. Yaw opens a fictitious account in the name of Ama when on rotation as an 
account opening clerk. Applies for a loan for Ama with forged guarantors 
when on rotated to the loan desk.  
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b. Yaw opens a fictitious account in the name of Ama when on rotation as an 
account opening clerk. Request for an overdraft and spends the money 
without paying 
c. Yaw opens a fictitious account in the name of Ebo in his bank Tarkwa rural 
bank in the same name as an existing customer Ebo when on rotation as an 
account opening clerk. Yaw then opens another fictitious account in Prestea 
rural bank in the name of Ama. Yaw would then pay a cheque belonging to 
the real Ebo into the false account when he is on rotation as a teller. He can 
then write a cheque for the fictitious Ebo account to be paid into the 
fictitious account in Prestea rural bank in the name of the fictitious customer 
Ama. When the transfer is made Yaw can then withdraw the money from 
the Prestea rural bank account in the name of Ama.  
d. Opens a dummy account in his bank for a non existing customer with the 
same name as Ebo when on rotation as an account opening clerk. Yaw 
would then pay a cheque belonging to Ebo in to the false account when he is 
on rotation as a teller and withdraw the money.  
Here again flaws in control measures are shown to enable an employee to commit 
fraud. There is no means for a rural bank to determine whether the actions of an 
employee in one role will enable him to commit a fraud in another. By getting the 
opportunity to work in different job roles an employee can learn the weaknesses in 
control measures create deception like fictitious account and also cover fraud. This type 
of fraud has occurred in many banks across the world the Donald McKenzie case in the 
Royal bank of Scotland and the Jerome Kiervel Société General case. It was agreed that 
there was a distinct possibility that this could also occur in the rural banking industry.    
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7.6.5 Fraud Scenario 5 - False cheque book request  
Yaw request for a new cheque book for Ebo with a forged cheque book request slip. To 
make a withdrawal there needs to be a valid cheque hence Yaw needs to be able to 
obtain that document that will allow him to create that deception that a withdrawal 
request is coming from the account holder. When Yaw is working as a customer service 
officer it is much easier to use a forged cheque request than a forged cheque because he 
is the one that has to verify it. He therefore takes the cheque book when it arrives at the 
branch, forges Ebo‟s signature to make a withdrawal.  
This type of fraud has two main variations where  
a. Yaw can make a cash withdrawal from Ebo‟s account using the cheque with 
a forged signature. 
b. On the other hand Yaw could also make a withdrawal from Ebo‟s account 
by paying a cheque into Fiifi‟s account. A withdrawal is then made by Fiifi 
and the money handed to Yaw. 
Forgery is used in this scenario to create a document that enables the fraudster cause 
deception to enable a fraud to be committed. The weakness in the rural banking system 
that makes this fraud possible is that there is no reliable way of verification of source 
documents except by their print design which can easily be replicated by current 
technology. This scenario was arrived at observing bank officials receiving new cheque 
book requests. It was observed that cheque requests was not keenly scrutinised like 
cheque withdrawals. 
7.6.6 Fraud Scenario 6 - Signatory alteration  
Yaw on rotation as a customer service clerk can add a signatory to Ebo‟s account. A 
signature is required to make a withdrawal so when Yaw is working as a customer 
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service clerk he adds a signatory to Ebo‟s account details. Here again Yaw chooses to 
add the signature because that is where he has control and is able to create the 
deception without being discovered. When he goes on rotation as a customer service 
person he could then use his access to a counter check as a customer service officer 
make a withdrawal. Counter cheques are cheque leaflets that are given to customers to 
use when they do not bring their cheque books to the bank. 
Here again this fraud scenario shows that in some roles, an employee in a bank can 
create documents and records that can enable the commission of fraud without proper 
controls to prevent abuse. Yaw is therefore able to create such records and documents 
to support his deception which enables him to commit the fraud. This scenario was also 
arrived at after observing the lack of mechanisms to detect false request and the poor 
scrutiny and lack of dual checks to request to change customer static data. 
7.6.7 Fraud Scenario 7 – Local Money transfer  
Yaw transfers money on behalf of Ebo to Ama who is at Prestea a different locality 
from Tarkwa and has no bank account. The local money transfer is therefore from Ebo 
through Tarkwa rural bank to Ama through Prestea rural bank. Ama is therefore 
required to collect the money in cash. Yaw however passes the transfer details to Esi 
before Ama claims the cash. Esi then presents herself as Ama before Esi turns up and 
collects the Money. 
Here the inability to match identification information to a natural could result in a 
fraud. Normally a photo ID is requested and this could be a voter‟s ID card. A 
Ghanaian voters ID does not have any security features besides there has been many 
reported instances of multiple voter registration with different names. Also with the 
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creation and transmission of identification information to be used by Ama in collecting 
is left to one person then the risks increases. This enables impersonation of Ama by Esi. 
7.6.8 Fraud Scenario 8 - Account opening  
Yaw opens a new account in Tarkwa for Fiifi who lives in Prestea. He collects Fiifi‟s 
initial deposit to pay into the new account when it has been activated. He however does 
not pay the cash into the account. This type of fraud, the bankers mentioned, is 
especially possible when the customer does not live in the same town or even abroad. 
In such a case Fiifi will not be able to detect whether his deposit was paid into the 
account or not. This type of fraud is possible because Fiifi being a new customer is not 
conversant with the normal paying in processes and would accept any instruction given 
by Yaw who opened the account especially when he trusted him. Though a pay in 
receipt is given to Fiifi it is only a stamped customer copy of what Fiifi filled in and not 
one printed of the system as a result of a transaction. Fiifi is unlikely to confirm 
whether all has been made to the account until the next time he comes to town which 
could sometimes be up to a year. 
There are two variations to this type of fraud 
a. When Yaw never pays the money into Fiifi‟s account 
b. When Yaw uses the money for a short term interest activity like a loan to Kwasi 
and pays the money back. 
In this fraud scenario Yaw builds trust in such a way that Fiifi accepts his offer to pay 
in the cash for him. It also occurs because paying in an initial deposit is a separate 
transaction as the account opening process though a minimum deposit is required for 
every account opened. This fraud had occurred in one of the rural banks studied. 
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7.6.9 Fraud Scenario 9 - Systems admin log in fraud  
Some systems administrators have access to log in information or sometimes have the 
right to override employees when there is a problem with the computer system or if 
some system functions have to be run like some end of day reports. Yaw working as a 
systems administrator uses his access to employee login profiles to take Ato‟s login 
details. Yaw fabricates a transaction as if it is has been performed by Ato. Transfers 
money from Ebo‟s account into Fiifi‟s another Fiifi collects the money and hands it 
over to Yaw.  
The weakness here is the poor implementation of separation of duties which allows 
some system administrators to have access to some security information.  Ato though a 
systems administrator cannot perform customer account transaction with his own set of 
permissions. He therefore needs to create a transaction that is seemingly coming from 
Ato for it to look genuine. This fraud was committed by an employee of one 
commercial banks several times before it was discovered. 
7.6.10  Fraud Scenario 10 - Dividend payment  
For customers who have made investments like shares, dividends from those 
investments are paid directly into their bank accounts. Ebo‟s dividend is sent to Tarkwa 
rural bank by ABC Ltd in which he has invested. These payments come in bulk to the 
bank with a list of all investors who have accounts in Tarkwa rural bank. 
Disbursements are then done at Tarkwa rural bank. Yaw therefore pays the bulk 
amount into the bank‟s suspense account. In making the disbursements to the various 
investors Yaw pays Ebo‟s part of the money into Fiifi‟s account. Fiifi then withdraws 
the money and gives it to Yaw.  
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The weakness that is exploited in this fraud is that bulk inward transfers are not 
automatically credited to specific accounts. In that case it allows staff members to be 
able to vary the destination account without the consent of the payee. This is the same 
for cheques paid in by individual and companies. It is the staff members who manually 
enter the account details they could enter it into a wrong account without detection. The 
specific risk with inward transfers is that the recipient does not always know transfers 
are coming in and hence might take time to detect the fraud. This fraud was committed 
by an employee of a commercial bank and the rural bankers confirmed that it is a 
possibility.     
7.6.11  Fraud Scenario 11 - Suspense account  
In this scenario, an inward transfer to Ebo has mistakes and so cannot be credited to 
Ebo or any other person for that matter as the details do not match. With the 
inconsistencies in the transaction the money stays in the suspense account. Yaw debits 
the suspense account to takes the money 
a. With an unclaimed transfer meant for Ebo who is an account holder sitting in 
the suspense account which is required by regulation to have a zero balance. 
Yaw takes the opportunity to debit the account and takes the money in cash 
purporting to have found the rightful recipient. 
b. With Ebo an account holder‟s transfer in the suspense account, Yaw transfers 
the money into Fiifi‟s account claiming him to be the rightful owner. Fiifi then 
withdraws the money and gives it to Yaw. 
c. In this variation an unclaimed inward transfer meant for Ama who is not an 
account holding customer. Yaw passes on the details for Esi to claim the money 
purporting to be the rightful beneficiary. 
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d. Also with an unclaimed inward transfer is to Ama a non customer in the 
suspense account. Yaw transfers the money into Fiifi‟s account. Fiifi withdraws 
the money and gives it to Yaw. 
Suspense accounts are known to be an immense source of fraud in many organisations 
(O'Gara, 2004). This is mostly due to the fact that they are designed to contain items of 
questionable origin destination or in transit. There is therefore the tendency to use any 
means to try to reduce the balance to zero. The question is whether the destination 
accounts or recipient is the rightful one. Staff from the rural banks indicated that the 
weakness is that time limits for balancing these accounts are not adhered to. Also 
because of the inability of to tie transfer information to an identity of a natural person 
or an account deception and impersonation becomes possible. Numerous examples of 
this fraud type were described by bankers from both the rural and commercial banks.   
7.6.12 Fraud Scenario 12 – Teller till fraud 
Yaw working as a teller at the end of a working day is allowed to keep a small amount 
of money in his till at the close of the day and the locked till kept in the strongroom. 
This money is the notes and coins that do not form a round sum. Yaw uses this money 
which should have been kept in the till to give small loan to Kwasi to make a profit. 
Yaw returns the money when Kwasi returns the money. 
The weakness is that physical cash is difficult to match to electronic money on 
computer system. It might show that money is in the till or in the strongroom but in 
reality the money might not be there. A Teller from the rural bank admitted having 
borrowed money from their till for personal use and returning it at a later date.  
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7.6.13 Fraud Scenario 13 – check Kitting  
Cheque kitting could be a major problem in situations where a reliable system of 
verifying whether cheques from other banks are not bad cheques. The current method is 
to wait for a set number of days usually three days before the cheque is given value. 
This does not necessarily mean that the cheque would have gone through clearing and 
verified to be good.  
In this scenario Fiifi deposits a bad cheque to Prestea rural bank cheque for a large 
amount issued by JoJo into his Tarkwa rural bank account. Meanwhile Fiifi has already 
issued a cheque to Ama to withdraw an amount. He then convinces Ato the operations 
manager to pay Ama‟s cheque with a smaller face value because a larger amount is 
coming into his account. He takes the money from Ama and uses it for his purpose. By 
the third day or more the Prestea cheque issued by Jojo would be found to be false but 
Fiifi would have taken out the money from the bank or even ready to return it after 
using it.  
Here Fiifi gains the trust of Ato to cause him to grant payment based on the belief that 
the cheque will be cleared and the amount will be covered. This is partly a trust based 
fraud. This fraud scenario obtained from two cases one of them involving a sum of 
about $720,000 and several cheques over several years.  
7.6.14 Fraud Scenario 14 - Account opening with false ID  
Banks are set up to serve customers and it is paramount that customers are who they 
say they are. This is because when money is paid into customer accounts or when loans 
are granted, it is assumed that the bank is doing business which someone who is 
traceable. An account opening fraud occurs in the various forms. Esi opens an account 
with fraudulent identity information. Rural banks require just a passport photo to open 
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an account. Only a few rural banks require a photo ID for identification as discussed in 
the previous chapter. 
a. Esi forges a Ghanaian voter‟s ID card in the name of Ama. The voters ID card 
is just a laminated card with no security features. She uses this card to open a 
bank account at Tarkwa rural bank. She then applies for a loan on the account 
which has the name Ama on it with the intention of not paying it.  
b. Esi obtains a new birth certificate in the name of Ama without proving she is 
the one (see chapter 5). With a forged birth certificate she can obtain any other 
document like a passport which she can use to as proof of identity to open an 
account with Tarkwa rural bank. She then applies for a loan on the account 
which has the name Ama on it with the intention of not paying it.   
c. Esi opens an account with Tarkwa rural bank with her own ID documents but 
gives a wrong address. She then applies for a loan on the account then 
disappears. With the wrong address she cannot be traced. 
This is a classic case of identity fraud. As discussed before identity information is used 
for the purpose of distinguishing a person from another it should also be able to help a 
business trace the person whose identity it is. Giving any form of wrong identity 
information is to create deception to gain a status which will accrue certain benefits or 
to avoid being traced when the need arises. Almost all the bankers spoken to mentioned 
at least one case of identity theft. There were also some of these cases also reported in 
the news especially in during the electoral commissions 2007 registration exercise.  
7.6.15  Fraud Scenario 15 – Employee hiding true ID 
In this scenario Yaw seeks employment with a false identity. Three variations of this 
fraud type were envisaged. 
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a. Yaw obtains a forged certificate and a birth certificate and passport to create a 
fictitious identity. He then uses the new fraudulent identity and qualification to 
seek employment to enable him gain access to the banking system as part of an 
organised crime syndicate.  
b. Yaw in applying for a job uses a different address and refuses to declare his 
correct address and other important personal information like employment 
history to create a deception. This deception is to avoid being traced if the need 
arises.   
c. This variation similar to the first one but has a different motivation. Here Yaw 
obtains a fictitious identity and refuses to declare past history to hide his 
dubious past. Yaw obtains a forged certificate and a birth certificate and 
passport to create a new identity. He then uses the new fraudulent identity and 
qualification to seek seeks employment 
There is a risk that prospective employees may want to hide their identity or their 
history of fraud. A fraudster might also want to seek employment with a different 
identity for the purpose of committing fraud because it is easier for an employee to 
commit fraud since they are closer to the banks systems and have more access. Such 
fraudsters could do so to help them get a job and to avoid being traced in the event of a 
fraud. This scenario was partly related to the previous fraud scenario when perpetrators 
used various levels of fraudulent identity.  
This fraud is mainly possible because of the difficulty of matching the natural person to 
the identity identifiable information and the ease of obtaining identity documents. One 
of the rural bank managers interviewed mentioned that the one of the things they look 
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at was the character of the employees. He however admitted that it could be a problem 
if the employee used a false identity. 
Fraudulent withdrawal  
As discussed earlier cheques are a major means by which customers authorise 
withdrawals from their account. Cheques can also be used for payment and therefore 
are sometimes issued by customers to third parties who may or may not have a bank 
account with that bank or another rural bank. Cheques therefore become a prime target 
of fraudsters. The rural bankers spoken to mentioned that cheque fraud was 
increasingly becoming a major problem in their industry. Many cases of this type of 
fraud were described and were pointed to as evidence of this. 
Alterations can easily be made to genuine cheques which have been issued to show 
different recipients or amounts. 
Alternatively when a criminal has access to a genuine blank cheque leaflet from a 
customer‟s cheque book and can forge the customer‟s signature a withdrawal can easily 
be made.  
Criminals can also forge cheques fill them out and forge the signature of account 
signatories and withdraw various sums from customer accounts   
Four types of cheque fraud are discussed in this analysis:  
7.6.16 Fraud Scenario 16 – Cheque Fraud Variation 1 
Fiifi who has an account in a Tarkwa rural bank with a fraudulent cheque for 
withdrawal  
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a. He goes to pay into his account a cash cheque he stole. The cheque was 
originally issued to Kwasi by Ebo with a Tarkwa rural bank cheque. Fiifi 
endorses the cheque to show that it was issued to him. A cash cheque is a 
cheque which is issued and signed but does not bear the name of the recipient 
hence Fiifi by endorsing with his name it shows the cheque was issued to him. 
b. Fiifi forges a Tarkwa rural bank cheque in the name and account number of 
Ebo. He also forges Ebo‟s signature and goes to Tarkwa rural bank to make a 
withdrawal.  
c. Fiifi Steals a blank cheque leaflet forges Ebo‟s signature and fills it to show the 
cheque was issued to him by Ebo and pays it into his bank account. 
With this fraud Fiifi is known to the bank and if the cheque is not found to be 
fraudulent before being paid then it would be successful. For bank staff to detect the 
cheque as fraudulent as in the third variation of the fraud, they must detect that the 
signature is forged. This is the same in the second variation but in that case the bank 
staff must also detect that the cheque is also forged. Detecting both variations of fraud 
would depend on the ability of the bank staff to identify the forgery. With the first 
example unless Ebo finds the cheque is missing and reports it to the bank before Fiifi 
presents it nothing can prevent it from succeeding. In all three cases Fiifi is known to 
the bank and if his identity details are correct he could be traced but if the amount it big 
then he could just go out of town in order not to be arrested.  
The major weaknesses here is the ability to detect the document, in this case the 
cheque, is fraudulent. Then there is the problem of the verifying whether the cheque 
was truly issued by the account holder.   
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7.6.17 Fraud Scenario 17 – Cheque Fraud Variation 2 
Esi who does not have an account in a commercial or rural bank goes to Prestea rural 
bank to fraudulently withdraw a Prestea rural bank cheque. 
a. Esi steals a Prestea rural bank cheque issued to Yaa from Jojo. The cheque 
stolen in this case is a crossed cheque so bears Yaa‟s name. She endorses the 
cheque to show that Yaa has passed the cheque to her to make the withdrawal. 
She presents the cheque to the bank with her real identity and makes the 
withdrawal. 
b. Esi steals a Prestea rural bank cheque issued to Yaa from Jojo. The cheque 
stolen in this case is a crossed cheque so bears Yaa‟s name. She forges an 
identity document to claim to be Yaa and presents herself to the bank with her 
forged identity to cash the cheque. 
c. Esi steals a Prestea rural bank cheque issued to Yaa from Jojo. The cheque is a 
cash cheque and so does not bear Ama‟s name. She endorses it to show it was 
issued to her and then makes the withdrawal. 
d. Esi forges a Prestea rural bank cheque issued in the name and account number 
of Jojo to Yaa from Jojo. She forges Jojo‟s signature on the cheque, fills the 
cheque in and presents it to make a withdrawal. 
This scenario has similar problems with verifying the signature and the authenticity of 
the cheque as in scenario 16 however this time the perpetrator does not have an account 
with Prestea rural bank and so it makes it more difficult to trace her if the transaction is 
later found to be false.  
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7.6.18 Fraud Scenario 18 - Variation Cheque Fraud 3 
Fiifi who has an account in Tarkwa rural bank goes to Prestea rural bank to withdraw a 
fraudulent Prestea rural bank cheque.  
a. Fiifi Steals a cheque issued to Ebo by Jojo with a Prestea rural bank cheque 
from a rural bank but endorses to show that Ebo has passed the cheque to him 
(Fiifi). He therefore presents himself to the bank with his real identity to cash 
the cheque. 
b. Fiifi forges a cheque in the name and account of Jojo. He fills it and signs it and 
presents it to Prestea rural bank to make a withdrawal. 
This scenario, just like scenario 18, Fiifi is not known to the Prestea rural bank though 
he is a customer of Tarkwa rural bank. Tracing him would be very difficult to do  
7.6.19 Fraud Scenario 19 – Cheque Fraud Variation 4  
Aside a cheque or signature being forged, the amount can also be amended to increase 
it. Fiifi is an employee and does transactions on behalf of Ebo. She is therefore known 
to the bank staff as someone who does transactions for Ebo. 
a. Fiifi is Ebo‟s employee who has been issued with a cheque from his employer. 
He alters the original amount of five thousand to fifty five thousand. This he 
does by adding the word fifty to the amount in words and the Arabic numeral 5 
to the amount in numbers to increase the value. He then withdraws an amount 
higher than originally intended from Ebo‟s account.  
b. Fiifi steals a cheque from employer Ebo writes it and forges Ebo‟s signature and 
presents the cheque to Yaw (a teller) and to cash it. 
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c. Fiifi steals a cheque from his employer Ebo writes it and forges Ebo‟s signature 
and pays it into his account. 
In this scenario the cheque is an authentic document and Fiifi who has done many of 
such transactions uses his real identity to commit the fraud. The main deception is to 
assume the authority that Ebo gives to him but in this case has not been given the 
authority. 
7.6.20 Fraud Scenario 20 Customer repudiation 
Ebo gives a cheque to a third party customer Kwasi to make a withdrawal from his 
account. Ebo then comes to the bank to deny writing the cheque and demand to be 
reimbursed. 
Employees of the bank spoken to during the field work said in the event of a suspected 
fraudulent cheque transaction the cheque leaflet and cheque number are checked to 
verify whether it is a genuine cheque leaflet. Then they also check the signature to 
verify whether the customer issued the cheque. They can in the case of a forged cheque 
eventually determine it is forged but it is very difficult. In a specific fraud incident that 
happened in a commercial bank and recounted during the field research, the account 
holder due to ill health had signed blank cheques for a family member. This was stolen 
and the amount filled and presented. The withdrawal was successful because the 
signature was in fact that of the customer.  
Though customers are responsible for their chequebooks it is also the banks 
responsibility to prevent fraudulent withdrawal from customer account. It is therefore 
important that banks be able to ensure that customers do not deny transactions they 
themselves have requested for. 
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7.7 Pattern in Fraud Scenarios 
After a critical analysis of the rural banking processes and scenarios it is evident that 
the risks faced by rural banks are a combination of transaction, identification based 
failures and document fiddling.  
Fraud Goal Financial benefit of the actor 
Actors Employee – Internal operative  
Customer – Account holding and non account holding 
Fraud Target Identity, transactions, documents 
Fraud 
Technique 
Assuming a false identity and or false authority to enable 
transaction execution. 
 
Table 7.1 Rural Banking Fraud Model 
The rural banking fraud model showed in table 7.1 indicates the essential elements of 
fraud within rural banks. The scenarios showed weaknesses in controls, poor separation 
of duties and the inability to tie incoming cheques or source documents to transactions. 
It also showed that these weaknesses lead to transaction without source documents, 
impersonation, fraudulent gaining authority, forged cheques and altered cheques and 
the use of false identity. Table 7.2 shows a summary of the fraud scenarios discussed in 
this chapter. 
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Fraud Scenario Perpetrator Methods for Deception Targeted Step 
Unauthorised 
withdrawal 
Employee Perform transaction without valid 
request 
Source document 
Unauthorised Loan Employee Perform withdrawal feigning customer 
phone request 
Source document 
Same day reversal Teller Perform transaction reversal with false 
premise  
Transaction reversal 
Job rotation  Employee Opening customer account with a 
fictitious identity 
Identity verification during a/c 
opening 
False cheque book 
request 
Front office clerk Fictitious request of cheque book Source document 
Signatory alteration Front office clerk Fictitious change of signatory to 
customer account  
Source document 
Money transfer  Front office clerk Impersonation for money collection  Transfer of transaction details 
Account opening  Front office clerk Refusal to pay in initial deposit    Initial paying in of deposit    
Systems admin login  Systems 
Administrator 
Accessing login details Access to login details 
Dividend payment Back office clerk Paying dividend into different account Crediting beneficiary account  
Suspense account Back office clerk Withdrawal or transferring money to 
wrongful recipient from suspense a/c 
Crediting beneficiary account  
Teller till Teller Withdrawal from teller till End of day processes 
Cheque kiting Account holding 
customer 
Gaining trust of manager Withdrawal from account 
Account opening with 
false ID 
Account holding 
customer 
Identity fraud Identity verification during a/c 
opening 
Employee ID Job Applicant Identity fraud Identity verification during 
recruitment 
Cheque Fraud 1 Non account 
holding customer 
Forged cheque Cheque of authenticity of cheque 
Cheque Fraud 2 Non account 
holding customer 
Impersonation of cheque beneficiary Verification of authority of cheque 
holder 
  Forged cheque Cheque of authenticity of cheque 
Cheque Fraud 3 Non account 
holding customer 
Impersonation of cheque beneficiary Verification of authority of cheque 
holder 
  Forged cheque Cheque of authenticity of cheque 
Cheque Fraud 4 Non account 
holding customer 
Amendment cheque details  Cheque of authenticity of cheque 
  Forged cheque Cheque of authenticity of cheque 
Customer Repudiation Account holding 
customer 
Repudiation of transaction Verification of authorisation to 
perform transaction 
 
Table 7.2 Summary of Fraud Scenarios 
All the frauds described in the scenarios occur when fraudsters take advantage of 
weaknesses to mismatch items in the two different spheres of the rural bank operations. 
As can be seen in the scenarios rural banks work in two spheres first the physical actors 
or tokens and their representation in the form of records tracking them as shown in 
Figure 7.2. 
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There is for example the human person and the personal identifiable information kept 
as the identity of the person in the bank. On the other hand there are source documents 
and the transactions processed. Then there is the cash and the amount stored on record. 
Deception leading to fraud is able to occur when these two aspects do not match. For 
example when a fraudster is able to claim an identity either at the account opening 
stage or job application or impersonate a customer whose identity has been created and 
stored in the banks records.  
Since people are offered certain benefits because of who they are, being able to 
impersonate a person accrue these benefits to the impersonator. On the other hand 
banks offer benefits to people on the basis of documents in their possession and if these 
documents get into the hands of fraudsters they acquire the ability to access these 
benefits. In the same way fraudsters could get access to physical cash without detection 
if it does not show in the record of the cash kept in the bank. Such cash could be used 
and returned without it being discovered. 
All these are able to occur because there is a disconnect between the physical part of 
the system and the records electronic or otherwise. Table 7.3 shows the summary of the 
physical elements and the records that represent them. 
Natural Person Source Document 
 
Cash 
Transaction Personal Identification 
Information 
Records/Electronic 
money 
Physical 
Actors  
Records  
Figure 7.2  Interactions Between Actors in Banking 
System 
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Physical element Record 
Natural Person Account Holder Identity information 
Non Account Holder Identity information/document (e.g. ID card) 
Employee Identity information 
Photographs Identity 
ID Cards Identity 
Source Document Cheque Withdrawal Transaction 
Internally Generated Voucher Credit/Debit Transaction 
Cash Cash in Vaults Cash Account balance 
Cash in Till Till Account balance 
Table 7.3 Physical Elements and Records Representing Them    
Fraud is able to occur in the rural banking system because there seem to be a 
disconnect between the various components of the system that runs the banking system. 
The first as mentioned is the disconnect between the banking processes and the 
documents used to initiate the processes then fraudsters can perform the process 
without a document. There is an opportunity to commit fraud if a transaction can be 
processed without a valid document to back it. There should be a reliable mechanism 
that can verify and tie source documents to relevant steps of the transaction such that 
the transaction cannot be executed unless a there is a valid supporting document.  
The second is the inability to reliably connect an identity within the banks records or 
the personal identification information to a natural person. This inability creates the 
opportunity for impersonation. 
The final one is the inability to match the physical assets in this case cash with the 
records on banks records. An insider to the bank can therefore take cash from the bank 
and return it at a later date without detection because the bank records would show that 
the right amount of cash that is supposed to be there but in reality it is less.  
The other risks present are that preceding subjects or objects are not verified properly 
before subsequent subjects or objects. For example it must be objectively verified that 
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an account holder issued a cheque before a withdrawal is made to the account.  It is 
therefore critical that preceding subjects be objectively verified before the next subject 
can be verified in a chain of transaction. This mechanism should be able to verify 
whether a subject has been authorised or not to initiate or execute a transaction.   
Any design to deal with fraud should be able to deal with these fundamental issues. The 
first is to match the physical elements in the banking processes to the records. The 
second is to be able to ensure that preceding events are objectively true before a 
subsequent event can proceed.  
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Chapter 8 
 
 
8 Rural Banking Integrity Model 
This chapter discusses the Rural Banking Integrity Model (RBIM) which is the fraud 
protection model that is proposed to deal with the weaknesses within the rural banking 
industry. It introduces innovative mechanisms incorporating some information security 
techniques which are aligned to the culture of the community. It makes use of 
traditional community structure and the adinkra symbols to achieve identity 
certification and verification. 
8.1 Fraud Control Requirements 
In order to deal with the weaknesses identified in the last two chapters there are certain 
requirements that must be met. These are as follows; 
 Ensuring that identities are reliably verified. Verification of identities would be 
done by reliably linking the identity of a customer of a bank to the natural 
person. 
 Ensure that only the rightful customer or bank official can initiate a transaction 
by linking the verified identity to the documents purported to come from them. 
This is also to ensure that documents used to initiate transactions are not forged 
and are issued by genuine customers or officials of a bank. To achieve this, 
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customers must to be tightly tied to documents and documents tied to 
transactions. This means that if one element in the chain is false a transaction 
cannot proceed. 
 Ensuring authorised employees are the ones performing transactions 
 Ensuring that there are not conflicting tasks performed by employees 
8.2 Rural Banking Integrity Model 
The rural banking integrity model has four main parts namely Community Based 
Identity Certification, Identity Verification, Authority Verification and Transaction 
Security as shown in Figure 8.1 
 
The Community Based Identity Certification requires a customer to have his identity 
certified and a certificate issued before an account is opened for them. This is done by 
using a certified community leader to give an identity reference. Having an identity 
certificate is therefore a necessary condition before an account is opened or a 
transaction is processed.  
 
Identity 
Certification  
 
Identity 
Verification 
 
Authority 
Verification 
 
Transaction 
Security 
 
 
 
Community Based Identity Certification 
 
Transaction Verification Number System 
Transaction Authentication 
Number system 
Digital Certificate 
Static 
Separation of 
duties 
 
Dynamic 
Separation of 
duties 
 
Object based 
Separation of 
Duties 
 
Atomicity Account 
Transfer Keys 
Figure 8.1 Rural Bank Integrity Model (RBIM) 
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Identity verification includes mechanisms designed to verify identities of customer 
when they request a transaction. When a certified customer returns to the bank for a 
transaction their identities are verified when they produce a valid Personal 
Identification Code (PIC). This is a set of four Adinkra traditional symbols provided in 
a serial order. For a third party customer, transactions can only proceed if a valid one 
time use Transaction Authentication Code (TAC) is used to show authorisation from 
the legitimate account holder. This is also asset of four Adinkra symbols.  
Authority verification involves verifying the authenticity of source documents. Every 
genuine document must have a Transaction Verification Code (TVC). A TVC is a 
machine readable random number printed on bank issued documents. 
While a PIC/TAC and a TVC are necessary conditions individually. A combination of 
a valid PIC/TAC and a valid TVC is the sufficient condition for a transaction to be 
initiated. 
Transaction security ensures the transaction processes are not manipulated. It involves 
separation of duties, account transfer keys and atomic transactions. When a transaction 
is initiated, there must be a satisfactory static, dynamic and object based separation of 
duties before it can proceed. In a case when it cannot be met, the necessary 
authorisation must be sought for it to be completed. Account transfer keys which are 
public keys are used to ensure payments made can only be paid into the intended 
account. Finally atomicity is used to ensure that a minimum number of tasks must be 
completed for a change to be effected in transactions.  
In the RBIM the customer, employee, document and transactions are validated before a 
transaction can be executed.  
 180 
8.3 Design Principles Adopted   
In designing a model to maintain the integrity of rural banking operations, several 
concepts have been adopted. The integrity model is essentially a role based access 
control system. However it incorporates concepts from other information security 
models including the new access control model for data mining environments which is 
a variation of the Chinese wall security policy and the Aggressive Chinese Wall 
Security Policy.  
This RBIM has been designed to meet the requirement of the Clark – Wilson model. 
However it also prescribes innovative ways of achieving optimum protection within the 
Clark – Wilson model whilst effectively meeting the security requirements of rural 
banks. This is done in cases where the Clark – Wilson model seems inadequate or 
lacking detail in dealing with certain aspects of risks faced by the banks. The Clark – 
Wilson Model for example does not do much with regard to human identification 
which has been shown as a key target of fraudsters. The rural banking integrity model 
prescribes new ways to meet this requirement which is crucial but intricately linked to 
the success of transaction protection mechanisms.  
In addition to the role based controls, it also implements various other levels of control. 
At the base, general privileges are assigned to all users depending on their role and the 
assignment of these privileges must meet the static and dynamic separation of duties 
requirements and also meet the least privilege security rule.  
The integrity model however uses other mechanisms to meet additional separation of 
duties requirements to restrict the use of the privileges. It therefore operates at a higher 
level of granularity during operation in controlling the use of privileges using various 
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parameters. This higher level of control supersedes a user‟s assigned static and dynamic 
privileges that go with roles. Controls are determined for every instance of request 
made by a user to use a transformation procedure. This is done because role based 
access control do not by themselves have the ability to deal with complex issues which 
organisations have, there is the need to go beyond access control mechanisms and make 
rules which addresses security issues (Farraiolo and Kuhn, 1992) hence the integrity 
model use of additional customised controls which are to be discussed shortly.  
To ensure the best possible design, the eight design principles are recommended for 
designing protection mechanisms (Saltzer and Schroeder, 1974) was adopted. These 
principles have been taken into consideration in the design of the protection 
mechanism. They are; 
1. Economy of mechanism: Keep the design as simple and as small as possible. 
2. Fail-safe defaults: Base access decisions on permission rather than exclusion. 
3. Complete mediation: Every access to every object must be checked for 
authority. 
4. Open design: The design should not be secret. 
5. Separation of privilege: Where feasible, a protection mechanism that requires 
two keys to unlock it is more robust and flexible than one that allows access to 
the presenter of only a single key. 
6. Least privilege: Every program and every user of the system should operate 
using the least set of privileges necessary to complete the job. 
7. Least common mechanism: Minimize the amount of mechanism common to 
more than one user and depended on by all users. 
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8. Psychological acceptability: It is essential that the human interface be designed 
for ease of use, so that users routinely and automatically apply the protection 
mechanisms correctly. 
8.4 Key strengths of the Integrity Model 
The key strengths of the model are its strong identification mechanisms which matches 
the identity of a person with the natural person.  
The integrity model is also strong on preventative action on fraud by verifying the 
identity and authority of an account holder or the employee who is performing the 
transaction before a transaction can proceed. Not only does it have mechanisms that 
verify the credential of the returning customer but also reliably certify that the identity 
being used is the legal identity of the natural person.  
The model uses well formed transactions and various mechanisms to prevent complex 
fraud which in some cases are committed using more than one process. It also 
incorporates various mechanisms that ties documents to transactions and verifies the 
authority of customers requesting transactions on another person‟s account. 
8.5 Role of ARB Apex Bank  
The main role of the ARB Apex bank serves as a certification and facilitation body for 
the RBIM. With the reach of the ARB Apex bank its participation could be crucial in 
supporting rural banks secure transactions by creating a structure to aid sharing of risk 
information between rural banks. One of the main roles the ARB Apex bank is 
expected to play in the RBIM is that of identity verification and management. This is 
discussed in the next section.  
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Rural banks perform many transactions that go across their own organisation‟s 
boundaries and through the ARB Apex bank. Though these transactions may not begin 
and end in the ARB Apex bank and so they do not have end to end control they can 
play the role of collecting, comparing and identifying anomalies in transactions. 
Information regarding risky customers and risky employees could also be shared to 
help reduce operational risk and fraud. This is because it provides a central point for 
rural banking through its services and its oversight function. A centralised security 
program provide increased efficiency and economy of security throughout the 
organization and the ability to provide centralized enforcement and oversight (Swanson 
and Guttman, 1996).  
The ARB Apex bank as discussed in chapter 5 holds accounts for rural banks and they 
also perform clearing between rural banks and take other commercial bank cheques for 
clearing at bank of Ghana on behalf of rural banks. They also support banking 
operations of rural banks and though apex bank is not involved in non-prudential 
regulation, their role in setting rural banks for secure operations can be critical to its 
success. 
8.6 Community Based Certification  
One of the key elements of the RBIM is identity certification. Identification of users in 
the rural banking systems as has been mentioned earlier is woefully inadequate. In 
performing customer due diligence the customers‟ background, country of origin, 
public or high profile position, linked accounts, business activities or other risk 
indicators should be considered to determine how risky the customer is (Working 
Group on Crossborder Banking, 2001). It is also recommended that banks should 
develop graduated customer acceptance policies and procedures that require more 
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extensive due diligence for higher risk customers. Though these recommendations are 
originally aimed at prevention of money laundering it is very relevant in the fight 
against fraud. Banks are therefore encouraged to satisfactorily verify the identity of 
their customer.  
In the case of services like the Home cash/efie ne fie (see chapter 6) where customers 
open accounts from another bank, mechanisms are needed to ensure that due diligence 
are done properly. Rural banks must not rely only on the due diligence done by the 
bank where the prospective customer lives but must also be able to independently 
verify the identity of the prospective customer. Initial identification mechanism done 
with a community based identification mechanism to be discussed shortly should be 
able to deal with this. With the reach of the ARB Apex bank, its role in bringing 
together information from various locations could be key to ensuring proper due 
diligence is done. 
As discussed in chapter 3, rural communities form the basis of the identity of almost all 
Ghanaians. Rural banks can therefore tap into this social system for the purpose of 
identifying and assessing the risk rating of prospective customers. Figure 8.2 shows the 
actors of the community based certification system. 
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Every family has a family head and families are keen to have the respect of the 
community. The design of the integrity model takes advantage of this unique culture to 
verify the identity and character of a prospective customer by asking the family in the 
person of the family head to give a reference.  
ARB Apex bank would have the role of accrediting the customer through the 
community scheme and assigning them a risk value. ARB Apex bank would under the 
community based certification have list of vetted and approved list of community 
leaders and family heads to represent their families. These vetted leaders would be 
called upon to identify and verify the particulars of members of their Families who 
have applied to open accounts with rural banks.  
Families in effect stake their reputation on the member being refereed. In so doing, a 
family refereeing its members will be held liable by being labelled as risky if the 
refereed member ends up as a fraudster. They would therefore have the incentive not to 
Verification authority/ARB 
Apex bank 
 
Family 
Member/Prospective 
Customer 
 
Family Head/ 
Accredited Referee 
 
Applies for 
Certification 
Referees 
Applicant 
Family 
Figure 8.2 Actors in Community Based Identification  
 186 
endorse a criminal to a bank as it would bring the whole family into disrepute reducing 
the trustworthiness within the community and with the bank. 
It is expected that people who have moved from their original home towns could still 
take advantage of the centralised ARB Apex certification scheme to have their family 
heads give them a reference. 
In a case of where people cannot use their families for certification community leaders 
of acceptable identifiable groups could be used as a mechanism for referencing. In 
marketing towns for example there are marketing associations with identifiable leaders. 
These organisations could give a group reference to their members but that would mean 
that they would be staking their reputation on the line when they give a reference to a 
person. 
The logic here is that the level of reputational risk to a family or a community grouping 
must be commensurate with the risk rating the bank would assign to the person being 
assessed.   
When a prospective customer is certified an electronic identity certificate would be 
created and stored on a secure server on at the ARB Apex bank. This is to ensure 
higher security and to enable other rural banks to access these certificates for the 
purpose of identification where customers of one bank go to another rural bank to 
perform a transaction.  
Each customer must therefore have an electronic certificate which would bear the 
name, photo, address, account details and the level of risk that the customer poses to a 
bank. This certificate is necessary before an account is opened and would be available 
to all rural banks. 
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When a certified customer goes to a bank his identity will be verified with an electronic 
certificate which is created during the initial community based certification system 
discussed in the previous section. As mentioned earlier rural banks are limited to 
specific localities and therefore needs ARB Apex bank as an intermediary when they 
have perform transactions which involve different localities.  
Figure 8.3 illustrates the verification of a certified customer‟s identity. Currently if a 
customer of one bank goes to another bank to perform a transaction the customer has to 
provide identification to the bank as a non customer would. In the case of the RBIM, if 
the customer has been accredited by the ARB Apex bank then the customer can use this 
accreditation to certify their identity.    
8.7 Customer Authority Verification 
The RBIM uses the Personal Identification Code (PIC), Transaction Authentication 
Code (TAC) and the Transaction Verification Code (TVC) to verify the identity of 
Rural Bank Rural Bank 
Digital 
Certificate 
Digital 
Certificate 
ARB Apex Bank 
Figure 8.3 Verification of a Certified Customer 
Customer 
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customer and source documents. Currently when an account holding customer goes to 
the bank, identification is by the matching the person to a photograph. For the bank‟s 
customer the photograph which the bank matches against the person is what was 
provided by the customer during account opening and is already on their system. This 
mechanism is maintained but in an enhanced form where the digitised photograph of 
the certified customer is kept on the secure ARB Apex bank server and retrieved for 
use by rural banks. To ensure the transaction has been initiated by the legitimate 
customer and Personal Identification Code (PIC) is required to be entered by the 
customer. 
The RBIM introduces the Transaction Authentication Code (TAC) to identify non 
account holding customers. Currently they do not have photograph with the banks, so 
documents like a passport or a voter‟s identification card with a photograph is required. 
Passport and other government issued documents have been shown earlier to be 
unreliable in chapter 5. They in most cases represent a single point of failure since they 
are trusted to be reliable documents but are not.  
Transaction Verification Code (TVC) is the means introduced to verify source 
documents. Currently the only means verifying whether a cheque is genuine is the 
customer‟s signature and cheque number. Now as mentioned in the fraud scenarios in 
chapter 6, if a person presents a fraudulent cheque to cash at a rural bank, a Forged ID 
document or a “genuine” ID obtained with a false identity there would be no way to 
trace this person except.  
As discussed in chapter 3, the Clark-Wilson model indicates that separation of duties 
requirement should insist the initiator of a well formed transaction be different from the 
executor. In the case of rural banks there isn‟t a reliable way to verify that the 
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transaction was truly initiated by the genuine customer due to the highly unreliable 
means for verifying a customer‟s identity. In addition an employee can masquerade as a 
customer and an employee to initiate and execute a fraudulent transaction as shown in 
scenarios 1 and 2 in chapter 6.  
Mechanisms are therefore needed to deal with this serious flaw where the bank cannot 
reliably identify the transaction originating customer. The integrity model looks at 
various ways that people can be identified more reliably using one time use Transaction 
Authentication Code (TAC). It also uses the Transaction verification Code (TVC) to 
reliably verify that documents authorising the initiation of transaction are genuine.  
8.7.1 Personal Identification Code /Transaction Authentication Code 
The concept of a PIC/TAC is basically verifying authority to perform a transaction on 
an account by what you know based on the adinkra symbols. Being a set of pictorial 
traditional symbols it is expected to be easier for the rural community to use than 
Arabic numerals because majority of the rural population are illiterate. 
 Certified customers will have a PIC which is unchangeable. This is a four adinkra 
symbol code that certified customers will use to identify themselves every time they go 
into the bank. Third party customers on the other hand will use a onetime use TAC for 
verification of third party customers and to confirm they have the authority to perform 
the transaction. Certified customer are customers who have been certified by the ARB 
Apex bank using the community based identity verification system. Third party 
customers on the other hand are customers requesting transactions on accounts which 
are not theirs. A TAC is also set of four Adinkra symbols. Figure 8.4 shows the 
operation of the customer verification processes.  
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There are a total of eighty of these symbols representing various aphorisms. The RBIM 
however will use twenty symbols that are most used by artisans like traditional 
jewellers and printers. The principle of the TAC is that when a third party customer 
requires performing a transaction on another person‟s account, they need to show prove 
authorisation from the account holder. This is done by presenting a valid TAC for 
verification.  
An account holder would be issued with a unique set of TACs for the purpose of 
identifying third party customers. The objective of TACs is to help employees identify 
who has legitimate authority to request a transaction on an account. This would prevent 
criminals be it employee or an outsider from cashing fraudulent cheques either in the 
form of a forged leaflet or by stealing a genuine leaflet and forging a signature. To cash 
a fraudulent cheque a criminal would have to breach the cheque security, be able to 
forge a signature and breach the TAC security. 
Prospective 
customer 
Third party 
customer 
Certified 
Customer 
RURAL 
BANK 
Issues cheque + TAC 
Certification 
Presents cheque + TAC 
Presents cheque + PIC 
Figure 8.4 Customer Identification Verification System 
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When a cheque is issued to a third party the customer gives the cheque recipient a TAC 
which is an authentication number to present along with the cheque to the bank. This 
person presenting the cheque enters the TAC by pressing a combination of Adinkra 
symbols on a key pad in the particular order given. The TAC is then hashed and 
matched with the hashed value linked to the specific account on the banks secure 
server. 
PICs are used in the same way as a TAC but since it is a code for the certified customer 
it does not change with every transaction. When a certified customer goes to a bank 
they enter their PIC and the hashed value is matched against that stored on the banks 
secure server for the said identity and account. 
One time use TACs are random numbers translated into sets of four Adinkra symbols 
and issued to customers. Each Adinkra symbol will be given a numeric value hence 
when it is entered onto a keypad it is translated into a number for hashing. TACs are to 
be issued separately by the bank to customers and a one way encrypted version is kept 
on a secure server in the bank and tied to a customer‟s account. TACs would not be 
linked to individual cheques because it is not meant to verify a cheque. TACs would be 
issued separately in batches to the account holder to be issued randomly to third party 
customers by the account holder as a means of verifying their authority to perform 
transactions on their account. 
TACs are therefore going to prevent fraudsters using deception to assume the authority 
to perform a fraudulent transaction.   
Also using the twenty most used symbols to create the TAC identification system 
would give a total of 20
4
 possible combinations giving a total of 160,000 TACS! The 
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probability of guessing a TAC is 0.00000625 and far lower and more secure than the 
current 4 digit PIN system in use.  
8.8 Customer Authorisation and Transaction Verification Code (TVC)   
The transaction verification code (TVC) is used as a means to verify the authenticity of 
cheques and to avoid forgery which banks officials claimed has recently been on the 
increase. Fraudsters have been able to reproduce cheques which bank employees have 
not been able to detect. In the RBIM model every cheque would bear a TVC which is a 
machine readable number randomly generated and printed on the cheque. When 
cheques are presented they would be scanned to read TVCs which would be hashed and 
matched to numbers on a secure server in the banks for authorisation before 
transactions can be processed. Generating TVCs would be done by an automated 
system writing the hashed version on to the customer‟s account whiles electronically 
transmitting the plaintext version to secure printers to be printed on cheques.       
8.8.1 TVCs, Transaction Authentication and Non repudiation 
The other main objective of a TVC is to prevent account transactions without a valid 
paper trail (cheque). A transaction without a valid TVC cannot proceed. It therefore 
increases the difficulty for an employee of a bank to fraudulently withdraw money from 
customer account without the customer‟s cheque. Even if an employee has the relevant 
permissions assigned to make an account withdrawal, it cannot be done without a valid 
TVC.  
One other objective is to reduce the likelihood of non repudiation. Transactions can 
only be performed on an account with a document with a valid TVC. Hence for a 
transaction to have been performed then it is almost certain that the cheque is a genuine 
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leaflet from the customer‟s cheque book. Combined with third party identification 
procedures (See TAC) in the model it can be verified whether a cheque was cashed by 
the customer or a third party.    
8.9 Transaction Security 
In the RBIM users are only allowed to modify data with a well formed transaction. 
Well formed transactions prevent users from entering or modifying information within 
an information system in an arbitrary way. The two main ways where integrity can be 
achieved in commercial system involves the use of a well formed transaction and 
separation of duties (Clark and Wilson, 1987). Well formed transactions preserve the 
integrity of information and keep enough data on transactions to be able to reconstruct 
the transaction.  
Various mechanisms in addition to the identity management mechanisms described 
above are considered to help achieve this property. They include separation of duties, 
atomicity and public key encryption. 
Just like in the Clark – Wilson Model, the RBIM uses the structure of the transaction to 
ensure internal consistency of the information stored on computer systems.  
Separation of duties is a mechanism that prevents having several tasks in a transaction 
fall into the hands of an individual. It is a mechanism aimed at ensuring the 
correspondence of data objects within an information system and the real world objects 
they represent (Clark and Wilson, 1987 , Nash and Poland, 1990).  
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8.9.1 Separation of duties and fraud prevention 
As mentioned earlier the integrity model implements separation of duties in three forms 
namely static and dynamic separation of duties to ensure that possible fraud within the 
same transaction does not occur. In these two forms of separation of duties conflicting 
tasks in a transaction must not be assigned to the same role. Secondly, where an 
individual is assigned more than one conflicting permissions then the conflicting 
permissions must not be executed within the same transaction. 
The third is an object based separation of duties constraint that has to do with the use of 
conflicting tasks on the same object. This introduces some Chinese wall policies into 
separation of duties. An individual cannot execute two conflicting permissions in 
different transactions on the same object.  
8.9.1.1 Static separation of duties  
As is currently in rural banks, there are certain tasks that would hardly be assumed by 
certain types of staff. An example would be the authorization role of the manager 
would never be assumed by a clerk. There is no justification in including these 
permissions in a clerk's set of permission in a role based access environment that the 
integrity model operates. Since tasks like these are permanently in conflict and would 
never overlap they are separated by static separation of duties mechanisms. 
8.9.1.2 Dynamic separation of duties  
On the other hand there are roles that can easily be assumed by clerks in a situation say 
when a colleague is taken ill and cannot turn up for work. It is prudent to put these 
mutually exclusive permissions in the same role but to regulate their use with dynamic 
separation of duties mechanisms which would prevent a user from exercising two or 
more mutually exclusive permissions in one transaction. 
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8.9.1.3 Object based separation of duties  
The integrity model uses object based separation of duties to prevent possible fraud 
occurring using more than one unrelated transaction. This form of fraud prevention 
technique does not automatically prohibit certain combination of transactions, rather 
tasks are deemed conflicting based on the context. In such a case where two or more 
tasks are thought to be conflicting additional authorisation and controls would kick in 
before the transaction can proceed.  
Implementation of object based separation of duties in the integrity model introduces 
elements of the Chinese wall security policy which excludes a user from certain 
privileges based on the user‟s prior activity. Object based separation of duties is used to 
regulate situations when users exercise permissions which have been legitimately 
assigned but creates a conflicting situation when used on the same object. Such 
permissions could be in mutually exclusive roles in separate transactions at different 
times hence would not be picked up in static or dynamic separation of duties.  
There are known cases where employees have used the assigned permissions 
legitimately when in one role and also exercised other permissions legitimately in other 
roles but together these permissions exercised on the same object poses a security risk. 
An example of high profile fraud perpetrated using normally non-mutually exclusive 
transactions is the Mckenzie Bank of Scotland fraud case (Lister, 2006 , BBC, 2006). 
Mckenzie opened fictitious accounts and then used then to apply for loans totalling £21 
million. 
With rural banks using job rotation as a means of ensuring security, there is a high risk 
of employees using the various positions assigned to them and the permission that go 
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with them to perform various transactions to commit fraud or as a cover up of 
fraudulent transactions. 
In object based separation of duties employees (subjects) are unauthorized to perform 
transactions on accounts (objects) that is in a state which might be in conflict with the 
current transaction. The state of the object is the combination of three elements namely 
the data object in question, the type of transaction and subject performing the 
transaction. This is referred to as the RBIM access control triple.  
Conflict here is between the history of access control triple with regards to that 
particular object (customer account) and the access control triples of the current 
transaction with regards to the same object. The principle of putting together the history 
of transactions to determine level risk makes use of the principle of aggregation where 
adversaries put bits of information together to get the bigger picture. Here the focus is 
on putting transactions together to commit fraud rather than putting data objects 
together.   
Given a state of an access control triple for an object which puts it at higher conflict 
with a current transaction the implication will be that it is easier for the employee to 
commit fraud. The level of conflict indicates the level of risk the current transaction 
poses. If the risk of a current transaction is higher, the level of security requirements for 
the transaction to proceed would be increased or set to a higher level and would require 
a higher level of authorisation or scrutiny. 
In other words a series of transaction by a subject on an object should determine 
whether the subject can have further access of a particular type in the future. The issue 
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would not be who you are but what you have done and whether you have the 
opportunity to commit fraud.  
For a subject S1 who has performed transactions T(1......n) on an object O1, if S1 wants to 
perform a transaction Tc, the conflict C will be between the 
C= f [S1O1T(1.....n)] – f [S1O1Tc] 
C= f [S1O1(T(1.....n) –Tc)] 
The level of conflict with respect to a specific object and subject will depend on the 
historical transactions of the subject on the object and the current transaction. 
The tranquillity principle is used in dealing with object based separation of duties. It is 
however not in terms of upgrading or downgrading the security level of the object that 
has been accessed by a subject. Rather it is used to upgrade or downgrade the level of 
conflict between a history of a user and a current transaction. When an employee 
performs a transaction that is in conflict with another transaction, the security 
requirement to perform the second transaction is increased. Object based separation of 
duty is to help deal with any opportunity that could arise to commit fraud.  
8.9.1.4 Distance and Conflicting Transactions  
Distance as used in the new access control model for data mining environments to 
measure the severity of conflict (see chapter 3). This principle is used to deal with over 
classification in the RBIM. The problem with object based separation of duties is that 
employees could easily be eliminated from performing any transactions with time 
because they would have performed every transaction on an account. In rural banking 
there are small staff numbers and the implementation of the object separation of duties 
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constraint could be a serious problem where the transaction history of bank staff can 
progressively put each member of staff in a position where every transaction is in 
conflict with the current transaction.   
In the object based separation of duties, conflict is determined by the historical 
transaction by the subject on the object and the current transaction the subject requires 
performing. So given the historical transaction T1...n and current transaction Tc, the risk 
rating which depends on the level of conflict which is a function of the two will be;  
R = f(T1...n, Tc) 
Where 
R = Fraud Risk  
 T1...n = Transaction history 
And Tc = Current transaction c 
What is proposed is that aside the subject‟s transactions there would have been other 
intervening transactions by other subjects which may reduce the risk. An example will 
be if an employee opened an account and the customer has been handled by other staff 
then the risk of it being a fictitious account will be reduced. This is because it is 
expected that other employees would have verified the existence of the customer. On 
the other hand if there has not been any intervening transaction which could have 
possibly answered some questions then it must be flagged as a high risk transaction 
requiring additional authorisation. 
The fraud risk therefore becomes;  
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R = f(T1...n,|OH, Tc) 
Where 
R = Fraud Risk 
 T1...n = Transaction history 
Tc = Current transaction c 
OH = Objects history 
And  T1....n,|OH = Transaction history of given an object history (OH)  
As mentioned earlier the level of conflict determines the level of risk and this would be 
the basis for determining the level of authorisation or scrutiny required to get the 
transaction in question processed.  
Different levels of risk would have a different authorisation requirement. When the 
current fraud risk is determined the corresponding level of authorisation would be 
required to ensure the transaction proceeds. Object based conflict rules would be 
determined to reflect the risk management policies which are based on a risk 
assessment, risk rating of the staff and other prevailing factors like the number of staff 
etc. 
8.9.2 Atomicity in Transactions  
The concept of splitting a transaction process into smaller tasks with each task given to 
a separate person has been shown to be a reliable security mechanism. However there 
are risks that arise when the breaking up of transactions create risk transactions that 
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give criminals the opportunity to commit fraud. These transactions are able to bypass 
controls and give opportunity for fraud.  
The integrity model therefore has an atomicity requirement. This requires a minimum 
set of subtasks to be completed before a task is deemed valid. An atomic task should 
include enough sub tasks to ensure that all any information entries or changes on the 
computer system matches real world objects they represent and the intensions of all 
stakeholders of the objects.   
8.9.3 Account Transfer Keys  
Interbank and inter account transfers were also identified as a source of fraud and it is 
important to ensure that inter account transfers do not end up in the wrong as a result of 
errors or a deliberate attempt to commit fraud.  
A public key encryption protocol is a reliable way to achieve this. When a customer 
requires to make an inter account transfer in the same or different bank, the recipient 
would in addition to giving the customer an account name, the bank branch and an 
account number, an account transfer key (ATK) which is the recipients public key. The 
recipient bank branch code, recipient account holders name and account number, 
senders name and amount would be encrypted and sent over the network.   
When the message is received it would be decrypted with the accounts private key and 
can only default into the right account. If the details do not match to an account then 
the transfer would be rejected and returned immediately. Also to achieve optimum 
results it would require the payee to personally enter the ATK. This would eliminate 
the risk of the employee entering the wrong key.  
 201 
8.10 Validation of RBIM 
As discussed earlier, security requirements could be validation to ascertain that the 
right system is being built and that the system implements the requirements. A 
validation process could be done formally or informally. Validation is necessarily an 
informal process since only human judgment can determine if the system that was 
specified and built is the right one for the job (Kuhn et al., 2003).  
The RBIM was validated informally using rural and commercial bank staff. Brain 
storming was used as an informal means to discuss the model and to refine it. The final 
model was then informally validated by running the fraud scenarios discussed in 
chapter 6. This was done to see how the RBIM will deal with those of fraud scenarios. 
Generally the RBIM had mechanisms to deal with all the fraud scenarios except for 
one. This was fraud scenario 19A. Also fraud scenario 19A was not prevented because 
the RBIM could not detect the amendment of the amount on a cheque which has been 
issued to a third party.  
The validation process involved two discussions each with four rural bankers and a one 
commercial banker. A total of 10 discussions were made with five members of staff 
aimed at refining the model and the other five aimed at validating the design. Various 
suggestions were made during the discussions and amendments were subsequently 
made to the original designs. The designs changes include the inclusion of a PIC to 
eliminate the weakness of using a photograph and a signature for identification and 
verification of a certified customer.  
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The various fraud scenarios and the mechanisms that deal with then have been shown 
in a table in Appendix E. This table shows the weakness in the system that enables the 
fraud to take place and the prescribed mechanism to deals with it.  
8.11 In Summary 
The Rural Banking Integrity Model was presented in the chapter as it presents a simple 
fraud control model that is aligned to the culture of the rural Ghanaian community. It 
presents a robust identity certification system that uses traditional community 
structures. It also presents the use of authentication codes that uses traditional pictorial 
symbols that can tie the various elements within the banking system. Other mechanisms 
together with the ones mentioned earlier are used to reduce deception that lead to fraud 
are also presented. Informal validation showed the RBIM to be an effective design that 
can deal with fraud.   
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Chapter 9 
 
 
9 Conclusions  
The research concluded that conventional risk management and fraud and banking 
controls would not work in the rural banking industry in Ghana and that the Rural 
Banking Integrity Model as a fraud control model that is designed to meet the needs of 
the rural banking industry.  
The research work has covered various aspects of fraud and fraud control in the 
Ghanaian rural banking industry. Fraud was dealt with as an operational risk problem 
and it was therefore looked at from the point of view of business processes that deliver 
rural banking services. As was shown during discussions, a holistic view was however 
taken analysing the rural banking system and its environment. All the questions that the 
research sought to answer were adequately answered and it presented a better 
understanding of the manifestation of the nature of fraud.  
9.1 Nature of Rural Banking Industry 
During the course of the research work the rural banking industry was critically 
analysed. It was shown that the industry is unique and that has it has its strengths and 
weaknesses. A discussion of the regulatory framework revealed that it primarily 
 204 
determines the nature of rural banking. It does that by restricting its operations in terms 
of geographical location and the type of business operations rural banks can pursue. 
Other characteristics like the structure of the industry and individual banks was shown 
to have an impact on fraud and the effectiveness of fraud control mechanisms like 
separation of duty.  
It was clear that conventional banking controls cannot be effective against fraud in rural 
banks due to various reasons. Conventional practices have their weaknesses and also 
the nature of the rural banking system make it difficult to use these practices. Some of 
the weaknesses identified in conventional banking control were the unreliability of 
signatures, cheques and the ability to circumvent controls. Other weaknesses that were 
as a result of the nature of the rural banks and these include the absence of street names 
and fixed addresses and documents like bills as a means of identity verification, 
unreliability of photo ID documents in Ghana. It was also seen that the lack of 
education and familiarity with technology could be a disadvantage in implementing 
certain mechanisms.  
Due to the nature of the rural banking industry there is some systemic vulnerability that 
makes it difficult to implement conventional fraud control mechanisms. Some of these 
weaknesses are that banking processes had to cross organisational boundaries making it 
difficult to assign control responsibility. The other weaknesses involve small staff sizes 
of rural banks which reduce the ability to use separation of duties thought to be critical 
to fraud control. The environment of rural banks was also critically discussed as a 
source of threat and opportunity to dealing with rural banking fraud.  
9.2 Scenarios 
The research was able to identify various ways in which fraud could be manifested 
within the rural banking industry. In doing so 20 fraud scenarios were presented with 
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the help of the experienced bankers in the industry. In analysing how these scenarios 
could be perpetrated it was realised that the lack a reliable tie between the physical 
elements of banking operations and the records was the main problem that enabled 
fraudsters to create a deception for the fraud.   
9.3 Annual Loss Expectancy (ALE) Model 
The ALE which is a main means for assessing risk was not used in the study of rural 
banking fraud risk. The ALE model involves assessing risk in terms of its likelihood 
and impact. This model was however thought to be inappropriate for this purpose 
mainly because there is a wide range of fraud risk events that could occur and historical 
events could not be used a means of predicting future events. Therefore to use the ALE 
model would involve mainly subjective values. A vulnerability analysis was rather used 
to determine all reasonable weaknesses. A holistic fraud mitigation system was then 
developed. This method was desirable because weaknesses can be exploited in different 
ways to commit fraud and dealing with the weaknesses deals with the various known 
and unknown forms it can be exploited.  
9.4 Fraud Control and Security Models 
It is proposed that internal controls which is the best means for dealing with fraud is 
best implemented when users cannot have the discretion to abide by it or not. Further to 
this, information security is put forward as the best means to enforce internal controls 
in a computer dependent industry like banking. It therefore suggests that computer 
security techniques must be seen as a tool in the managing operational risks.   
Several security models were analysed as a means analysed to adopt useful 
mechanisms to develop a fraud control system. The role based access control 
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framework and the Clark-Wilson security model informed much of the design of the 
rural banking integrity model however many other security models provided useful 
techniques to deal with risks identified. Mandatory and discretionary access controls 
were discussed. Mandatory access controls were thought to be more appropriate in 
enforcing a fraud control system and to enforce organisational policy than a 
discretionary access control models.  
Whilst multilevel security was originally developed for military systems it has various 
principles like over classification and tranquillity that were useful in the development 
of the RBIM. Other multilateral security principles as implemented in the Chinese Wall 
Security Model and its derivatives also provided useful techniques for dealing with 
separation of duties issues.    
As was shown in chapter three, role based access controls reflect the nature of 
organisations and so gives a good means for structuring security controls. On the other 
hand it does not give a high level of abstraction when it comes to dealing with the 
threats. The RBIM however gives a model with a higher level of abstraction for dealing 
with the risk of fraud in the rural banking industry.  
9.5 Rural Banking Integrity Model (RBIM) 
Having analysed the threats of the rural banking industry, the Rural Banking Integrity 
Model (RBIM) is presented as an innovative model for dealing with fraud risks. It 
introduces community based mechanisms for identification and authentication codes 
based on set of traditional symbols for authentication. It also deals with various issues 
ranging from managing conflicting tasks to user authentication that could be exploited 
to commit fraud. It also incorporates the fraud prevention controls into the transaction 
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process in such a way that members of staff do not have the discretion to abide by it or 
not.  
Also each individual control mechanisms used in the RBIM is a necessary condition to 
execute part of a transaction. When all the control mechanisms act together they 
become sufficient for a transaction to be successfully completed.  
9.6 Identity Certification and Verification 
Identity verification and management was seen as one of the main issues creating risks 
within the rural banking industry. The community based identity certification is 
proposed as a solution to this particular problem.  
 It was shown in chapter two that personal identity is a social construct and with such 
strong community identity in rural Ghana it becomes natural to use the community as 
the mean to verify customer identity. The community based identity certification is 
therefore used in the RBIM as a means to achieve that. In this certification mechanism, 
certified family or community leaders are used to certify the identities of people 
thereby staking a family or a trade association‟s reputation on the certified customer.  
9.7 Verification of Authority 
It was seen that the main vulnerability that enables fraud is that fact that records cannot 
be meaningfully tied to the physical person, resource or genuine authorisation that they 
represent. Also the current mechanism for identifying the identity of a customer and the 
authority to perform a transaction is a signature but this is thought to have a 0.3 risk of 
forgery. This is by far higher compared to the 0.001 probability of guessing a 
traditional four digit numeric PIN is used.  
 208 
Rural communities being largely illiterate and having their own traditional symbols, the 
Adinkra system of symbols was used in the RBIM. A 4 code personal identification 
code/transaction authentication code (PIC/TAC) is used in the RBIM. Using 20 
Adinkra symbols the probability of guessing a PIC/TAC correctly reduces to 
0.00000625 making it even more secure than the traditional PIN. 
Also the Transaction Verification Code (TVC) is proposed as a means of verifying the 
authenticity of cheques and other source documents.  
These mechanisms are all aimed at tying the various components of transactions to 
each other and removing opportunity for deception.   
9.8 Separation of duties (SOD) 
Static, dynamic and object based separation of duties are used in the RBIM to deal with 
conflicts which could lead to fraud risk. In object based SOD the level of conflict 
should be a function of the previous activity by a particular employee on an account 
and the current transaction that the employee wants to perform given all other 
transactions performed on the said account. In the use of object based separation of 
duty, the level of conflict indicates the level of risk. Hence the measurement of the 
conflict or risk would be used to indicate the level of authorisation required for the 
transaction to go through.  
9.9 Compliance and Governance 
It is clear that the threats faced by organisations directly affect the ability of these 
organisations to achieve their stated goals. Internal control and the maintenance of 
security are seen as a strategic activity which ensures that the objectives of an 
organisation are met.  
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The implication is that mechanisms that are designed to deal with risks should be 
aligned with business goals. Most business functions have come to the realisation that 
the best means achieving success of a strategy largely depend on its alignment with the 
organisation‟s environment and culture (Pearce and Robinson, 2000). The environment 
whether internal or external is always unique and has various characteristics that 
determine that certain mechanisms work better than others. It also presents various 
opportunities to the organisation to take advantage of. The environment however also 
presents some unique threats that must be dealt with. 
It is clear, as discussed earlier, that rural banks face many threats, some being unique 
and others in common with businesses in general and the banking industry in particular. 
The most important issues issue is not the presence of the threat but rather how the 
banks respond to these threats. The best way of dealing with issues of such strategic 
significance is to carve out solutions which take advantage of the environment by 
aligning the solution with the conditions inherent in the environment. The Rural 
Banking Integrity Model does exactly that. It takes advantage of the characteristics of 
the rural banking industry and rural Ghana and design a system that would be able to 
best secure the business interest and support the achievement of their organisational 
goals     
The key here was to first understand the environment in order to take advantage of it. 
This enabled choosing a path that allowed building on the industry‟s capabilities, taking 
advantages of the opportunities available. It also allowed a strategy to be chosen such 
that the impact of the risks inherent in the environment and limitations in the 
organisation are avoided.  
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9.10 Security and Cultural Considerations 
Most often than not systems have been taken from one context and implemented in 
another without modification. The analysis of the rural banking industries clearly 
shows that this does not work since many conventional banking practices will not work 
in the rural banking context. These mechanisms however could work well when they 
are deployed taking into consideration societal, cultural and other contextual 
characteristics. Context was shown to be very important and that standards should 
therefore be modified to suit each system in order to be effective. 
9.11 Fraud as a Systemic Issue 
Fraud control is often thought to be a very targeted exercise that aims at detecting 
ongoing frauds or situations that precede frauds. This aims at knowing all the forms of 
fraud and the events that lead to or enable a person or company being able to profit at 
the expense of the company providing the service. Some of these models use intrusion 
detection and audits to detect and control fraud. This thesis looks beyond specific 
instances of fraud manifestation and adopts the view that fraud occurs as a result of 
systemic weaknesses that allow the creation of deception and reducing these 
weaknesses is the best means for controlling fraud. This view is also adopted because it 
can also deal with unknown fraud instances considering the dynamic diverse nature 
way that fraud is manifest.   
9.12 The Role of Various Actors 
This thesis looks differently at actors within the system with regards to security design. 
It is obvious that actors, either within or outside a system, influence the system with 
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what they do.  The view adopted in this work is not only about what these actors can do 
to influence the system but rather looks at it at two levels.  
The first is the level of control that one has over actors of the system. Internal actors 
have a high level of knowledge and are close to the system and system managers have a 
considerable level of control over these actors within a system. On the other hand 
system managers do not have much control over actors external to the system. They are 
however not only seen as possible malicious subjects but could be taken advantage of 
to improve performance of the system.  
The second issue is the acknowledgement that the characteristics of the system its 
actors and its environment offer limitations and or abilities that must be taken 
advantage of in the process of designing systems to prevent threats. This work clearly 
shows that characteristics of external factors though system managers have no control 
can have as much influence and can become a major player in the operation of a 
security system. The characteristics of rural Ghana are taken advantage of to improve 
security of rural banks. 
9.13 Future Research 
Though the questions that this research sought to answer were all thoroughly answered 
there are some issues that will need to be studied further in the future. These issues are 
discussed subsequently.  
9.13.1 Culture and Security Interactions   
There is no doubt that soft issue such as traditions and culture play a role in 
effectiveness of a security system. Examining the issue of culture and its fusion into 
technology is a very complex undertaking. This is mainly due to fact that human 
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behaviour is very unpredictable and sometimes illogical. There is therefore the need to 
take time to study the subtleties in the subject matter. Further work is also needed to 
determine the extent to which soft issues affect the effectiveness of security and which 
factors must come into play in choosing one mechanism over another. The issues that 
affect the response of people to specific security mechanisms and technologies should 
be researched further to understand which mechanisms will work better in what 
societies.  
9.13.2 Implementation Model 
This research took a variety of mechanisms from various security models and used 
these mechanisms to develop a model for the rural banking industry. This raises the 
issue of composability of these mechanisms. It is not very clear that these mechanisms 
when put together within the context of the rural banking industry would be able 
deliver the level of security anticipated. It would be very useful to have an 
implementation model to investigate the issues of composability of any integrity 
mechanisms and cryptographic algorithms that might be used to implement the RBIM.  
9.13.3 Replication of Work 
There is the need to replicate the work to cover a greater part of the country to improve 
the current RBIM. There is the possibility of subcultures that might require slight 
variation to the designs.  Also the northern part of Ghana was not included in the field 
study and since they are thought to have differences in culture it would be desirable to 
replicate this study in that region especially in order to incorporate their characteristics. 
This is desirable because the rural banking industry and the ARB Apex bank cover the 
whole of the country and the differences in culture must be reflected in the design. 
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9.13.4 Object based separation of duties 
As mentioned earlier object based separation of duty is used in the RBIM to deal with 
separation of duty problems in the rural industry. Further work however is required to 
develop a mathematical model for calculating a value which to represent the level of 
conflict. This value should be such that it can be used to determine what type of access 
should be given to employees. Achieving this model would greatly support separation 
of duty and increase the level of granularity in the separation of duties function. 
9.14 Conclusion  
The research work has added to the understanding of the rural banking industry in 
Ghana in terms of the fraud risks faced and the possible internal controls that can be 
used to deal with these risks. 
A clear description of the risks associated with the operations of rural banks in Ghana 
has been done. A comprehensive and coherent system design has been done to deal 
with the fraud risks of the rural banking industry and if implemented should give 
assurance that the business processes of the rural banks are safe and secure. This design 
has introduced innovative developing mechanisms for managing dynamic role based 
access control and dynamic separation of duties based on the past activities of users is 
also expected to be developed. 
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11 Appendices  
APPENDIX A: Structure of the rural banking industry 
 
ARB Apex Bank 
(Sub regulator and 
facilitator) 
 
Bank of Ghana (Regulates/Supervises) 
 
Customers/Depositors 
 
Rural Banks (135 Individual Banks-
Provides services to public and 
transfer money among themselves 
and with regular banks 
Financiers  
Government of 
Ghana, 
International Donors, 
N.G.O 
Share 
holders(Local 
Communities, 
Bank Of Ghana, 
Other 
Shareholders 
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APPENDIX B: Questionnaire – Rural Banks 
 
This questionnaire is part of a PhD research project to help develop a computer 
security system for the rural banking sector. I would like to mention here that your 
identity or your banks identity is not required in the study and hence would not be 
mentioned in any part of the study. Also any information provided would be for 
academic purposes only and would be treated with utmost confidentiality. 
 
Could you please answer the questions below? 
 
1. How many agencies does your bank have 
…………………………………………… 
 
2. How many members of staff does your bank have 
A) Full time…………………………. 
B) Part time…………………………. 
 
3. Can you provide an organizational chart or alternatively fill the attached table 
with the current staff positions (e.g. Manager or clerk) and show their 
immediate supervisor and their role/function (e.g. counter clerk) within the 
bank; 
 
a.) Head Office  
Authority level Supervisor 
(reports to)  
Description of role and duties within bank  
(e.g. Customer services, account opening 
e.t.c) 
Supervising 
manager  
  
Manager    
Supervising 
accountant 
  
Accountant    
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Projects officer    
Cust. Serv. officer    
Operations Officer   
Clerk   
Clerk   
Other    
Other   
 
b.) Agency 
Authority level Supervisor 
(reports to)  
Description of role and duties within bank  
(e.g. Customer services, account opening 
e.t.c) 
Agency Manager   
Accountant   
Operations Officer   
Clerk   
Clerk   
Other   
Other   
 
4. How do you deal with the job functions for any position if they become vacant 
or an employee has to take a leave or some time off? 
……………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………… 
5. Do you do job scheduling and rotation for your staff     Yes (   )  No (   ) 
 
If the answer to question 5 is yes then answer questions 6, 7 and 8 if not please 
proceed to question 9 
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6. What are the objectives for doing job scheduling and rotation 
……………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
7.  At what intervals do you revise your job schedules or rotate jobs? 
…………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
8. What are the job roles that are distributed among staff in the job schedule? 
................................................................................................................................
................................................................................................................................
................................................................................................................................ 
 
9. Is it possible for a member of staff to perform an activity on behalf of the bank 
other than the ones stated in their job schedule?                    Yes (   )  No (   ) 
 
10. If the answer to question 9 is yes, who would give authorization to the staff to 
perform that activity? 
 …………………………………………………………….     
 
11. If a member of staff performs an activity without authorization are there 
mechanisms to detect it?      Yes (   )  No (   )  
 
12. If the answer to question 11 is yes, what are the ways that your bank uses to 
detect such instances? 
a) ……………………………………………………………………………… 
b)……………………………………………………………………………… 
c) ……………………………………………………………………………... 
d) ……………………………………………………………………………... 
e) …………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
13. Does your bank have specific procedures/guidelines for delivering your 
products and services?     Yes (   )  No (   ) 
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14. What services does your bank provide to the public? (Please tick)       
a) Savings Account   (   ) 
b) Current Accounts   (   ) 
c) Apexlink local Money Transfer (   ) 
d) Efie ne fie    (   ) 
e) Fixed deposit   (   ) 
f) Call Accounts    (   ) 
g) Loans    (   ) 
i) Other ………………………… 
 
15. Please enumerate the processes that your bank goes through to deliver the 
various services mentioned in question 14 in the attached table and the 
corresponding staff position that performs each stage. 
 
16. Do you have problems in adhering to your processes and or Apex Bank 
Guidelines for delivering services to the public?   Yes (   )  No (   ) 
 
17. If the answer to question 16 is yes how you rate the problems you encounter in 
ensuring that your procedures are adhered to (please circle your answer).              
1            2            3             4             5       (where 5 is the highest)  
 
18.   What are the sources of the problems you have in adhering to your 
procedures?  Staff   (   )   Customers   (   )   Management  (   ) Apex Bank   (   )                                                 
(note; you can select more than one group) 
 
19. How do you identify new customers who come to open accounts? 
…………………………………………………………………………………... 
20. When a customer comes to perform a transaction in your bank how do you 
identify him/her? 
……………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………… 
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APPENDIX C: Current Banking Processes 
 
I. Apex money transfer process 
1. Customer request for transfer of money. 
2. Details are checked by the clerk and verified by an officer. 
3. Customer account is debited or pays in cash to teller. 
4. Message is composed on form BO22 and given a MIN. 
5. The message is written and recorded in a dispatch book . 
6. The message is coded independently by two officers using a test key and 
prefixed to the message. 
7. Message is relayed by electronic means and entered in the outward transfer 
register. 
8. Message is typed onto form BO25 and signed by the two officers who coded the 
message and part one sent to the paying bank, part two sent together with an 
interApex/RCB credit advice form BO27 to the zonal clearing centre and part 3 
retained. 
9. Message received decoded and authenticated. 
10. Message entered in receipt book. 
11. Transmitted message to the paying bank and transfer of a fully completed BO27 
attached to part 3 of the BO23 form. 
12. Preparation of the BO24 form by Apex link clerk and transfer to the Teller. 
13. Customer identified by ID payment made. 
14. Money is paid to recipient in cash or into the designated account. 
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ACCOUNT OPENING 
 
II. Identity Verification in Account Opening Process at account holding bank 
 
 
 
Ebo  
(Prospective customer)
  
Tarkwa rural bank 
(bank employee) Customer Account 
Ebo fills an application form, presents 
ID documents and request for an 
account  
ID documents checked Staff member 
satisfied, Identity created and written 
to new account.   
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III. Identity Verification and Account Opening Process from a different bank 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ebo  
(Prospective customer)
  
Tarkwa rural bank  Customer Account 
Ebo presents ID documents  
and request for an account  
ID documents verified,  new identity 
created and written to new account.   
Kumasi city bank 
(trusted intermediary) 
Ebo‟s details and request passed 
on to Tarkwa rural bank 
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ACCOUNT TRANSACTIONS 
 
IV. Paying into account 
  
Ebo  
(Customer)  
Tarkwa rural bank 
teller 
Ebo‟s Customer 
Account 
Ebo presents cash and his account 
details to teller Enter transaction 
details into customer 
account 
Teller stamps pay in slip and 
gives Ebo‟s copy to him 
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V. Third party cheque payment from same bank 
  
Fiifi 
(Customer)  
Tarkwa rural 
bank teller 
Ebo‟s 
Customer 
Account 
 Fiifi presents cheque 
from Ebo and his 
account details to teller Enter debit 
transaction details 
into Ebo‟s account   
 
Teller stamps pay in slip and 
gives Ebo‟s copy to him 
Fiifi‟s 
Customer 
Account 
 
Enter credit 
transaction details 
into Fiifi‟s account   
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VI. Account to Account transfer/payment from different bank 
  
Fiifi 
(Customer)  
Tarkwa rural 
bank teller Apex bank 
 
Fiifi presents Prestea 
bank cheque from Ebo 
and his account details 
to teller 
Cheque passed to 
Apex bank for 
clearing 
 
Teller stamps pay in 
slip and gives Ebo‟s 
copy to him 
Fiifi‟s 
Customer 
Account 
 
Enter credit 
transaction details 
into Fiifi‟s account   
 
Cheque cleared and 
all clear passed to 
Tarkwa to pay 
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VII. Withdrawal from account 
  
Ebo  
(Customer)  
Tarkwa rural bank 
teller 
Ebo‟s Customer 
Account 
Ebo presents withdrawal 
slip/cheque and account details to 
teller Teller checks whether payment can 
be made  
Teller gives money to Ebo 
Transaction acceptable 
Enter transaction details into 
customer account 
 235 
 
VIII. Loan Application Process 
 
  
Customer 
Account 
Project 
Officer 
Ebo Fills and 
presents loan 
application to 
project officer Project Appraises Application 
and passes it on to Loan 
Committee 
Loan is approves and 
passes it on to back office 
for processing 
Customer 
account credited 
Loan Approval 
Committee  
Back office 
clerk 
Ebo  
(Customer)
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APPENDIX D: Rural Banking Integrity Model Processes 
 
 
IDENTITY VERIFICATION 
 
I. Identity Verification in Account Opening Process at account holding bank 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ebo  
(Prospective customer)
  
Tarkwa rural bank 
(bank employee) 
Apex Bank (Apex ) 
Ebo presents ID documents  
and nominate approved referee ID documents checked 
and forwarded to 
Apex for reference  
Request made by Apex bank to 
nominated referee for reference 
(preferable in a face to face meting)
  
Reference passed on to 
Apex to create certificate 
Certificate written to Apex and 
Tarkwa bank secure server to 
enable them open account and 
provide services 
Apex Approved 
referee 
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II. Account opening from the city based bank – Efie ne fie 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ebo  
((Prospective customer)
  
)  
Tarkwa rural bank 
(relying party) 
Apex Bank 
(credentialing party) 
Ebo presents ID documents  
and nominate approved referee ID documents checked 
and forwarded to Apex 
to refereed  
Ebo‟s details passed on to 
nominated referee for reference 
(preferable in a face to face 
meting)  
 
Reference passed on to Apex 
to create certificate 
Certificate passed to Tarkwa 
bank secure server to enable 
them open account and 
provide services 
 
Kumasi city bank 
(trusted intermediary) 
Ebo‟s ID documents and 
request forwarded to Tarkwa 
Rural bank 
Apex accredited 
referee 
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ACCOUNT TRANSACTIONS 
III. Third party cheque payment from same bank and use of TAC 
  
Fiifi 
(Customer)  
Tarkwa rural 
bank teller 
Ebo‟s 
Customer 
Account 
 Fiifi presents cheque 
from Ebo and his 
account details to 
teller 
Enter Ebo‟s account details 
and TAC into secure server 
for verification   
 
Teller stamps pay in slip and 
gives Ebo‟s copy to him 
Fiifi‟s 
Customer 
Account 
 
Enter credit 
transaction details 
into Fiifi‟s account   
 
Tarkwa rural 
bank Secure 
Server 
 
Enter debit 
transaction details 
into Ebo‟s account   
 
Verification of genuine 
cheque 
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IV. Account to Account transfer/payment from different bank TAC 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fiifi 
(Customer)  
Prestea rural 
bank teller Apex bank 
 
Fiifi presents Tarkwa bank 
cheque from Ebo, his PIC 
and TAC to teller in Prestea 
rural bank 
Cheque passed to 
Apex bank for 
clearing 
 
Teller stamps pay in slip 
and gives Fiifi‟s copy to 
him 
Fiifi‟s 
Customer 
Account 
 
Enter credit 
transaction details 
into Fiifi‟s account   
 
Cheque cleared and 
all clear passed to 
Tarkwa to pay 
 
Tarkwa Secure 
Server via 
Apex 
 
Ebo‟s Account details and 
TAC entered for  cheque 
Verification from Tarkwa 
Secure server via Apex 
 
Confirmation of 
genuine cheque 
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V. Paying into different customer account and TVC 
 
 
Fiifi 
(Customer)  
Tarkwa rural 
bank teller Secure server 
 Fiifi presents his bank 
cheque/cash to pay in to 
Ebo‟s account details and 
an ATK to teller 
Enter transaction 
details to secure 
server 
 
Teller gives Fiifi‟s pay – in 
receipt to him 
Ebo‟s 
Customer 
Account 
 
Teller confirms and 
completes the payment 
to Ebo‟s account 
 
Server decrypts and 
verifies the transaction 
details as valid 
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APPENDIX E: Scenarios Testing 
 
 
 
Fraud Type Variation Fraud enabling steps Solution Mechanism 
1. Unauthorised withdrawal A fraudulent origin of transaction request Transaction Verification Code 
 B fraudulent origin of transaction request Transaction Verification Code 
2. Unauthorised Loan A Non presence of cheque/voucher and ID Transaction Verification Code 
Transaction Authentication Code 
 B Non presence of cheque/voucher and ID Transaction Verification Code 
Transaction Authentication Code 
3. Same day reversal A Poor verification of authenticity of reversal Atomicity transactions, Transaction 
Verification Code 
 B Poor verification of authenticity of reversal Atomicity transactions, Transaction 
Verification Code 
4. Job rotation  A Poor identity verification in a/c opening Object based separation of duties,  
Community Based ID Certification  
 B Poor identity verification in a/c opening Object based separation of duties,  
Community Based ID Certification  
 C Poor identity verification in a/c opening Object based separation of duties,  
Community Based ID Certification  
 D Poor identity verification in a/c opening Object based separation of duties,  
Community Based ID Certification  
5. False cheque book request A Fraudulent origin of request  Transaction Authentication Code 
 B Fraudulent origin of request  Transaction Authentication Code 
6. Signatory alteration A Fraudulent origin of request  Object based separation of duties, TAC  
7. Money transfer  A Non secure transfer of transaction details Transaction Authentication Code 
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Fraud Type Variation Fraud enabling steps Solution Mechanism 
8. Account opening  A Initial paying in of deposit    Atomicity   
 B Lack of linkage of a/c opening and pay in Atomicity   
9. Systems admin login  A Conflict of duty  Static separation of duties 
10. Dividend payment A Lack of linkage of a/c details and payment 
request 
Account Transfer Key 
11. Suspense account A delay in transaction completion,  
unauthorised account transaction 
Account Transfer Key 
 B delay in transaction completion, 
 unauthorised account transaction 
Account Transfer Key 
 C delay in transaction completion,  
unauthorised account transaction 
Account Transfer Key 
 D delay in transaction completion,  
unauthorised account transaction 
Account Transfer Key 
12. Teller till A Lack of separation of duties Static separation of duties 
13. Cheque kiting A Lack of cross checking Atomic transaction 
14. Account opening with false ID A Non reliability of ID document Community Based ID Certification 
 B Non reliability of ID document Community Based ID Certification 
 C Non reliability of ID document Community Based ID Certification 
15. Employee ID A Poor due diligence Community Based ID Certification 
 B Poor due diligence Community Based ID Certification 
 C Poor due diligence Community Based ID Certification 
16. Cheque Fraud 1 A Lack of detection forged cheque Transaction Verification Code 
 B Lack of detection forged cheque Transaction Verification Code 
 C Lack of detection forged cheque Transaction Verification Code 
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Fraud Type Variation Fraud enabling steps Solution Mechanism 
17. Cheque Fraud 2 A lack of verification of authorisation of a/c 
holder 
Transaction Authentication Code 
 B lack of verification of authorisation of a/c 
holder 
Transaction Authentication Code 
 C lack of verification of authorisation of a/c 
holder 
Transaction Authentication Code 
 D Lack of detection forged cheque Transaction Verification Code 
18. Cheque Fraud 3 A lack of verification of authorisation of a/c 
holder 
Transaction Authentication Code 
 B Lack of detection forged cheque Transaction Verification Code 
19. Cheque Fraud 4 A Inability to verify of Customer wrote amount Not Solved 
 B lack of verification of authorisation of a/c 
holder 
Transaction Authentication Code 
 C lack of verification of authorisation of a/c 
holder 
Transaction Authentication Code 
20. Customer Repudiation A Lack of proof of ID of person requesting 
transaction 
Transaction Verification Code 
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APPENDIX F: Adinkra Symbols 
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